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Abstract 
 
 
The explosive growth of mobile applications and Cloud computing has enabled 
smart mobile devices to host various Cloud-based services such as Google apps, 
Instagram, and Facebook. Recent developments in smart devices‟ hardware and 
software provide seamless interaction between the users and devices. As a result, 
in contrast to the traditional user, the mobile user in mobile Cloud environment 
generates a large volume of data which can be easily collected by mobile Cloud 
service providers. However, the users do not know the exact physical location of 
their personal data. Hence, the users cannot control over their data once it is stored 
in the Cloud. This thesis investigates security and privacy issues in such mobile 
Cloud environments and presents new user-centric access control techniques 
tailored for the mobile Cloud environments. 
Most of the work to date has tried to address the data security issues on the Cloud 
server and only little attention has been given to protect the users‟ data privacy. 
One way to address the privacy issues is to deploy access control technique such 
as Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) to control data access 
on users‟ data. XACML defines a standard of access control policies, rule 
obligations and conditions in data access control. XACML utilizes Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) schema to define attributes of data requesters, resources, 
and environment in order to evaluate access requests. A user-centric 
attribute-based access control model using XACML which enables users to define 
privacy access policies over the personal data based on their preferences is 
presented. 
In order to integrate the data security and user‟s privacy in mobile Cloud 
environment, the thesis investigates attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme. 
ABE scheme enables data owners to enforce access policies during the encryption. 
Context-related attributes such as requester‟s location and behavior are 
incorporated within ABE scheme to provide data security and user privacy. This 
will enable the mobile data owners to dynamically control the access to their data 
at runtime. In order to improve the performance, a solution that offloads the 
high-cost computational work and communications from the mobile device to the 
Cloud is proposed. Anonymisation techniques are applied in the key issuing 
protocol so that the users‟ identities are protected from being tracked by the 
service providers during transactions. The proposed schemes are secure from 
known attacks and hence suitable for mobile Cloud environment. Security of the 
proposed schemes is formally analyzed using standard methods. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Mobile handsets have changed human life to a great extend during the last couple of 
decades, and it was one of the biggest inventions of the early 1980s.The recent 
technological advancements in mobile devices and wireless technology enabled 
users to migrate to portable computers such as smartphones and tablet computers 
from traditional desktop computers; hence, users can access online services via 
mobile handsets from anywhere and anytime. This transformation increased the 
user interaction with computers to a great extent. Various new online technologies 
and services are introduced to adopt the change in computer landscape. Mobile 
Cloud computing is one of the emerging technologies where the traditional Cloud 
computing is being transformed to improve the mobile Internet user experience. 
Mobile Cloud Computing is defined as the application of Cloud computing in 
combination with mobile devices over mobile networks [1]. The combination of 
Cloud computing and mobile technology improves the user experience and 
productivity, particularly in the working environment [2], e.g. location-based 
services such as Google Map services via mobile devices provide convenient 
navigation services to mobile Cloud users. All the necessary distance and route 
optimizations are done within the Cloud. Mobile devices are not involved into such 
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high-performance computations. However, this change creates challenges in terms 
of user data security and privacy. Within this context, this thesis discusses the 
security and privacy perspective of this trend and proposes novel algorithms to 
mitigate the risk in identity management and privacy protection. In the following, 
various components of mobile Cloud computing are briefly discussed followed by 
contributions and structure of this thesis. 
 
1.1  Motivation 
The recent technology advancements in mobile communication networks and the 
increasing penetration of smartphones are transforming the mobile Internet and 
empowering the users with rich mobile experience. Today‟s users prefer to access 
online data and services, such as using Dropbox for Cloud storage, and sharing 
photos with friends using Instagram via mobile devices [3]. This trend has fuelled 
the need to transform the traditional Cloud computing into mobile Cloud 
computing that can help to address some of the data processing challenges. 
However, the limitations of smartphones such as onboard computing power, 
battery time, and storage capabilities of mobile devices hamper their ability to 
support the increasing sophisticated application demanded by users [4]. Mobile 
Cloud computing is an emerging Cloud service model that combines the Cloud 
computing paradigm with traditional mobile networks framework. Researchers 
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embrace new paradigm of mobile Cloud computing such as mobile storage as a new 
way to extend the capabilities of mobile devices and mobile platforms, which has 
the potential to impact the business environment and provide more convenience to 
individual's daily life. 
When users are accessing Cloud based services through their mobile devices, the 
Cloud service providers may collect data from the users for service delivery. Most 
of today‟s Cloud service providers work in a collaboration environment. Consider 
the following scenario, an Instagram user can either share his photos with other 
preferred Instagram users, or publish the content on his Facebook page. In order to 
do so, he has to authorize Instagram with certain access rights on his Facebook 
account. There are two security concerns in this scenario:  
 
(1) Identity leakage: Users‟ Facebook identity data will be collected by 
Instagram. Service providers collect user‟s attributes or identity  
related data during the service period. In mobile Cloud computing 
environment, the user‟s real identity can be disclosed without 
permission by a collusion attack from a number of service providers, 
which is considered as a new security threat from mobile Cloud 
computing.  
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(2) Data and Privacy Protection: Users use the Cloud for online data 
storage. The data managed by Cloud service providers consists of 
different types of information, such as identity information, location 
data, and medical records. This information is closely associated 
with user privacy; hence, the access privileges to access this 
sensitive information should be strictly controlled. However, 
existing security approaches are not suitable for protecting the users' 
privacy in a mobile Cloud computing environment. 
 
The above security and privacy issues are new challenges in mobile Cloud 
computing environment. Hence new security solutions are required to seamlessly 
secure the data and online services delivered over the mobile Cloud platform, as 
well as users‟ privacy. 
 
1.1.1  Problems with the Current Technologies 
Existing security mechanisms of current information systems are becoming 
increasingly inadequate for today‟s complex mobile Cloud environments. The 
majority of current security implementations are adopted from the traditional 
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approaches, which are not suitable for mobile Cloud environment [3, 5-7]. The 
major shortcomings of the existing security solutions are summarised below: 
Lack of control for users to protect their data: Service providers often hold and 
process user data. If such data are disclosed or abused by unauthorized service 
providers, the mobile Cloud users may lose their competitive advantage or even go 
out of business. Most of the security solutions implemented by the Cloud providers 
do not allow the data owners to define the necessary access control policies to 
restrict access for the personal data. Hence, tailored access control techniques are 
required in order to restrict data access in Cloud computing in order to protect 
user‟s privacy. 
Lack of protection mechanisms against user identity theft: In general, mobile 
users obtain different services through various Cloud service providers, e.g. when 
a Facebook user launches a third-party app in the Facebook App store, the app 
providers requests the users' identities and data access consent (i.e. to read the 
friendship details, location information or publish data on the personal home page 
etc.) in order to deliver the requested service. Personal data such as friendships 
and location information can be considered as privacy information. Hence, each 
app provider knows the users' partial identity and privacy information from their 
Facebook profile. 
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Today most of the social media apps are accessed from smartphones. Hence it is 
possible to obtain real-time contextual attributes (i.e. location, network 
connectivity, app usage)which are available in mobile Cloud environments. If two 
or more service providers corporate together to combine a user‟s information that 
they hold, the user‟s sensitive privacy information may be illegally shared without 
the user‟s consent. In order to protect the privacy of the individual, untraceable 
identities are required in mobile Cloud computing. The identity management 
solutions should satisfy the requirements that user‟s real identity should be 
protected and be hidden from the service providers. 
The centralized architecture is inadequate: In real life, a number of authorities 
hold different types of attributes for an individual. Higher education institutions 
have people‟s educational records. Hospitals store their patients‟ medical records. 
These organizations can be considered as attribute authorities who maintain a set of 
attributes for the user. However, most of the current implementations have only one 
trusted authority, which acts as the administrator of the whole system, maintains 
identity management and issues decryption keys. It will become a bottleneck of the 
system if there are a large number of users. Storing all users‟ information at one 
central repository is not an ideal solution too. If a Cloud service provider is attacked 
then all sensitive information of the users will be compromised. 
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This thesis focuses on addressing the problems stated above, and proposes robust 
solutions to overcome the current security vulnerabilities in the mobile Cloud 
computing environment. 
 
1.2  Contributions of the Thesis 
This thesis contributes to the development of a framework for identification, 
authorization, and data access control in mobile Cloud computing environments. 
The current security technologies in Cloud environment are examined and a 
context-aware Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (MA-ABE) scheme to 
address the above security issues in mobile Cloud environment is proposed. The 
MA-ABE scheme enables data owners to define access policies during encryption 
and is flexible and practical for mobile Cloud computing environment. A number of 
attribute authorities can work together in a collaboration environment, and issue 
secret keys to the data owner to secure his personal data that is stored in the Cloud. 
By capturing real-time context-related attributes via users‟ mobile devices, a 
security solution can be achieved for authentication and authorization.  
In order to restrict access for users‟ online data, an Attribute-Based Access Control 
(ABAC) Model using Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)  
for mobile Cloud environment is presented. XACML is a privacy access policy 
language which performs access control based on attributes. Using XACML allows 
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access rules to be defined in a policy-oriented fashion, with policies being easily 
updated as rules change and is suitable for mobile Cloud environment. 
 
The following are the major contributions of this thesis: 
- Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption in mobile Cloud 
computing: To protect the individuals data and privacy in mobile 
Cloud environments, the MA-ABE scheme is used to enable data 
owners to define access control policy while storing encrypted data 
in the Cloud. A data requestor can only decrypt the data based on 
his/her attributes. In this scheme, a number of attribute authorities 
maintain different sets of attributes and issue decryption keys for the 
user respectively. Users obtain decryption keys from each authority 
based on their attributes. The model has removed the trusted 
authority which is responsible for monitoring communications and 
issuing decryption keys in existing MA-ABE systems. Thus, it 
improves the security and system efficiency. 
- Incorporation of context-related attributes to conventional ABE 
shceme: The available contextual information in mobile Cloud 
environment is used by data owners during the encryption and 
decryption process, which strengthens the security and privacy 
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protection in a more flexible, user-centric, and fine-grained manner. 
Light-weight cryptographic algorithms are also designed for mobile 
Cloud computing environment. By utilizing the Cloud infrastructure, 
the light-weight cryptographic algorithm offloads the high-cost 
computation and communication overheads to the Cloud.  
- Anonymisation key issuing protocol: Anonymisation techniques 
are involved in the key issuing process. An anonymous algorithm is 
used to mathematically hide users‟ real identity. Thus, identities are 
protected from collusion attacks (see in section 1.1.1) in mobile 
Cloud environments.  
- XACML-based access control model: A user-centric access 
control model for mobile Cloud environment is proposed to address 
user‟s data privacy issues in section 1.1.1. The model is based on the 
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) and 
enables users to define their own access control policies to secure 
their data from unauthorized access. 
1.3  Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of six Chapters in total. Chapter 2 gives an introduction and 
related definitions for mobile Cloud computing, identity, privacy and security 
related technologies. Then main technological building blocks for protecting 
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identity and data security such as cryptographic schemes, security protocols are 
discussed in this Chapter. The existing identity management systems such as .NET 
Passport, The Liberty Alliance, OpenID, Higgins and OAuth are examined in detail 
in Chapter 3. In addition to this the comparisons of the widely used identity 
management systems are also given in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 discusses the guidelines of privacy protection, and discusses the current 
approaches in privacy protection, e.g. solutions for privacy, data access control, and 
then proceeds by explaining the main building blocks required for data access 
control. Several widely used access control models are discussed followed by a 
brief discussion of privacy protection languages. The current schemes of 
attribute-based encryption are also examined. Finally, the requirements and 
challenges for privacy-preserving and data access control for mobile Cloud 
environment are discussed. 
Chapter 5 presents a new user-centric attribute-based access control model using 
XACML for mobile Cloud environments. The proposed framework enables users 
to define their own access control polices for their personal data. Real-time 
attributes are used to secure the data transactions. An attribute authority stores and 
manages all the attributes used in this study. The proof of concept of the proposed 
model is given at the end of the chapter. 
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Chapter 6 proposes three different attribute-based encryption schemes for mobile 
Cloud environments: 1) context-aware single authority attribute-based encryption 
scheme 2) context-aware multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme and 3) 
low-complexity multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme. In the 
context-aware single authority ABE scheme, any context-related attributes that can 
be captured from user‟s mobile devices are used during the encryption. In addition 
to this a context-aware multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme is 
proposed in order to address issues of the single authority scenario. Finally, a low 
complexity multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme is presented to 
offload heavy computation and communication tasks from the mobile device to the 
Cloud. The Cloud infrastructure is utilized to improve the efficiency of 
multi-authority schemes. The algorithm is designed as a lightweight solution which 
can secure the data confidentiality and preserve the user‟s privacy. 
Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the contribution of the thesis and highlights 
the possible future research directions. 
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2 Identity, Privacy, and Security in Mobile Cloud 
Environment 
 
 
 
This chapter reviews the concept of mobile Cloud computing, identity, privacy and 
security as well as outlines important protocols used in this thesis. In particular, 
new issues rose in identity management, privacy and security technologies in 
mobile Cloud computing environment are discussed. 
This chapter is organized as follows: the Section 2.1 describes the concept of 
mobile Cloud computing followed by a case study of identity, privacy and security 
technologies in mobile Cloud environment in Section 2.2. Several security services 
and mechanisms which are currently implemented in mobile Cloud environments  
are outlined in Section 2.3. The conclusions are drawn in Section 2.4. 
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2.1  Mobile Cloud Computing 
2.1.1  Concept of Mobile Cloud Computing 
Mobile devices now provide online data and services to users from anywhere at any 
time. Most of the UK mobile operators have established 3G mobile networks and 
are now moving forward to 4G LTE networks which can provide much better 
performance compared to the 3G networks [8]. The term mobile Internet refers to 
the combination of the mobile communication and Internet [9]. Hence, mobile 
users can enjoy much better mobile data services via mobile Internet.  The number 
of smartphone subscribers within the UK is more than 50% of standard mobile 
users in 2013 and it is predicted to reach up to 75% by 2016 [10]. Due to the 
development of wireless communication technology and Web application 
technology, mobile Internet provides endless space for mobile network and a 
platform for developing new Internet-based technologies. 
Online services for mobile devices are designed using the end-to-end principle. 
Data and services transactions are taken place between the service providers and 
end-users. It is coupled with Internet-based technologies through certain standards, 
such as Extensible Markup language (XML) [11], JaveScript Object Notation 
(JSON) [12], and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [13] etc.  In today‟s 
market, the majority of “smart devices” are mostly based on Apple iOS [14] and 
Google Android mobile Operating Systems (OS) [15]. They provide powerful 
solutions for mobile platform to satisfy the growing requirements of mobile users. 
Developers can freely design innovative mobile applications for mobile users. 
Apple announced that there are over 75 billion downloads from the AppStore by 
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June 2014 [16], and over 1.3 million apps available for iOS devices by September 
2014 [17]. Meanwhile, Google Play reached 25 billion downloads with over 
675,000 apps by 26th September 2012 [18].Google did not release further data on 
the number of app downloads in the Play market. However, the Play market beats 
AppStore with over 1 million apps in 2013 [19]. The AppBrain provides real-time 
number of available apps in Google Play market [20], and there are 1432174 
applications available in the Google Play market as of 17th December 2014. These 
mobile apps give great convenience to people‟s life. Users are increasing the 
demand of any sophisticated applications to do more work on their mobile devices. 
The latest advances in mobile communication networks and the increasing 
penetration of smartphones are transforming the mobile Internet and are 
empowering end users with rich mobile experience [4]. However, the limited 
onboard computing, energy and storage capabilities of mobile devices are 
hampering the ability of smart devices to satisfy such demands. For instance, it is 
impossible for a hotel reservation app to run at the smartphones as stand-alone 
software. Because a user has to download a huge size database which stores all 
related information, and the cost of operations such as search, update and reserve 
from such apps are heavy. In order to address these limitations, Cloud computing is 
identified as a possible solution [21]. 
 Cloud computing has been widely recognized as the next generation‟s 
computing infrastructure. It offers some advantages by allowing users to use 
infrastructure, platforms, and software provided by Cloud servers at low cost [22, 
23]. It represents a new paradigm shift in Internet-based service that delivers highly 
scalable distributed computing platforms in which computational resources are 
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offered “as a service”. In addition, Cloud computing enables users to elastically 
utilize resources in on-demand fashion. As a result, mobile applications can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management efforts or service 
provider‟s interactions. With the explosion of mobile applications and the support 
of Cloud computing for a variety of services for mobile users, mobile Cloud 
computing is introduced as an integration of Cloud computing into the mobile 
environment. Mobile Cloud computing brings new types of services and facilities 
for mobile users to take full advantage of Cloud computing. 
In Cloud environment, applications are delivered as services over the Internet. 
The hardware and systems software in the Cloud data centres provide those services. 
When a Cloud is made available in a pay-as-you-go manner to the public, it is 
called a public Cloud; the service being sold is utility computing [24]. Currently 
available public Clouds in the market include Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud 
(EC2), Google AppEngine, and Microsoft Azure. The term of private Cloud refers 
to internal data centres of a business entity or other organization that are not made 
available to the public. Community Cloud is the Cloud infrastructure which is 
shared by several organizations and supports a specific community that has shared 
concerns. Hybrid Cloud is a composition of two or more Clouds (Private Cloud, 
Public Cloud, or Community Cloud) that remain unique entities but are bound 
together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and 
application portability. 
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines fou4 types 
of Cloud deployment models and three service models of Cloud computing [25]: 
Cloud deployment models:   
 Private Cloud: In this model, the Cloud infrastructure is provisioned 
for exclusive use by a single organization comprising multiple 
consumers. It may be owned, managed, and operated by the 
organization. 
 Community Cloud: The Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for 
exclusive use by a specific community of consumers from 
organizations that have shared concerns. It may be owned by one or 
more organizations in the community.  
 Public Cloud: The Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use 
by general public. 
 Hybrid Cloud: In a hybrid Cloud, the Cloud infrastructure is a 
composition of two or more distinct Cloud infrastructures (private, 
public, community) that remain unique entities, but are bound 
together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data 
and application portability. 
 
Service models of Cloud computing 
 Cloud software as a Service (SaaS). The capability provided to the 
consumer to run their application running on the service provider‟s 
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Cloud infrastructure. The consumers are not required to manage or 
control the Cloud infrastructure such as network, storage, or servers. 
Users can access the services from various client devices through a 
thin client interface such as a Web browser (web-based email). The 
applications such as Gmail and Facebook are the popular mobile 
Cloud computing SaaS applications. 
 Cloud Platform as a Service(PaaS). Cloud consumers are able to 
develop and deploy their own applications onto the Cloud 
infrastructure using programming languages and tools supported by 
the Cloud provider. Consumers do not required to manage the 
underlying Cloud infrastructure but have the control over the 
deployed applications and configurations of the application hosting 
environment. The Amazon AWS is one of the emerging PaaS 
product which could be used for mobile Cloud computing. 
 Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The Cloud consumer has 
the ability of processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental 
computing resources where the consumer can deploy and run their 
software including operating systems and applications. The 
consumer does not manage the Cloud infrastructure but has control 
over operating systems, storage, deployed applications and possibly 
limited control of select networking components.  
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Mobile Cloud computing aims at using Cloud computing techniques for 
storage and processing of data on mobile devices to reduce their limitations. It is the 
combination of mobile Internet and Cloud computing [26]. An illustrative example 
of mobile Cloud computing is how a smartphone can best utilize the Cloud 
resources to reduce its energy consumption. A computing task can be either 
executed on the mobile devices or outsourced to the Cloud. Where to compute the 
task is dependent on the overhead trade-offs between computation and 
communication while considering the requirements of applications‟ Quality of 
Service (QoS) and users‟ Quality of Experience (QoE) [27], where the QoS refers 
to the overall performance seen by a customer [28] and the QoE refers to the 
difference between expectations and perceptions for a service from a customer 
[29]. 
Zhang and Yan proposed a QoS framework to manage QoS assurance in 
mobile Cloud computing [30]. They used specific factors for mobile Cloud 
services such as signal strength, mobile operating systems, hardware etc based on 
the core factors such as reliability, assurance, tangibles, empathy, and 
responsiveness. Researchers in [31] proposed a solution which is called 
evidence-based method to measure QoE. They use six factors to provide the 
evidences, which are review design, quality of review, consistency across services, 
directness to services and business users of services, numbers of reviews, and 
other related modifying factors. 
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2.1.2  Advantages of Mobile Cloud Computing 
Mobile Cloud computing improves the performance of many applications on 
mobile devices. By using mobile Cloud computing, the following limitations of 
mobile devices can be mitigated: 
(1) Data storage capacity and processing power: Even though the hardware 
specification of mobile devices is much improved, storage and 
processing power are still the major constraints of the mobile devices. 
For instance, the Instagram [32] service enables mobile users to upload 
photos to Cloud immediately after capturing the images. Users can 
browse all the photos from any supported devices. With mobile Cloud 
computing, users can save energy and storage space of their mobile 
devices. Such services are today successfully implemented by Flickr [33] 
and Facebook [34] too. 
(2) Battery life: Battery life is one of the most important concerns for 
smartphones. With the modern hardware, mobile devices are equipped 
with much more powerful processors, and more memory space to 
process complex computations. However, these new hardware result in 
an increase of energy cost and may not be feasible for all mobile devices. 
Hence offloading complex computations to the Cloud can reduce the 
operational cost of the mobile transactions. In addition it can also help to 
conserve the battery life-time. 
(3) Reliability: Cloud can provide more reliable and effective environment 
to store data and hosting applications compared to the mobile devices. 
Chapter 2. Identity, Privacy, and Security in Mobile Cloud Computing 
 
20 
 
Factors such as the mobile operating system, battery, hardware etc. can 
influence the reliability. Furthermore, the damage or theft of mobile 
devices can cause unexpected loss if data are stored locally. By using 
Cloud, such loss can be minimal since the data are stored and processed 
on the Cloud. 
(4) Flexibility and Scalability: Cloud resources can be consumed in an 
on-demand, fine-grained, and self-service manner. It is more flexible for 
service providers and mobile users to run applications without 
reservation of resources. The deployment of applications can be scaled 
to satisfy the changes for demands of users, and service providers can 
easily update their services without considering resource usages. 
(5) Ease of integration: Mobile users can consume services from different 
service providers since it is easy to integrate multiple services in the 
Cloud.  An example of multiple services integration is that of 
Instagram users who can share their photos on Facebook or Flickr if 
they authorize Instagram with access to their personal data and page. 
 
Due to these advantages, the mobile Cloud computing is largely adopted in 
Mobile Commerce, Mobile Health, Mobile Education and Mobile Gaming 
applications. Such mobile applications are developed in a global mobile market. 
Gartner‟s report says that by β016, nearly 40% of mobile application development 
project will leverage Cloud mobile back-end services [35]. However, there are 
several drawbacks in mobile Cloud computing that needs immediate attention 
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before it can take off in commercial arena. The drawbacks associated with mobile 
Cloud computing are discussed in the next section. 
2.1.3  Issues of Mobile Cloud Computing 
With the advantages discussed above, different types of mobile Cloud computing 
services greatly increase convenience, however, new issues are introduced which 
may affect the QoS and QoE of mobile Cloud computing. 
(1) Network bandwidth and latency: Bandwidth and communication 
latency are big issues in mobile Cloud computing since the radio 
resource for wireless networks is much scarce as compared with 
traditional wired networks. Bandwidth for 3G cellular systems may 
be limited by cell tower bandwidth in some areas with low power 
signal receptions which in turn leads to lower bandwidth and higher 
latency [26]. The incoming 4G wireless network can address this 
issue. Wi-Fi is also considered as a solution, but the performance of 
Wi-Fi depends on the number of mobile users. If there are a large 
number of users, the bandwidth will also be decreased. 
(2) Network availability and intermittency: Constant and speedy 
Internet connection must be ensured in mobile Cloud Computing. 
Mobile users may not be able to connect to the Cloud to obtain 
service due to traffic congestions, network failures and loss of signal. 
In [36], authors proposed a Wi-Fi based multi-hop networking 
system to address this problem. A list of neighbour nodes is selected 
by a user, and if there is a loss of connection, the nodes with highest 
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weight value will continue to receive content. The new Hyper Text 
Markup Language (HTML) 5 comes with a function of data caching 
through mobile devices. It is also possible for mobile Cloud 
application to address this issue. 
(3) Resource poverty of mobile devices: The limited onboard computing 
power and storage spaces were the major issues of mobile devices. 
With the development of hardware, such problems can be resolved 
so that the mobile devices are able to display as much information as 
required to obtain maximum convenience. 
(4) Security concerns: The advancement in technology has also brought 
new security challenges. Everyone wants to protect their personal 
data online. Protecting user privacy and data secrecy from an 
adversary is a key to establish trust in mobile Cloud environments. 
The following two aspects of security related issues in mobile Cloud 
environment should be considered: 
a. Security for mobile user : Mobile users utilize Clouds for 
computing and storage resources. Client applications may be 
required to be installed on the mobile devices. The security 
of the running environment (i.e. operating system) of client 
applications should be guaranteed and protected from threats, 
such as malware, viruses, and Trojans. Meanwhile, the 
design of client application should authenticate the user and 
protect it from being used by unauthorized users. On the 
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other hand, mobile Cloud applications will request user‟s 
real-time context information, such as location-based 
services. Mobile users face privacy issues as service 
providers may use the important personal information for 
marketing purposes without prior permission. 
b. Security at Cloud: Mobile users benefit from storing data 
and hosting applications on the Cloud. Data integrity and 
confidentiality on the Cloud is one of the major concerns. It 
is important that no unauthorized users can reveal the data. 
Secondly, it is necessary to have access control over all of 
the user data on the Cloud. Thus, a user can decide which 
data requester can obtain access and know the purpose of the 
data usage. Thirdly, different service providers may holds 
partial identity information of a user. Avoiding collusion 
attack in mobile Cloud environment is also an important 
issue. 
 
The above issues are main concerns of the mobile Cloud environments. The 
main focus of this thesis is on the data security and privacy issues in the mobile 
Cloud environment and the protection of users‟ sensitive personal information such 
as identities and identity related attributes during electronic transactions. In the 
following sections, a case study for the investigation of current relationships within 
identity, privacy, and security technologies in presented in the context of mobile 
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Cloud Computing in Section 2.2. The current security primitives to protect the user 
identity and privacy in Section 2.3. 
 
2.2  Case Study 
Recall the example used in Chapter 1. If an Instagram user wants to share his photos 
with his friends on Facebook. He needs to authorize Instagram using his personal 
Facebook account details. Figure 2.1 shows the default authorization settings of 
Instagram at a Facebook account. Instagram will ask for the permission to contents 
on Facebook page and access to data at any time. As a result, the user‟s identity 
information and attributes recorded at Facebook are revealed to the Instagram 
service. This is a typical identity information authorization scenario in a mobile 
Cloud environment. 
A mobile Cloud user registers at service provider with a unique identity. For 
example, a user can use his email address as a unique identity to register at 
Facebook. The email identity may consist of a set of attributes such as surname, 
date of birth and place of birth to describe the user. These attributes can be either 
static or real-time. Attributes such as username, home address, date of birth, and 
device IMEI number can be considered as static attributes which will not be 
changed frequently. The identity in mobile Cloud environment normally includes 
real-time contextual attributes such as users‟ location records, time, and nearby 
devices. These contextual attributes can describe privacy information of a user. It is 
a key challenge to protect privacy while securing users‟ digital identities in the 
mobile Cloud environments [37]. 
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It raises an identity security issue that if two such service providers collude 
together, then they can reveal all the user‟s attributes. Existing identity 
management systems, such as OpenID [38], Higgins [39] etc. are designed for 
traditional PC-based Cloud environment, and do not work with all their features in 
mobile Cloud environments. Such identity management systems will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Figure 2.1Authorization Information of Instagram at a Facebook Account. 
 
 In today‟s mobile Cloud environment, mobile apps deliver convenient services 
to the user with good experience. This trend increasingly affects the user privacy. 
Let us take the location-based service as an example. Location-based applications 
are typical mobile Cloud applications. A user wants to book a table at a restaurant 
with best reviews around his current location. He uses a mobile app which has a 
large number of restaurants information stored in the Cloud database, such as 
Tripadvisor [40]. User‟s mobile device captures the current location and sends it to 
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the Cloud service provider hosting the mobile app. The app analyses the location 
and returns the requested results. In order to complete the booking, the user needs to 
give more details about him to the app. During this process, user does not know 
whether such personal details are collected by the app or some other third party 
entities. Furthermore, with a long time usage, the app may have a huge number of 
data based on the user‟s behaviours. The user will not know how his personal 
information will be used and even does not know his data is collected by the mobile 
Cloud service provider. 
Most of the service providers claim that they will only collect anonymous data. 
However, when the service provider has a large number of users, it may sell the 
users‟ sensitive data to a third party who can mine the data to build business models 
for profits [41-43]. Mobile apps can also be used to inject the malwares to users‟ 
phones. Some malwares can even monitor user‟s daily activities [44]. Researchers 
have investigated this issue and proposed solutions in order to prevent collusion 
attacks. Bugiel et al. presented a practical security framework for Android platform 
which addresses the problem of collusion attacks [45]. Their framework can 
monitor application communication channels in Android's middleware. A 
system-centric security policy-based mechanism is deployed to enforce access 
control in Android platform. They also improved the security framework with a 
system kernel module [46], which enables the framework to provide security 
protection at system level. 
The problem of identity security and privacy is to find a balance between user 
convenience and computer security. The best way is not to give any information in 
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order to protect privacy. However, in many cases users are often asked to give some 
personal information during system authentication process to gain access to data 
and services. Researchers have also put efforts to address issues raised above. 
Various access control techniques such as privacy-preserving languages, access 
control models, and attribute-based encryption are deployed to protect users' data. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 details those technologies and gives a literature review 
for related work. 
 
2.2.1  Existing Data Protection Laws 
Privacy protection must control what information about an individual is disclosed 
over the Internet. It includes two aspects: 1) the users should have the control of 
giving data access consents about their personal information to any authorized 
entities (i.e. it determines who can access the data) and 2) the control of how the 
data can be used (i.e. it determines the purpose of data usage).  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also 
published guidelines on the protection of privacy and trans border flows of personal 
data [47].  The guidelines have been used to derive privacy laws governing the use 
of information systems in a number of countries. It introduces eight basic principles 
for data privacy protection which are listed below. 
 Collection Limitation Principle: The collection of personal data and 
any such data should have limits. And the collection means should be 
lawful and fair, and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent 
of the data subject. 
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 Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be relevant to the purpose 
of use, and the extent for those purposes should be accurate, complete 
and kept up-to-date. 
 Purpose Specification Principle: The purpose for personal data 
collection should be specified earlier than the time of data collection and 
the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purpose or such 
others as are not incompatible with those purpose and as are specified on 
each occasion of change of purpose. 
 Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be disclosed, made 
available or otherwise used for the purpose other than those specified at 
the collection time, except with the consent of the data subject or by the 
authority of law. 
 Security Safeguards Principle: Reasonable security safeguards should 
be deployed to protect personal data against such risks as loss or 
unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. 
 Openness Principle: There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. 
Means should be readily available for establishing the existence and 
nature of personal data, and the main purpose of their user, as well as the 
identity and usual residence of the data controller. 
 Individual Participation Principle: An individual should have the right: 
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a) To obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation 
of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him; 
b) To have communicated to him, data relating to him  
I. within a reasonable time;  
II. at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; 
III. in a reasonable manner; 
IV. in a form that is readily intelligible to them; 
c) To be given reasons if a  request made under subparagraph 
(a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; 
d) To challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is 
successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or 
amended. 
 Accountability Principle: A data controller should be accountable 
for complying with measures which give effect to the principles 
stated above. 
The USA government published the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996 [48].  The act addresses the security and 
privacy issues of health data.  The European Union (EU) published the Data 
Protection Directive which regulates the processing of personal data within the EU.  
It defines that personal data can only be gathered legally under strict conditions for 
a legitimate purpose. Organizations who collect and manage user‟s personal 
information must protect it from misuse and must respect certain rights of the data 
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owners which are given in the EU law [49, 50]. In 2013, the European Commission 
proposed a major reform of the EU legal framework on the protection of personal 
data which is aimed at strengthening individual rights and tackling the challenges of 
globalisation and new technologies. 
 
2.3  Security Concepts, Technologies and Mechanisms 
This section examines the current technology building blocks and standards for 
developing security frameworks in identity management. In mobile Cloud 
environment, communications and data exchanges of mobile devices are taking 
place via wireless medium. Similar to Ethernet, three key aspects of information 
security referred to as CIA triad: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability [51] 
must be followed in wireless communication. Additional aspects to security such as 
Non-repudiation, Accountability are also referred to traditional CIA triad [52].  
The key aspects are described below. 
Confidentiality refers to the data concealment, preventing the disclosure of 
information to unauthorized entities. 
Integrity protects information resources form modification and deletion by 
unauthorized parties. It ensures the accuracy and consistency of information 
resources over the life-cycle. 
Availability serves the purpose that the information resources must be 
accessible when it is required. It ensures that the system work promptly and the 
services are not denied to authorized users. 
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Non-repudiation implies the occurrence of an event or an action and the 
participant. A party cannot deny receiving a request and the other party cannot deny 
that it is the sender of the request. 
Accountability implies the actions or decisions which are made by an entity 
are accountable. 
The concepts listed above are necessary requirements for any security 
frameworks. These concepts help to protect the information systems from attacks. 
Security mechanisms are normally designed based on those concepts. 
 
2.3.1  Security Technologies and Mechanisms 
Information systems implement security mechanisms to detect, prevent or recover 
from a malicious attack. It consists of series of security services such as 
authentication, authorization and access control etc. Various security techniques are 
used for these services such as cryptography, digital signatures [53], Transport 
Layer Security(TLS) [54] protocol, and Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) [13]. 
Cryptography is the mathematical approach to secure communication in the 
presence of adversaries. It will satisfy confidentiality of messages. The information 
should not be revealed to any other parties except the intended recipient. Prior to the 
modern age, cryptography is synonymous with encryption. The encryption is one of 
the important areas in cryptographic technologies. The message which contains the 
fully readable information is called plaintext. The encryption process is used for 
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scrambling or disguising the plaintext by applying cryptographic algorithms. A 
ciphertext is generated based on the plaintext after encryption process. The 
decryption process converts the ciphertext to plaintext. It is the reverse of the 
encryption process. A key is required for both encryption and decryption to perform 
cryptographic algorithms. It is a secret value which is sensitive and should not be 
revealed to any other third party. The key normally is a special numerical value 
which is long and large enough to prevent from attacks. 
The current cryptography technologies can be classified by two main 
categories: the secret key technology and the public key technology. In the secret 
key cryptography, the sender and receiver use the same key for encryption and 
decryption. Therefore, the key is shared as a secret by the two ends but is blind to 
the outer world. Different from the secret key cryptography, the public key 
cryptography has a pair of keys, a private key and a public key. The public key is 
open to any one while the private key is only known to the key holder. Either key of 
the key pair can be applied for encryption, but only the other key of the same key 
pair can do the decryption. Based on these two main technologies, several known 
cryptographic mechanisms are described in the following. 
2.3.1.1  Symmetric Cryptography 
Symmetric cryptography is the oldest and best-known cryptographic technique. It 
also refers to the secret key cryptography.  The secret key can be a number, a word 
or a string of random letters. The information system takes as input a secret key to 
the encryption algorithm with the plaintext to generate the ciphertext. Figure 2.2 
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depicts the work flow of the symmetric cryptographic mechanism. There are two 
commonly used types of symmetric encryption algorithms that are listed below: 
Block ciphers takes as input a block of data and encrypt them as a single unit 
with a key. Blocks of 64 or 128 bits have been widely used. Such algorithms are 
implemented in a variety of ways. For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [55] and the triple-DES (Data Encryption Standard) [56]. 
Stream ciphers encrypt the digits (typically bytes) of a message one at a time. 
The stream cipher algorithm proposed in [57] is a widely used model. 
 
 
Figure 2.2Symmetric En/Decryption Process 
 
2.3.1.2  Asymmetric Cryptography 
In symmetric cryptography, securely exchanging the secret keys over the Internet 
or public domains is a critical issue. Users have to prevent from sending them to 
wrong recipients. Asymmetric cryptography is a solution. It is also known to as 
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public key cryptography. Instead of using pre-shared secret keys, every user must 
have a key pair. The key pair consists of two keys: a private key and a public key. 
Both the private and public keys are generated or acquired by owner of the key 
pair. The public key is publicly available and can be used for encryption, 
verification of a digital signature (digital signature will be discussed in the next sub 
section). The private key is secured at the owner and is kept as a secret. In a public 
key scenario, a sender encrypts a message with the recipient‟s public key. The 
receiver who holds the corresponding private key can decrypt the message. Figure 
2.3 describes work flow of the asymmetric cryptographic mechanism. 
There are several existing asymmetric encryption algorithms, the EI Gamal [58] 
and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [59] are the most widely used public key 
schemes. 
 
 
Figure 2.3Asymmetric En/Decryption process 
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2.3.1.3  Digital Signature 
Digital signature supports the non-repudiation aspect of the information exchange. 
In digital signature scheme, a message is signed by the sender using the private key. 
The recipient can verify the signature using the sender‟s public key. The digital 
signature scheme gives an evidence for a recipient to believe that the message was 
sent by a known sender. The sender cannot deny the fact of having sent a message. 
It is used to preserve non-repudiation and authentication. The Digital Signature 
Algorithms [60] (DSA) and RSA [53]are commonly used. 
2.3.1.4  Hash Function 
Hash function is used to provide integrity of messages. A hash function is a public 
function which maps any length of data input into a fixed length output. Given a 
message M of arbitrary length, a hash function H will produce a fixed-sized hash 
value h in a form of h = H(M). h is a hash value of message digest. The properties 
of a hash function [61] are listed as follows: 
One-way property: H(x) is easy to compute h with any given input x, however 
it is computationally infeasible to compute such that H(x) =  h. 
Weak collision resistance: For any given x, it is computationally infeasible to 
find y ≠ x with H(y) =  H(x). 
Strong collision resistance: It is hard to find any pair (x, y) to compute such that 
H(x) =  H(y). 
By applying a hash function, the secret parameters such as password, secret 
keys can be verified based on the hash values of them. It greatly helps for data 
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validation with data privacy. Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is a hash algorithm and 
it was developed in 1993. The cryptography hash algorithm SHA-1 was published 
in 1995 with a maximum input length 264 bits and outputs a 160 bit message 
digest[62]. However, a successful attack on SHA-1 was reported in 2005 [63] and 
in order to avoid these problems, more advanced algorithms such as SHA-2 and 
SHA-3 in SHA family are used in modern day secure communication.  
2.3.2  Protocols and Standards 
2.3.2.1  Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
The Transport Layer Security and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are 
both cryptographic protocols which provide a channel communication security 
over the Internet [64]. It secures the communication channels above the IP layer and 
below the application layer. In a TLS/SSL scenario, asymmetric cryptography is 
used for authentication of key exchange. Symmetric cryptography is implemented 
for data exchange. 
SSL was first developed by Netscape [65], it enables a client-server application 
(normally is a Web browser and a Web server) to exchange data over public 
domains. Data confidentiality and integrity are ensured. The latest version of TLS is 
published in 2008 [54]. 
2.3.2.2  eXtensibleMarkup Language (XML):  
eXtensibleMarkup Language (XML) is a self-descriptive, platform-independent 
markup language. It is free, open standard and resembles a general-purpose version 
of HTML. XML is designed to represent, transport and/or store a range of 
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structured data. It enables users to define their own tags in XML document and is 
widely used for business data share and exchanging in different domains. XML 
parser is a software program that checks the syntax of the XML document and 
makes the XML document‟s data readable to applications. XML schema is a 
method of describing the semantic rules for a XML document to be validated. A 
XML parser firstly checks whether the document is well formed, the term of 
well-formed means satisfy all XML syntax rules. Then the parser will check 
whether the document is Valid, which means satisfied semantic rules that are in 
XML schemas. W3C published the XML specification in 2008 [48]. 
2.3.2.3  Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
SOAP is a standard lightweight transport protocol in Web services used for 
exchanging structured information in a decentralized, distributed environments 
over HTTP protocol. SOAP specification defines, using XML technologies, an 
extensible messaging framework containing a message construct that can be 
exchanged over a variety of underlying protocols [13]. In SOAP message systems, 
different applications can interoperate by negotiating both parties into a common 
data transfer protocol. Typically, a simple SOAP message is enclosed inside an 
SOAP envelope. The envelope contains two main regions such as the SOAP 
Header and SOAP Body.  The SOAP Header contains information about the 
SOAP message and the SOAP Body contains the message payload. 
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2.3.2.4  Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML is an XML-based framework that allows the exchange of authentication and 
authorization information between two Web service domains. There are four key 
elements covered by the SAML specification. 
SAML Assertions: a pack of XML-based data includes one or more statements 
made by a SAML authority. 
SAML Protocols: Defines data structures of request and response messages on 
how to obtain assertions. 
SAML Bindings: Map SAML protocol messages onto standard communication 
protocols, e.g. HTTP. 
SAML Profiles: Describe particular combination of SAML assertions, 
protocols and binding for a particular user case. 
SAML 1.0 was first adopted as a Web standard by OASIS in 2002 [66]. After 
several revisions, in 2005, SAML 2.0 was announced [67]. It has been widely 
adopted by government, higher education and commercial enterprises.  
SAML protocol messages are transported within the SOAP body and SAML 
response has SAML status and one or more assertions. The assertion consists of one 
or more statements which contains a single authentication statement. SAML is 
widely used in federated environment because it enables the functionality that users 
can authenticate themselves in one Web service domain without re-authentication 
in another domain. 
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2.4  Summary 
 
The mobile Cloud technology is a combination of Cloud computing and mobile 
Internet technologies. In general, when a user interacts with a service provider, 
some static user attributes may be gathered by the service provider. However, in 
mobile Cloud environment, not only static attributes but also dynamic user 
attributes such as location records and user behavior are collected by the service 
providers. Hence, this new notion adds various new threats to the user privacy. 
Identity management systems manage users‟ identities; it is also necessary to 
modify the security concepts to cope with the emerging mobile application trend. In 
particular, the current security concepts used in identity management is powerful 
enough for securing data and service transactions. Even though, smart mobile 
devices can use these security features, these is a necessary to develop new 
techniques to protect the privacy of real-time dynamic attributes in mobile Cloud 
environments. 
Due to the nature of mobile Cloud environments, service providers are now 
collecting much more sensitive information about the user with or without their 
consents. Users should have full control over their own data. Security technologies 
such as access control, and cryptography should enable the users to disclose 
personal data based on their preferences. The existing technologies are able to 
secure data transaction and confidentiality, but they cannot cover such new privacy 
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issues in today‟s mobile Cloud environment. Besides security, privacy protection 
has become a critical issue in modern day mobile applications. 
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3 Identity Management Systems 
As the number of mobile Cloud services requiring user authentication continues to 
grow, so does the number of digital identities. To help protect digital identities, a 
range of identity management systems have been proposed to address security 
issues of identity protection and identity management. These proposed systems are 
designed to simplify the management of a large number of identities, meanwhile, 
protect identities against cyber-attacks. This chapter briefly surveys various 
identity management systems in the literature. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The concept of Single-Sign-On (SSO) 
and federation which are implemented today by most of the identity management 
systems is introduced in Section 3.1.  In Sections 3.2-3.6 describe .NET Passport, 
the Liberty Alliance, OpenID, Higgins, and OAuth respectively. A discussion of 
the above identity management systems and literature review is given in Section 
3.7. Finally, the Chapter is concluded in Section 3.8. 
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3.1  Single-Sign-On(SSO) and Federation 
Different online services may be hosted by different service providers.  Users have 
to do the authentication to each service provider separately in order to access the 
different the Cloud services. SSO is a technology that lets users authenticate to a 
single authentication authority once so that they can access all authentication 
protected resources and services without re-authentication within the federated 
environment.  Therefore, one login action enables user access to all the permitted 
resources in a complex system without entering multiple usernames and passwords. 
SSO provides convenience to both the user and service provide. Users do not have 
to memorize many usernames and passwords and at the same time, it also reduces 
the number of authentication requests to the service providers. 
Federation, or Federation of identity, describes the technologies, standards 
which serve to enable identities to obtain access across autonomous security 
domains. A user of one domain can securely access data or services seamlessly 
from networks of other domains. SSO is a subset of the federated identity 
management framework. The user authenticates to the authentication server by 
submitting credentials such as username, X.509 certificate and identity related 
attributes etc. The credential includes the user identity and security information. 
The user identity is known as a federated identity. It is used in order to permit the 
user to gain access across different domains which are covered by the same 
authentication server using the same identity. The authentication server is named as 
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an identity provider . It takes charge of the authentication and authorization and 
maps the federated identity to other user identity credentials.  
SSO not only provides convenience to traditional PC users in the past, but also 
can continue to play an important role in today‟s mobile environment. The 
simplification of identity management delivers excellent user experience in mobile 
environment. Identity management systems satisfy requirements for security and 
user experience in different mobile environment. There are several identity 
management systems in today's market. In the following sections, these identity 
management systems are briefly described in detail. 
 
3.2  Microsoft .NET Passport: 
In 1999 .NET Passport was introduced by Microsoft [68]. In a .NET Passport 
system, the users can access multiple websites using a single set of credentials. 
Microsoft presents .NET Passport system as their web-based SSO solution. A 
Passport user gives permission to the Passport server to the Passport account 
credentials. The credentials consist of username, password, email address, first 
name, last name, date of birth, etc. The sites deploying Passport services are called 
participating sites. Microsoft provides Passport services as a centralized 
authentication server. 
.NET Passport frees the user from multiple registrations and memorizing 
passwords. The following figure explains how the Passport system works. 
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Figure 3.1.NET Passport Authentication Process 
(1) User requests resources from a Passport participating site via the 
browser 
(2) The participating site generates a Passport object and forward to the 
browser to check whether there are any valid passport cookies 
(3) If there are any existing cookies, the page loads with a sign-out link and 
consider the user as an authenticated user. Otherwise, the page loads 
with a sign-in link. 
(4) The user clicks the sign-in link to start the authentication process. The 
page then redirects to the .NET Passport sign-in page. The user‟s 
browser sends the Passport authentication request to the .NET passport 
server. The request contains the Passport Manager Object, the 
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participating site ID, the return URL to the participating site after 
authentication 
(5) .NET Passport Server checks the validity of the participating site ID 
and returns the URL and the Passport sign-in page 
(6) If the user is successfully authenticated by the .NET Passport server. 
The server generates encrypted cookies based on user‟s Passport User 
ID and the Passport profile and then forwards these data to the user‟s 
browser with the redirection URL. Cookies are encrypted by the 
participating site‟s public key. The communication is secured by 
TLS/SSL channel encryption 
(7) The browser redirects the page to the participating site with the 
encrypted cookies 
(8) The Passport Manager authenticate the cookies and grant access to the 
user for accessing the site 
.NET Passport is a SSO mechanism for systems that are connected over the 
Internet. User authentication is implemented via web forms. Although today‟s 
mobile browsers, such as Safari and Chrome are designed with many important 
functionality to execute operations as a traditional PC browser, the .NET Passport is 
not a suitable for mobile Cloud environment because of its browser-based feature 
and lack of participation from users. 
In 2008, Microsoft announced that .NET Passport becomes an identity 
provider of the OpenID framework [69]. The users of .NET Passport system are 
allowed to access any web sites that are covered by the OpenID authentication. 
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After this planned implementation in 2009, there is no further update for .NET 
Passport [70].  
3.3  The Liberty Alliance(Kantara) 
The Liberty Alliance is a large consortium which is established in 2001 by 
approximately 30 organizations. Now it has over 150 diverse member companies 
and organizations representing leaders in IT, government, and finance from across 
globe to build open, standards based specifications for federated identity 
management. The vision of the Liberty alliance is to establish privacy and security 
best practices as well as implementation guidelines. It also collaborates with other 
standards bodies with an eye toward adopting or extending other specifications [71]. 
From the mid of 2009, the work of the Liberty Alliance project has been to 
contribute to the Kantara Initiative [72]. Figure 3.2 depict the abstract view of the 
Liberty architecture. 
 
Figure 3.2 The Abstract View of Liberty Architecture 
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The Liberty Alliance project consists of a number of modules. Each module 
aims to solve different problems in identity management. The following section 
will discusses them in detail. 
Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF): The Id-FF enables identity 
federation and management. A Liberty Federation allows users to authenticate and 
sign-on to a domain once from any device and then access to the partner Web sites 
without re-authenticate. It is independent of platform, network devices, computing 
and mobile devices [73]. It provides approaches for implementing federation and 
SSO. 
Liberty Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF)[74]: The ID-WSF is an 
open framework for deploying and managing a variety of identity-based Web 
services. It contains a set of specifications for creating, using and updating various 
aspects of identities. The ID-WSF also presents security functions for privacy 
protection. 
Liberty Identity Services Interfaces Specification (ID-SIS): The ID-SIS is an 
open framework which contains a collection of specifications. These specifications 
are designed for the interoperability of different services [75]. 
Liberty Alliance is based on the notation of „trust circles‟ which are formed 
by a trusted authentication server and set of service providers. The trust 
relationship of the authentication server and service providers are supported by 
contractual agreements and it is outside the scope of Liberty Alliance 
specifications. According to the specification, the user authenticates to the 
authentication server and it expresses the authentication assertions to the relying 
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service providers. The assertion consists of the name identifier of the user for 
service providers to identify the user. The authentication server uses distinct 
identifiers for each user with different service providers. Figure 3.3 describes the 
Liberty notation of Trust. 
 
 
Figure 3.3The Liberty Notation of Trust 
 
 The Liberty Alliance supports SSO and use SAML token for authentication. 
Using SAML also enable it to bring attributes within the communication messages. 
However, it does not support attribute exchange which is critical in mobile Cloud 
environments. 
3.4  OpenID 
OpenID is an open source and decentralized identity management system that 
supports Web SSO to multiple sites using a single digital identity [76]. The OpenID 
framework was announced in 2005. An OpenID user can create an account with a 
preferred OpenID identity provider and then use the account for signing into any 
sites which accepts OpenID authentication. There are three main actors under the 
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OpenID framework: the user, the Relying Party (RP), and the Identity Provider 
(IdP). The RP is always known as the service provider from which the user requests 
services.  
In the OpenID framework, three parties are involved in the authentication 
process. They are theOpenID provider (OP), which stands for the identity provider; 
the Relying Party (RP) which is also called service provider and the user. Assuming 
that the OP and the RP has an existing trust relationship. OP has a trusted list of RPs. 
In the OpenID model, the users only need to have the identity and password details. 
Figure 3.4 describes the workflow of OpenID framework. 
 
 
Figure 3.4OpenID Authentication Process 
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(1) User requests to login into the RP and submits the credential 
(2) RP discovers the OP information from the user‟s credential and 
redirects the OP to the user 
(3) User enters the password into the field on the OP‟s page 
(4) If the user‟s credential is verified, OP redirects RP‟s page to the user 
 
OpenID users can choose a trustworthy OpenID server to register their OpenID 
account. They are identified as a URL: http://yourname.openidserver.com. The RP 
parses the URL and will get the OP‟s address “openidserver.com” and the user‟s 
identity “yourname”. Then the RP can redirect the OP to the user for authentication. 
The authentication process will make use of the identity “yourname” and the user 
will inputs the password. If the authentication is successful, OP will redirect RP‟s 
page to the user. In the whole process, user is not required to reveal the password to 
the RP which protects the privacy [77]. However, limitations are discussed in [78] 
that OP only uses one password to authenticate the user which is not secure enough. 
OpenID is a symmetric cryptography based framework, which is simple to use but 
more vulnerable than asymmetric encryption. Moreover, it is a web browser based 
mechanism and it utilizes the cookies which is not suitable for the mobile Cloud 
environment. 
There are two main versions of OpenID specification: OpenID 1.1 [79] and 
OpenID 2.0 [38]. The 2.0 version is compatible with the 1.1 version. OpenID has 
been largely adopted with one billion accounts and nine million sites enabling 
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OpenID authentication services [80].  IT enterprises like Google, Yahoo, and 
Microsoft are acting as the OpenID Identity Providers. 
 
3.5  Higgins 
Higgins [39] launched in 2003, an open-source Internet identity framework 
designed to integrate identity, profile, and social relationship information across 
multiple sites, applications and devices. Higgins is InfoCard-based and involves an 
active client. 
Higgins provides a Personal Data Service (PDS) that let each user control how 
their personal data is shared with friends and organizations they trust. A PDS is a 
Cloud-based service that works on behalf of a user, the individual. It gives the user 
a central point of control for his personal information. The user‟s interests, contact 
information, address, profiles, affiliations, friends etc. can be considered as user 
personal data. A PDS is a place where a user establishes bi-directional data flows 
between external businesses and his PDS, or between a trust recipient‟s PDS and 
his PDS. Figure 3.5 depicts the architecture of Higgins 2.0. 
Higgins uses the concept of cards to store information between the user and the 
other entity. The entity can be either a service provider or a person. In Figure 3.5, 
the cards shown in green represent a relationship between the user and an external 
site or business. The relationship includes a bi-directional data connection that 
shares and synchronizes a set of attributes between the site and the user‟s PDS. 
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Figure 3.5Architecture of Higgins 
The profile shown in brown circle represents a relationship between the user 
and another person. The relationship includes a bi-directional data connection that 
shares and synchronizes a set of attributes representing a friend. 
The blue box shown as AddOn App is a built-in app or extension app which has 
access to the local storage and update, add value to what‟s available irrespective of 
any particular relationship connections. 
The local storage for data storage holds user‟s data using the vocabularies of 
the Higgins‟ Persona Data Model β.0. It exposes these data to the Portal or a 
browser extension via an HTTP/Comet messaging interface.  
Higgins provides online identity management services in a profile/card based 
manner. A card is established for the user to control the data release to a preferred 
recipient. However, there are some limitations of Higgins. Although the client 
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apps are design as browser-based or a stand-alone client app, they cannot run 
perfectly on mobile devices at the moment. This is a major drawback in mobile 
Cloud environment. 
 
3.6  OAuth 
OAuth is an emerging, open, identity management standard. It describes a system 
which is designed to enable an end user to grant an Internet application controlled 
access to personal information (e.g. user attributes, photos, location records) stored 
at a third party site, without divulging long-term credentials such as passwords. 
Briefly, it allows a user, to grant access to your private resources on one site to 
another site. While OpenID in Section 2.6.2 is about using a single identity to sign 
into many sites, OAuth is about giving access to your stuff without sharing your 
identity at all [81]. 
There are four entities involved in the OAuth protocol: 
(1) Resource Owner:  refers to an end user of a hosting site. 
(2) Client: refers to the application (requesting site) to user‟s resources. 
(3) Resource Server: refers to the hosting site of user‟s resources 
(4) Authorization Server: refers to the server that issues an access token 
to a client after successfully authenticating the user and obtaining its 
authorization. 
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OAuth 2.0 [82] was published in 2011 and many IT leading enterprises such as 
Facebook, Google, LinkedIn are on the list of OAuth service providers. Recall the 
Instagram scenario, the OAuth protocol enables an Instagram user authorizing on 
Instagram access to personal data of his Facebook account. It is easy to use and 
saves plenty of time for the user. An OAuth user can freely choose which service 
provider can obtain the authorization to his personal content from the hosting site, 
but also define which part of data and time period that the requesting service 
provider can access. Your identity credentials such as password and username will 
not be revealed to the requesting services party. Hence user‟s privacy is partially 
protected. 
The following Figure 3.6 depicts the work flow of the OAuth protocol. 
 
Figure 3.6Workflow of OAuth Protocol 
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Although, OAuth limits new sites from obtaining all of user data and selling it 
against your will, it cannot prevent abuse of user‟s personal data. One of the largest 
OAuth implementation is Facebook which shares user‟s data with business partners. 
Those third-party applications in the App Store of Facebook have the rights to 
request access to personal data such as a user‟s friendship details, email address, 
education history, hometown etc. These settings make the user‟s privacy under 
threat. If one or more service providers combine their data together, the user will be 
face with the possibility of collusion attack. 
 
3.7  Comparison and Literature Review 
A generic comparison of the above identity management systems is given. 
Table 3.1 gives the results of comparison, where √refers to supported and  ×refers 
to not supported. 
 
Type SSO 
Attribute 
Exchange 
SAML 
Tokens 
.NET 
Passport 
Redirect-based √ √ × 
The Liberty 
Alliance 
Redirect-based √ × √ 
OpenID Redirect-based √ √ × 
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Higgins Client-based √ √ √ 
OAuth Redirect-based × √ × 
Table 3.1 Comparison of the Different Identity Management Schemes 
  
An identity management system should be able to protect private and sensitive 
information related to users and process [83]. The private and sensitive data not 
only contain identity information, but also contain privacy information. The 
traditional identity management technologies provided by existing identity 
management systems should be improved to support the emerging mobile Cloud 
technology. Researchers have done a lot of work in order to improve privacy 
protection of current identity management systems. 
Sun and Yan proposed a generic and flexible solution based on Cloud computing 
technology [84].They built a Cloud-based trusted identity management system. The 
system carries out authentication and authorization among heterogeneous mobile 
networks. They solved the WLAN/Cellular integration issues using Cloud-based 
technologies. However, they did not consider the privacy protection. Authors [85] 
presented a framework for mobile identity management. They used strong 
authentication methods to provide solutions encompass user access, signing and 
verification of users and transactions. However, strong authentication requires 
users to do further actions based on the requests, and this framework did not 
consider the user data protection. 
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For a smartphone user, the GPS sensor can capture the real-time location data, the 
camera can be used to recognize a person's face etc. Thus, lots of contextual data 
can be used to identity a user [83]. Paruchuri and Chellappan [86] proposed an 
architecture using the sensor data from the smartphone to generate the context and 
identify the user to the outside world. Various context information such as location, 
phone call history, Web browser history etc. are used to identify the user. However, 
their architecture is built and ran on a mobile device, thus it cannot work in a 
collaborated environment. Kim et al. [87] presented a context-aware platform for 
user authentication in Cloud computing. There are three components in the 
proposed platform: agent, middleware and Cloud service providers. The agent 
works on smart devices. It collects the context information, stores those 
information as a user profile. The profile also contains user's preferences. Thus, a 
user can initially control the data and specify the object that he wants to reveal his 
personal information. Middleware is responsible for connecting the agent and 
Cloud service providers. The proposed platform protects users' identity when 
authentication with a Cloud service provider, but it does not protect user's online 
data. 
Biometric authentication methods are also proposed as solutions for mobile 
environment. Witte et al.[88] proposed a context-aware mobile biometric 
authentication system based on support vector machines. They combine context 
information from the embedded sensors on a mobile device and biometric 
information together to achieve a higher level security. For instance, a dark 
environment may reduce the reliability of face recognition. Thus, context-aware 
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information is employed to improve the performance of the biometric systems. 
However, their work did not help the user to protect online personal data. 
Since the context information is collected from the mobile devices based on the 
users' behavior, user-centric model is investigated to solve the security and privacy 
issues for mobile users. The user-centric model enables user control their own data 
and activities with strong privacy and security protection [89]. Cloud resources 
should be collected and allocated according to mobile applications and customized 
for each individual user. Bogeret al.[90] proposed a user-centric management 
approach using smartcard. In their approach, users' attributes are stored in the 
smartcard, thus, a user can control the release of his attributes. However, a user has 
to carry the smartcard when he needs to identify himself which cause 
inconvenience and increase the possibility of identity theft if the smartcard is lost. 
Seo et al.[91] proposed an architecture for context management over pervasive 
networks. They set up a centralized context manager which is able to understanding 
complex interactions among different contextual entities. Thus, the system can 
process and deal with different contexts obtained from different domains around a 
user. Their work strengthens the user-centric model by managing contexts from 
different providers for the user. Authors in [92] presented an approach empowering 
end-users to tailor their mobile applications according to their privacy needs. They 
implemented a mobile application prototype, which can collaborate with different 
mobile Cloud applications. However, their evaluation results are based on specific 
application they developed. The compatibility with existing mobile Cloud apps is 
unsolved. 
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 Based on the research work on context-aware solution and user-centric model, 
researchers investigated a new approach to identify the user based on the user 
behaviors. The user's context data on a smartphone such as call history, location 
records, app usage etc. indicates the user's normal activities. By profiling such 
activities, frauds can be detected [93].Lee and Song proposed a model to analyze 
user behavior of privacy management on online social network [94].They first 
studied the core issues of privacy and then tested conventional theories for the 
context in online social network. They contributed to describe the privacy issues 
for online social network applications and their proposed model can serve as a 
reference for system designers to understand managing privacy on online social 
networks. Their research was an ongoing project, and did not consider the privacy 
issues for mobile users. Paraskevopoulos et al.[95] developed methods for 
enabling the extraction and characterization of normal behavior patterns. By 
studying call activity and mobility patterns, they classified the behaviors that 
exhibit similar characteristics. The data recorded by cell-towers were also used to 
analyze the mobility of mobile phone users. Their experimental results showed 
that the proposed methods can be used to predict events and actions that are 
possible to happen if some specific circumstances exist. Their research moves one 
step forward for detecting users' behaviors. Such evidences can be used to identify 
a mobile user. Lathiaet al.[96] presented a platform which is called UBhave, the 
UBhave is a project that aims to investigate the power and challenge of using 
mobile phones for digital behavior change interventions. Data is collected from 
smart mobile devices and user's online social networks activity. By developing 
tools to visualize the sequential use of the various interventions over time, the 
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overview of user's behaviors can be provided. The analysis of large data set from 
the user, the system can be used to promote positive behavior changes. However, 
the platform still has issues for the energy constrains at the smart mobile devices. 
Furthermore, the privacy concerns when collection data from a mobile user is still 
unsolved. 
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3.8  Conclusion 
The .NET Passport, Liberty Alliance, OpenID, and Higgins identity management 
systems provide the SSO architecture for users‟ convenience when accessing 
multiple Web sites in a Web browser. However, such identity management systems 
do not have a proper client in mobile platforms which is not suitable for mobile 
users. To a certain degree of protecting user‟s online privacy, OAuth is a flexible 
and powerful privacy protection scheme that users have the ability to choose the 
recipient of his personal data. But it cannot protect the data from abuse by the 
hosting service provider. The requirements of mobile Cloud user should not only 
focus on identity management, but also on the privacy protection. 
Based on the study of the above identity management system and recent 
research works, in mobile Cloud environment, users should establish an online 
storage which stores all his personal data. A privacy-preserving mechanism should 
be deployed to protect users‟ Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The existing 
identity management systems can protect user‟s identity from potential attacks, but 
naturally they do not consider the privacy protection and thus lack mechanisms to 
protect users‟ data. It is necessary to setup an access control system to restrict 
access on user‟s online data and using novel cryptographic technologies to satisfy 
the requirements in mobile Cloud environment. The behaviour-profiling techniques 
can be explored to improve the identification of a mobile user to a more 
fine-grained way. 
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4 Access Control Technologies 
The exponential growth of Internet usage let user‟s personal data to be 
leaked to various unknown service providers. Users do not have control over the 
data collected by the service providers and this may eventually breach the user 
privacy. Responding to this requirement raises the emerging need of solutions 
supporting proper information security governance, allowing users managing their 
information to enforce restrictions on information acquisition as well as its 
processing and secondary use. Hence, it is necessary to set up a data access control 
mechanism so that users‟ data can be protected from being abused. There are three 
main solutions that can be explored to protect the privacy of the user's data: (1) 
privacy-preserving techniques to protect user data, (2) deploying access control 
technique to control usage of user data and (3) storing data in the encrypted form. 
This chapter reviews the current main access control models, privacy protection 
languages, and encryption schemes, and then discusses the possible solutions to 
address the related issues. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 discusses background 
information about privacy-protection. Section 4.2 reviews the access control 
models and the privacy-preserving languages are examined in Section 4.3. Section 
4.4reviews the attribute-based encryption schemes and discusses the challenges in 
existing approaches. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
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4.1  Access Control Models 
Most of the time, users want to safeguard the information that may be harmful or 
embarrassing. Thus, the notion of privacy and the notion of control fit together[97]. 
Access control is a suitable approach for privacy protection in electronic 
information systems. Access control defines the selective restriction of access to a 
place or other resources. In the information engineering, the access may mean 
certain operation (such as Read, Write, Share and Delete) on the resources, or 
consuming services. Permission to access a resource is called authorization. With 
the years of research carried out over the past decades, several access control 
models have been proposed and applied in the industrial applications. 
In any access control model, the entities that can perform actions in the system 
are called subjects, while the entities which are representing the resources to which 
access may be controlled are called objects. In a computer information system, both 
subjects and objects should be considered as software entities rather than human 
users. Human users may only perform actions on the system via the software 
entities which are controlled by them. In most of the current information systems, 
access is approved based on successful authentications. The system will make a 
decision to grant or reject an access request from an already authenticated subject. 
The models that are used by the existing systems are classified into two types, 
the capability based model and the access control lists (ACL) based model[98]. In a 
capability based model, the subjects will be granted access to any objects based on 
an unforgettable reference or capability to the objects. For instances, the possession 
of your car key grants you access to your car. Such a capability will be transmitted 
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to another party in order to convey the access. The Plessey System 250 was built in 
1970 [99]. It is the first operational computer system to implementation capability 
based model. The mechanism is different in the ACL based model. The system 
granting access to a subject depends on whether the subject‟s identity is on the 
permission list which is associated with the objects. For example, the security staff 
of a high-level conference will check a guest‟s ID to see if his/her name is on the 
invitation list. Access is conveyed by editing the list. For computer networking, an 
access control list refers to rules that are applied to port numbers that are available 
on a host, each with a list of hosts that are permitted to use the services. 
The capability based model and the ACL based model have the features to 
grant access to group members. Such as the doctors in the same department will 
have the same access privileges. In a higher level of control, users are assigned with 
a user ID. All the processes started by the same user ID have the privileges 
corresponding to the user ID. This level of control is still not fine-grained enough. 
A doctor has the access to modify any patient‟s records in a department. However, 
to a history of records, the system should define the access policy so that they won‟t 
be easily tampered. There should be a more fine-grained access control scheme to 
achieve a more flexible privacy protection mechanism. In the following subsections, 
four main access control models which are categorized as either discretionary or 
non-discretionary are discussed [100].  
4.1.1  Discretionary Access Control 
The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [101] criteria was defined as follows: 
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“Means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of subjects and/or 
groups to which they belong. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a 
subject with certain access permission is capable of passing that permission 
(perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject.” 
The DAC mechanism restricts access to objects based solely on the identity of 
subjects who are trying to access them. The user may also be restricted to a subset 
of the possible access types (e.g. read, write, execute) available for the protected 
resources. Typically, a particular user or set of users have the authority to distribute 
and revoke the access to an object, which means a particular user with certain 
access permission can pass the permission on to any other subject without notifying 
the administrator or the access control system. 
The first general model of DAC was proposed by Lampson in 1972 [102]. 
With several years of research, the DAC mechanism is widely used in variety of 
implementations, especially in the commercial and industrial environments because 
of its flexibility. In most of the operating systems, such as Windows, Linux, and 
Macintosh are based on DAC model[103]. If a user creates a file in one of these 
operating systems, he/she can decide the access privileges he/she wants to give to 
other users. Then the operating system will make access decisions based on the 
access privileges define by the user. However, the DAC mechanism has drawbacks.  
For the issue of distributing permission, the particular user cannot provide real 
assurance on the information flow in a system. A user who has the access to read 
certain data may pass the permission to another user which are not cognizant by the 
data owner [100]. The data owner loses the control of the usage of data after 
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sending it to the user. Most of the proposed designs of DAC [104-107]are not 
lightweight so that it cannot efficiently deployed in mobile Cloud environment. 
 
4.1.2  Mandatory Access Control 
The Mandatory Access Control (ManAC) is commonly discussed in contrast to 
DAC as sometimes it is termed as non-discretionary access control. In ManAC 
model, a user will be granted access to a resource only if rules exist that allows the 
user to access the resource. Subjects and objects have a set of security attributes. 
When a subject requests access to an object, an authorization rule will be enforced 
by the system, and examines the provided security attributes. A decision will be 
made based on the attributes and rules. 
 ManAC model was investigated over decades. Thomas [108]presented a 
ManAC mechanism for the UNIX file system. In this mechanism, all files have a 
set of attributes. File attributes consist of name, owner, owning group, access 
permissions and modification times of a file, and etc. The operating system uses 
some of these attributes to enforce DAC. DAC allows the owners of files to 
determine who can access their files by defining DAC access policies. Rjaibi and 
Bird [109] presented a multi-purpose implementation of ManAC in relational 
database management systems. Their implementation allows a database 
administrator to define labels and to set up a database table such that access to a 
row in that table is based upon the label associated with that row and the label 
associated with the user accessing that row. ManAC are mostly deployed in 
centralized systems such as operating systems, and database systems. Li et al. 
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presented a fine-grained ManAC model for XML documents [110]. They 
extended XML document model to include label information and define new rules 
to satisfy this extended model. An extra XML file contains security labels and 
permitted actions are defined. Each request has to satisfy the requirements in the 
extra XML files. Authors in [111] presented a ManAC mechanism for mobile 
devices based on virtualization. Their proposed mechanism was deployed inside 
the virtual machine monitor. The virtual machine monitor is considered as a 
trusted computing base. All requests from each subject to objects are enforced by 
the access control mechanism based on policies. Thus, mobile devices were not 
required to be involved in the access control process. This model moved a step 
forward for access control in mobile environment at that time. However, it is out 
of date to support mobile Cloud environment.  
In practice, a subject is usually a process or thread; objects are constructs such 
as files, directories, shared memory segments, etc.  For instance, in a database 
system, ManAC can also be applied. The objects are tables, views, procedures, etc 
[112] and the subject is the user. The root user (the administrator) defines access 
rules for each user and the data consent for user is granted based on the rules. 
Typically, a centralized security policy administrator will control the security 
policies. Users do not have the ability to override the policy, which is contrast to the 
DAC mechanism that a subject has the ability to make access decisions and/or 
assign security attributes. In real world, almost all UNIX-like operating systems 
uses ManAC as a part of the operating system's kernel[113], such as 
FreeBSD[114]. 
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4.1.3  Role-Based Access Control 
The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an approach to restrict system to 
authorized users [115, 116]. It is largely adopted in majority of the enterprises and 
organizations with more than 500 employees which require multi-level security 
[117].  
Within an enterprise or organization, roles are created for various job functions, 
e.g. manager, director, researcher etc. In a RBAC model, permissions are 
associated with the roles. Users are made members of appropriate roles, and 
permissions to certain resources are acquired through the role assignments. The 
users do not have the access to the resources but only request permission through 
their roles. This greatly simplifies the management of permissions.  There are 
three primary rules defined for RBAC: 
Role Assignment: A subject must be assigned a role in order to exercise 
permission. 
Role Authorization: A subject‟s active role must be authorized for the subject. 
This ensures that users can only use roles for which they are authorized. 
Transaction Authorization: A subject can exercise permissions only if the 
permissions are authorized for the subject‟s active role. This rule ensures that users 
can only exercise permission for which they are authorized. 
Roles are commonly combined in a hierarchy. High-level roles subsume 
permissions owned by sub-roles. Compared with DAC model, access permissions 
are controlled by the system not users. RBAC differs from ManAC that is the 
management of permissions. ManAC controls basic operation permission (e.g. read, 
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write) based on a user‟s security attributes. While in RBAC, the system controls 
complex operation in a transaction (such as an e-bank transaction), or may be as 
simple as read or write. In such a view, the management of permissions in a system 
is transferred to and can be considered as the management of roles. since a role in 
RBAC can be viewed as a set of permissions. Figure 4.1 depicts a standard RBAC 
model and Figure 4.2 shows an example of the RBAC role hierarchy. 
 
 
Figure 4.1Illustration of the Elements in a Standards RBAC Model 
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Figure 4.2Illustration of a Role Hierarchy 
 
Researchers have done many works to improve the RBAC model. Elisa 
Bertino et al.[118] proposed the Temporal-RBAC (TRBAC) model which 
addresses temporal issues related to RBAC. Coyne and Weil proposed a model 
which is called the International Committee for Information Technology Standards 
(INCITs) Cyber Security 1.1. The model implemented the access control mapping 
between difference information systems [119]. The work improves the 
interoperability cross complex enterprises. Elisa and Catania et al.[120] presented a 
spatially aware RBAC model which involves location-based services. Their work 
extends the RBAC model to deal with spatial and location-based information. 
Sejong Oh and Seog Park [121] proposed a task-RBAC model which was founded 
on the concept of classification of tasks. The task model deals with each task 
differently according to its class, and supports task level access control and 
supervision role hierarchy. Strembeck and Neumann [122] presented an context 
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aware RBAC model. Their approach extended the RBAC services to the 
enforcement of context constrain. The new requirements for the RBAC can be 
found in [123-126].  Kulkarni and Tripathi proposed an context-aware RBAC 
model in pervasive computing [127]. They setup a programming framework to 
specify and enforce context information during an execution of a role, such as 
dynamically interfaced services, permission executions. 
Traditional RBAC models lack the ability to specify fine-grained access 
control on individuals in certain roles and on individual objects. This is a big 
disadvantage when it comes to collaborative environments since their nature 
requires permissions based on object types. It suits a centralized environment which 
is different from today‟s distributed mobile environments. 
4.1.4  Attribute Based Access Control 
In Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) model, access is granted based on 
attributes of the user, not based on the rights of the subject associated with a user 
after authentication. Unlike RBAC, the ABAC model can define permissions based 
on just about any security relevant characteristics, known as attributes [128]. 
Compared with ABAC, RBAC is outdated, expensive to implement and unable to 
accommodate real-time environmental states as access control parameters. ABAC 
is newer, simpler to implement and accommodates real-time environmental states 
as access control parameters [129]. 
ABAC fully encompasses the functionality of RBAC approaches. The ability to 
make use of additional resource attributes is suitable for mobile Cloud environment.  
Attributes such as location, time, date, IMEI number, OS version of a mobile device 
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can strengthen the security level of data transactions and provide more evidence to 
the system to make access decisions. Therefore, ABAC can provide a more flexible 
and complex access control solution. Due to the mobility of a mobile user, such 
contextual attributes keep changing. Traditional access control model cannot utilize 
such attributes in run-time. Different combinations of attributes from a subject, an 
object and environment make ABAC provide a more fine-grained way than 
RBAC.ABAC is a flexible, scalable, dynamic and fine-grained model, with special 
features providing great convenience to distributed environments. Moreover, DAC, 
ManAC and RBAC are initially designed for access control management within a 
single domain, which is not suitable for mobile Cloud environment because of the 
collaboration among different mobile Cloud service providers. ABAC is 
considered as a suitable access control model for mobile Cloud environments. 
Attributes are the set of properties that may be associated with a given entity. 
An entity may be a subject, resource or environment that is considered related to the 
interaction between a user and an application. Authorization decisions are based on 
the related attributes, which are established by digitally signed credentials through 
which credential issuers assert their judgments about the attributes of entities. 
Because these digital credentials are signed, they can serve to introduce strangers to 
one another without on-line contract with attribute authorities [130]. Three types of 
attributes are considered for the access control purpose. 
Subject Attributes: A subject is an entity which requests access on an object. 
The attributes associated with a subject define the identity and characteristics of the 
subjects. Such as a subject‟s identifier, name, organization, job, etc. 
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Resource Attributes: A resource is an entity that is requested by a subject. The 
attributes of resources can be leveraged to make access control decision with 
subjects‟ attributes. The online resources‟ metadata can be considered as relevant 
attributes for making decisions. 
Environment Attributes: The environment attributes are used for describing 
the related operational, technical, and even situational environment or context in 
which the access request taken place. Such as time, location, data, operating system 
(OS) .etc. The environment attributes are not associated with a subject or an object. 
 
 Researchers [128, 130,131] have addressed the issues for deploying ABAC in 
the Web service architecture. In [84], Bo Lang and Ian Foster et al. presented an 
ABAC model to address privacy issues for Grid Computing. They also provided a 
toolkit that is called Globus Toolkit release 4 to implement the framework. Bobba 
proposed an attribute-based message system using ABAC to realize a real-time 
message system [132]. A location aware ABAC system is presented by Isabel et al. 
to extend ABAC with dynamic authorizations. Lanjing Wang and Baoyi Wang 
proposed an ABAC model for Web services in multi-domain environment [133]. 
They presented meta-attribute and meta-policy to describe the attributes and polices 
in local domain to collaborate with other domains. ABAC is an ideal access control 
model for mobile environments, and several solutions have been proposed to 
address the privacy issues in mobile environment [134-137].  
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4.2  Privacy-Preserving Languages 
In order to address the issues in the privacy practices, different types of languages 
are available to represent the human readable policies in more precise and computer 
compatible formats [138]. Some languages are designed to help enterprises express 
their privacy policies in ways that are more amenable to policy enforcement and 
some languages are designed to help users define their privacy preferences. 
Privacy policy languages can help with several of the stages involved in 
managing privacy policies (e.g. writing, testing, approving, analyzing, and 
withdrawing). They were designed to express the privacy controls that both 
organizations and users want to express.  Most of the privacy policy languages 
were designed for specific purposes with specific features and characteristics and 
most of the initiatives for designing these languages have occurred in the last fifteen 
years. The W3C began the development of the Platform for Privacy Preferences 
(P3P) in 1997. CPExchange was developed in 2000 to facilitate 
business-to-business communication about privacy policies [139]. Then the 
requirements to express internal privacy polices within an organization from 
industry made IBM design the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) 
in 2003[140]. And during the same period, the OASIS presented the eXtensible 
Access Control Language (XACML) for both privacy and security policies in a 
machine readable format [141]. 
The privacy policy languages are expected to be fairly simple and small. 
Therefore they have been designed as light-weight XML markup languages. They 
are not expected to perform high-level mathematical operations or complicated 
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flow controls. The next three sections will briefly discuss three main privacy policy 
languages.  
4.2.1  The Platform for Privacy Preferences 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is developed by W3C in 1997. It is 
designed to express website privacy policies in machine-readable format[142] and 
to grant users more control over their personal information when browsing the Web. 
The P3P user agent allow users to automatically be informed of site privacy 
practices and to automate decision-making based on the Web sites‟ privacy 
practices [143]. Thus, the P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL) was 
introduced to express user‟s preferences for making automated or semi-automated 
decisions regarding the acceptability of machine-readable privacy policies from 
P3P enabled sites [144]. 
A P3P-enabled website will have a set of policies, e.g. stating the uses of 
personal information that is gathered from the site visitors. With a P3P-enabled 
Web browser, a P3P user can also define a set of policies, e.g. what personal 
information can be revealed to the Web sites that they visited. Then when a user 
visits a site, P3P will compare what personal information the user is willing to 
release, and what personal information the server wants to get. If the two do not 
match, P3P will inform the user and ask if he/she is willing to proceed to site and 
risk giving up personal information. 
Although P3P provides the support for privacy for Web sites, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) has criticised P3P, referred to the technology as 
a “Pretty Poor Policy” [145]. They claim that P3P software is not suitable for 
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average person to understand because of its complexity and difficulty. Many 
Internet users are likely to be unable to use the default P3P software. Furthermore, 
the P3P framework is not initially designed for supporting Web privacy. In the 
mobile Cloud environments, these disadvantages are critical. 
4.2.2  Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language 
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) is used to formalize 
privacy authorization for actual enforcement within an intra- or inter- enterprise for 
business-to-business privacy control [146]. EPAL services themselves are 
exchanging privacy policies and making privacy authorization decisions. In 
particular, EPAL concentrates on the privacy authorization by abstracting data 
models and user authentication from all deployment details. 
EPAL has a rudimentary temporal nature that a request to perform an action 
might lead to allow or deny judgement and obligation [147]. In EPAL, an 
obligation is usually an action that some agent is required to perform in the future 
which controls the purpose of data usage after sending to the requesters. The EPAL 
framework does not consider the privacy for the Web application which is the 
limitation for mobile Cloud environments. 
4.2.3  Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
The Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) was formed by the 
OASIS standards consortium.  XACML defines a privacy policy language using 
the attributes of requestors, resources, and environment. It provides standard XML 
schema for expressing policies, rule obligations and conditions. Additionally, it 
specifies a request/response protocol for sending a request and having it approved. 
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XACML is primarily an attribute-based access control system, where attributes 
associated with an entity will be embedded into a XACML access request, while the 
access decision is made depending on whether the access requester satisfies the 
XACML policy. 
The XACML access control framework contains four key main components: 
the Policy Administration Point (PAP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP), and the Policy Information Point (PIP).  
 PAP: The system entity that creates a policy or policy set 
 PDP: The component that evaluates the applicable policy and 
renders an authorization decision. 
 PEP: The system entity that performs access control. It issues 
decision request to the PDP and enforces the access decision 
received from the PDP. 
 PIP: The PIP is where the entire attribute are stored. 
Additionally, in most of the systems, a context handler is required to convert 
access requests into the native request format of the XACML canonical form and 
convert the authorization decisions in the XACML canonical form to the native 
response format. Any required obligations should be performed by PEP with the 
enforcement of an authorization decision [148]. 
Figure 4.3 depicts the data flow of the standard XACML frameworks. The 
model operates based on the following steps. 
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Figure 4.3 Data Flow of a Standard XACML Framework 
 
(1) PAPs prepare and write the policies and policy sets to be available to 
the PDP. These policies and policy sets represent the complete policy 
for a specific target. 
(2) The access requester sends a request to the PEP. 
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(3) The PEP sends the request for access to the context handler, in its 
original request format, including the attributes from all the 
stakeholders, such as subjects, resource, action and environment. 
(4) The context handler constructs an XACML request context and sends 
it to the PDP. 
(5) If additional attributes are required, the PDP will request them from 
the context handler. 
(6) If the additional attributes request received from the PDP, the context 
handler requests them from a PIP. 
(7) The PIP obtains the requested additional attributes from subjects, 
resource, action and environment. 
(8) The PIP returns the requested attributes to the context handler. 
(9) The context handler can decide whether to include the resource in the 
context. 
(10) The PDP evaluate the policy after receiving the requested attributes 
and resource (optionally) from the context handler.  
(11) The PDP sends the response context and access decision to the 
context handler. 
(12) The context handler forwards the response context to the PEP after 
converting it to its original format. 
(13) The PEP fulfils the obligations. 
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(14) If access is permitted, the PEP permits the access; otherwise, it denies 
access. 
 
Based on the flow, the PDP has no control over the enforcement of the policy 
decision. This model for access control depends on having every request for 
protected resources go through PEP, which isresponsible for all enforcements. The 
implementation of PEP is usually application- or platform-specific, as it is usually 
built into the application or the platform on which the application is built. 
Any policy must be stated in terms of a specific vocabulary of terms. In 
XACML, vocabulary terms are called attributes, and are defined by the particular 
applications or domains that use policies – they are domain-specific. The PDP does 
not need to understand the domain-specific meaning of each attribute used in a 
policy; it needs to understand only how to determine whether the values supplied 
for each attribute in an authorization decision request satisfy the conditions for 
access specified resource in the policy. In order to do this, the PDP needs to know 
only a unique identifier for the Attribute and the generic data type of the values for 
that Attribute. It is the responsibility of each application or domain that will be 
using policies to define an Attribute to correspond to each of its policy vocabulary 
items. This means assigning a unique identifier for the item, the data type of the 
values for that item, and the meaning of each value that might be used for that item.  
The meaning of the values is not used by the PDP, however, and is significant 
only to the application or domain. Thus, the format (syntax) of an Attribute is 
domain-independent, even though the meaning (semantics) of the Attribute value is 
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domain-specific. The policy language may itself define some standard Attributes 
that are available for use in any policy. 
XACML was largely adopted after being presented in 2002 [149]. Compared 
with EPAL, the functionality of XACML 2.0 is a superset of EPAL 1.2. The EPAL 
differences often result in less functionality than XACML has [150]. XACML is 
designed to support centralized or decentralized policy management. It also 
supports both general access control and privacy policies, allowing these closely 
related policy types to be integrated. XACML is both a more comprehensive access 
control policy language than EPAL, and a full- featured privacy policy language. 
XACML has already been an OASIS approved standard. With the support of many 
organizations, XACML are more open to the public requirements. Whenever an 
issue comes, the researchers can react quickly to address them. There is an active 
community of users and developers who are continuing to expand improve, and 
apply the language [151] which gives a powerful and long life to XACML. 
Many scientific research works have been done to address issues in the Internet 
privacy protection field. Claudio extended the XACML architecture and modules 
for effective credential-based management and privacy support [149].  Anderson 
and Devaraj proposed a XACML-based Web services policy constraint language 
(WS-Policy Constraints) [152].  Vivyinget al. extended the XACML with policy 
negotiation. They explore XACML‟s potential in privacy negotiation and 
introduced a policy negotiation point. Their work addressed issues in the access 
control negotiation process between Web services [153]. 
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Since XACML provides the support for integrating SAML standard [154], the 
combination of XACML and SAML gives a more powerful solution for 
authentication and authorization. SAML can protect, transport and request 
XACML schema instances and other information needed by an XACML 
implementation. Ardagna et al. described extensions to the access control industry 
standards XACML and SAML to enable privacy-preserving and credential-based 
access control [155]. Their extensions allow the requester to learn which attributes 
have to be revealed and which conditions must be satisfied, thereby enabling to 
leverage the advantages of privacy-preserving technologies such as anonymous 
credentials. Hommel presented architecture for the integration of XACML and 
SAML, it established an access control framework in Federated Identity 
Management systems [156]. Nils and Vladimir describes a location aware access 
control model on top of Geographically XACML. It sketches how spatial 
separations on duty constraints (both static and dynamic) can be implemented. The 
work provides location dependent access control and security enhancing solutions 
on mobile devices [157]. 
XACML can also be used for mobile environments.  Qing presented a 
XACML-based policy-driven access control for mobile environments [158]. They 
introduce a mapping function and assign a unique ID for the mobile users. An 
attribute authority takes charge of maintaining the attributes.  An access request 
from a mobile user in an unknown domain can be involved in the local 
authorization process. 
 XACML is a powerful privacy access control language which can be deployed 
in a distributed system. Although in a XACML policy-based system, the message 
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flows must be formatted in the XACML format, it provides huge convenience for 
access control that the user can easily define polices to protect data. Such features 
can help mobile users to protect their privacy in mobile Cloud environments. In the 
next section, another approach to protect users‟ data in mobile Cloud environments 
is investigated. 
 
4.3  Attribute Based Encryption 
Besides establishing an access control system, another way to protect privacy in 
mobile Cloud environment is by storing the data in the encrypted form, thus 
minimizing the risk. However, data sharing is one of the most important features of 
mobile Cloud computing. Traditional encryption schemes are one-to-one solutions 
and cannot efficiently satisfy the user‟s online data sharing requirements. 
Encrypting the data in the Cloud alleviates the above problem [159]. Thus, if 
the servers which store the data are compromised, the amount of lost information is 
limited because the adversary does not have the decryption key to obtain the data in 
the plain text. In a traditional public key encryption method, data is encrypted by a 
particular individual who has already established a public-private key pair. The 
traditional method in mobile Cloud environment limits the ability of users to 
selectively share their encrypted data at a fine-grained level, e.g. a patient wants to 
grant decryption access to doctors in a specific department of a hospital for his 
medical records. This can be done by either encrypting the file in a shared group 
public key, or encrypting the file for each doctor. None of these techniques is 
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particularly appealing. There is a requirement for expressing more complex access 
policies during the encryption. 
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) was proposed by Sahai and Waters [160]. It 
is a type of public-key encryption scheme in which the key of a user and the 
ciphertext are dependent on attributes. In an attribute based encryption system, data 
owner encrypts the data by using several attributes. A decryptor can decrypt the 
data only if his/her attributes matches the required attributes. Figure 4.4 shows the 
architecture of Sahai and Waters‟ ABE scheme. 
 
Figure 4.4Illustration of Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme 
 
Sahai and Waters made some initial steps to solve this problem for expressing 
access polices during encryption. In their system, user‟s key and ciphertexts are 
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labelled with sets of descriptive attributes and a particular key can decrypt a 
particular ciphertext only if there is a match between the attributes of the ciphertext 
and the user‟s key. An authority with access to the master keys will issue different 
private keys to users, where a user‟s private key is associated with an access 
structure over attributes and reflects the access policy. The decryption algorithm 
allows users to decrypt data using their private keys as long as their access policy 
specified by their private key permits. 
The original ABE construction of Sahai and Waters allows, the authority to 
issue the private key based on threshold access policy. In order to decrypt the data, 
at least k attributes should be overlapped between a ciphertext and a private key. 
This primitive feature limits the expressibility of the access policy. For instance, the 
attribute authority monitors and manages n number of attributes in total where 1 ≤ k 
≤ n. The data owner encrypts the file with k number of attributes enforced. When a 
user requests a decryption key for the file, the attribute authority issues a private 
key for the user with dk number of attributes. Only if k ≤ dk, the user can decrypt the 
requested file. Sahai and Water‟s model cannot define more complex access 
policies, two main extensions of original ABE scheme were proposed afterwards: 
Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) to address the 
drawbacks of Sahai and Water‟s scheme and provide more functionality.  
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4.3.1  Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
In 2007, Goyal and Pandey [159] developed a richer type of ABE cryptosystem and 
demonstrated its applications. In their system, each ciphertext is labelled by the 
encryptor with a set of descriptive attributes. Each private key is associated with an 
access structure that specifies which type of ciphertexts the key can decrypt. This 
method is called as Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE), since the 
access structure is specified in the private key while the ciphertexts are simply 
labelled with a set of descriptive attributes. Their method supports fine-grained 
access control to facilitate granting differential access rights to a set of users and 
allow flexibility in specifying access rights of individual users. The data is stored on 
the server in an encrypted form; different users are allowed to decrypt the data 
based on the access policy.  
In the ABE scheme, the access policy scheme is based on the secret-sharing 
scheme (SSS). In 1979 Shamir [161]proposed a construction methodology for 
secure-sharing scheme in 1979. In his scheme, the access structure is a threshold 
gate. If there are t or more parties take part in within N (1 ≤ ݐ ≤ ܰ) number of 
parities, they can reconstruct the secret by using their shares. If there are less than t 
number of parties, they cannot get any information about the secret. Benaloh [162] 
extended Shamir‟s idea to a tree-access structure. The tree consists of threshold and 
the interior nodes consist of AND and OR gates. The leafs consist of different 
parties. Any set of parties that satisfy the tree can reconstruct the secret together. 
Goyal and Pandey proposed a new secret sharing scheme that each private key is 
associated with a tree-access structure where the leafs are associated with attributes. 
A Secret-Sharing Scheme (SSS) is used to divide a secret among a number of 
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parties. The information given to a party is called a share of the secret. Every SSS 
realizes some access structures that define the sets of parties who should be able to 
reconstruct the secret by using their shares. 
The KP-ABE scheme can be viewed as an extension of Sahai-Water‟s 
conventional ABE framework with the embedding of a secret-sharing scheme in 
the private key. The authority can specify a more general secret sharing scheme for 
monotonic access trees. They also suggested a new ABE scheme which is discussed 
in the next section. Figure 4.5 shows the work flow of KP-ABE scheme. 
 
Figure 4.5Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme 
 
4.3.2  Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
Bethencourt et al.[163] presented a new ABE scheme which is called 
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). In CP-ABE scheme, 
user‟s private key will be associated with an arbitrary number of attributes 
expressed as strings. When a data owner encrypts a message, he/she specify an 
associated access structure over attributes. A user will only be able to decrypt the 
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ciphertext if that user‟s attributes pass through the ciphertext‟s access structure.  
The access structures are described by a monotonic access tress, which means the 
nodes of the access structure are composed of threshold values and the leaves 
describe attributes. They suggest the AND gates can be constructed as n-of-n 
threshold gates and OR gates as 1-of-n threshold gates. Figure 4.6 depicts a 
working setup of the CP-ABE scheme. 
 
Figure 4.6Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme 
 
Traditionally, access control is enforced by employing a trusted server to store 
data locally. The server is entrusted as a reference monitor that checks a user‟s 
credentials before allowing him to access data. Most existing public key encryption 
methods allow a party to encrypt data to a particular user, but are unable to 
efficiently handle more expressive types of encrypted access control scenarios. 
Both the KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes can efficiently address this problem. A 
Ciphertext
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UserPrivate key with
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data owner can exert control over who has access to the data he/she encrypts. All 
the users who satisfy the requirements are able to decrypt the ciphertext.  
There is only one authority that issues the private keys and manages all the 
attributes in both the KP-ABE scheme and CP-ABE scheme making this scheme 
highly secure. The authority is normally named as central authority or global 
authority. It verifies all the attributes or credentials for each user in the system and 
issues private keys to the user. Therefore, it is powerful enough to get all the 
messages and communications of the user with or without permissions. Users‟ 
privacy is at risk if the central authority is compromised. This is the major 
drawback of the CP-ABE and KP-ABE scheme. Furthermore, since the central 
authority issues private keys for all the users, if the system is built as a large and 
global scale system, the authority will become a common bottleneck. If the system 
spreads the central authority‟s key over several machines to alleviate performance 
pressures, it will also raise the risk of key exposure [164].  
 
4.3.3  Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption 
Researchers proposed Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (MA-ABE) 
scheme to address the issues of a single authority ABE scheme. In reality, different 
entities are responsible for maintaining different sets of information, such as Driver 
and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) managing all the UK driver and vehicle 
information, National Health Service (NHS) managing UK‟s patients‟ information.  
In a single authority scenario, in order to get medical and driver‟s information, there 
must be at least one fully trusted authority that monitors all the information. If the 
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fully trusted authority is compromised, then all the sensitive data that stored at 
DVLA and NHS is under risk. There is a requirement to construct an ABE model 
where more than one authority can operate simultaneously, each handing out secret 
keys for a different set of attributes. 
Chase [165] firstly proposed an efficient MA-ABE scheme in 2007. In her 
scheme, the data owner has the ability to specify for each authority k a set of 
attributes monitored by that authority and a number dk so that the message can be 
decrypted only by a user who has at least dk number of the given attributes from 
every authority. The scheme allows any number of attribute authorities to be 
corrupted, and guarantee the security of encryption as long as the required attributes 
cannot be obtained exclusively from those authorities and the central authority 
remains honest. However the central authority still exists in the scheme but with 
less functionality. It is stilled fully trusted but handles no attributes and only issues 
the corresponding keys. 
For a user of Chase‟s model, he will be assigned with a global identifier (GID). 
The GID has the following properties: 
 No user can claim another user‟s GID 
 All authorities can verify a user‟s GID 
Thus, the GID can be an identifying string for which a user has provable 
credentials and it seems likely that such information would be presented when users‟ 
attributes are verified. If two users request the private keys from two attribute 
authorities, the GID enables the authorities to distinguish the two requests in order 
to prevent collusion. 
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Each user will send his GID to the central authority and receive a 
corresponding key. The central authority will not get any information about the 
user‟s attributes. The central authority only issues a setup key for the user‟s GID 
and holds the master secret of the system. Although the central authority does not 
monitor any attributes, it still be able to decrypt any messages with the master 
secret. Figure 4.7 illustrates the architecture of Chase and Chow‟s MA-ABE 
scheme. 
Chase‟s work[165]made a small step forward than the single authority ABE 
scheme, the main drawback of CP-ABE and KP-ABE still remains with the 
existence of central authority. In 2009, Chase and Chow presented an improved 
MA-ABE scheme [166] based on Chase‟s previous work. In the latest work, the 
central authority was removed and it provides secure privacy-preserving techniques 
and better security. In the improved framework, GID is still used as the identifier of 
users with same properties discussed before. Each pair of attribute authorities 
would share a secret key. For each user, he/she will request secret keys from each 
authority and combine them to get the decryption key. The authorities are not 
allowed to communicate with each other to prevent collusion attacks. Chase and 
Chow used anonymous techniques to hide the identity of users which means the 
GID is now completely hidden to the attribute authorities. The authorities cannot 
track user‟s attributes from the requests to identify the user and then combine their 
keys together to get decryption keys of the user. It achieves the pseurandomity, 
anonymity and untracebility, therefore, the privacy of the user is protected. They 
also provide extensions to the basic framework, such as to support more complex 
access structure and variable thresholds gates across authorities. 
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Figure 4.7Illustration of Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption 
 
The improved Chase and Chow‟s framework provides a more practical ABE 
scheme. However, the computational cost and communication overheads are high 
and complex. The user has to communicate with all the authorities to obtain the 
decryption key. In mobile Cloud environment, the processing power may not be 
strong enough and the mobile data network may not be reliable for completing all 
required communication. 
Lewko and Waters [164] proposed a decentralizing ABE scheme. In their 
system, any party can become an authority and there is no requirement for any 
global coordination other than the creation of an initial set of common reference 
parameters. A party can act as an authority simply by creating a public key and 
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issuing private keys to different users that reflect their attributes. Each authority can 
function entirely independently and can join or leave freely. The central authority is 
removed in the scheme. It is secure against any collusion attacks and it can process 
the access policy expressed in any Boolean formula over attributes. However, their 
method is constructed on a mathematical model that incurs heavy computational 
cost. 
Kan Yang and XiaohuaJia [167] designed an access control framework for 
multi-authority and proposed an efficient and secure MA-ABE scheme for Cloud 
storage. Their work is the first multi-authority scheme based on the CP-ABE 
scheme which does not require a central authority. However, they introduce a 
certificate authority which is responsible for assigning an unique identity for each 
user and an authority identity for each attribute authority. The certificate authority 
is also fully trusted. 
Li et al. proposed a framework that achieved fine-grained, cryptographically 
enforced data access control model based on MA-ABE scheme for the medical 
records stored in the Cloud [168]. The patient uploads his encrypted PHI files to the 
Cloud storage using KP-ABE scheme; then the doctor or nurse requests the PHI file 
based on the attributes received from all the authorities. However, their proposed 
framework is based on a single central authority, which may be the bottleneck of 
the systems. Akinyele et al. presented a design of self-protecting electronic medical 
records using KP-ABE scheme on mobile devices [169]. Their system allows 
healthcare organizations to export medical records to locations outside of their trust 
boundary. Each encrypted record has its own access policy. They implemented an 
iPhone client application for storing and managing medical records offline. 
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However, their work is not suitable for the collaboration environment since it is a 
single authority based scheme.  
In mobile Cloud environment, real-time context-related attributes can be 
captured to provide more complex policies to secure the data access control. These 
attributes can be time, current location, date, IMEI number and any other contextual 
attributes. Those can be derived from the local context information using the 
hardware embedded within smart devices.  Enforcing these attributes into the 
encrypted data during the encryption can effectively reduce the risk of collusion 
attack. Several works are discussed in the following paragraphs. They have 
proposed approaches to incorporate such type of attributes. 
Liao and Chao [170] proposed a location-based encryption scheme. They 
proposed a location-dependent approach to incorporate the coordinates while 
encrypting. The user can only decrypt the data when the coordinates acquired for 
GPS receiver are matched with the target coordinate. Considering the inaccuracy 
and inconsistency of the GPS signal, they involve a toleration distance to increase 
the practicality. However, privacy-preserving and data access control were not 
considered. A secure, selective group broadcast system in vehicular networks using 
dynamic attribute-based encryption is presented by Chen et al. in [171]. Chen et al. 
introduced a fading function to CP-ABE scheme in order to allow attribute level 
updates. The fading functions allow treating attributes in accordance with their rate 
of change so that attributes can be updated independently from the entire private 
keys. By choosing a proper fading rate, the balance of trade-offs between security 
and efficiency can be controlled to deliver a better broadcasting service or a better 
security services. Their work finds a solution for using context-related attributes 
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under a single domain. Xu and Martin proposed a dynamic user revocation and key 
refreshing for ABE in Cloud storage [172]. In Xu and Martin‟s model, the system 
can refresh the system keys or remove the access from a user without issuing new 
keys to other users or re-encrypting existing ciphertexts. Therefore, the mobile user 
can have a more flexible solution to protect their data and privacy in the mobile 
Cloud environment. 
4.3.4  Challenges 
In the ABE scheme, collusion attack is the most important challenge. For example, 
Alice is a doctor in hospital A and Bob is a student at City University London. 
Sender encrypts a message with two out of three of the following attributes: doctor 
of hospital A, student at City University London, and home address in London. If 
Bob and Alice combine their attributes then they have two out of three required 
attributes, but they should not be able to get the decryption keys to obtain the 
content of the message. 
Sahai[160] addressed this issue by generating different random sharing of a 
secret for each user. So private keys issued for different users cannot be combined. 
In Chase‟s original MA-ABE scheme [165], GID is introduced as the identifier of 
each user and can be distinguished by each authority to prove the possession of 
attributes. In MA-ABE, the scenario is different from the single authority. 
Assuming that there are two authorities, AA1and AA2. Alice request keys for 
attribute set S1 from AA1and S2 from AA2. Then Bob also requests keys for 
attributes S1 for AA1 and S2 from AA2. If the authorities do not exchange 
information about the two requests and Alice and Bob are identified by nothing 
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beyond their attributes. So from the authorities‟ point of view, the two scenarios 
must be identical. By using the GID, the authorities can distinguish these two 
scenarios in order to prevent collusion attacks. 
However, using the GID may cause the system to issue the decryption keys 
based on the identifier and not based on the attributes. So Chase still uses the central 
authority to issue a setup key for the user‟s GID. The central authority will not 
monitor any attributes; user only sends the GID to it and receives the key. Each 
authority computes his own independent secret by giving away only the GID. With 
the key obtained from the central authority, the user can always combine the results 
to obtain the secret. The secret given by each authority is a pseudorandom secret 
and only combined with the key from the central authority. 
In Chase and Chow‟s improved MA-ABE scheme [166], without the adding of 
additional key of the central authority, each attribute authority generates a set of 
secret while issuing keys. When user receives these keys and reconstructs the secret, 
the computation will use these secrets to get the summation which is equal to 1 or -1. 
The innovative mathematical design successfully addressed these issues. MA-ABE 
is an ideal solution for data security in the mobile Cloud environment, since it 
combines the techniques of access control and cryptographic technologies.. 
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4.4  Conclusion 
A large amount of personal data is generated by mobile-based services; these 
user-generated data must be properly protected from unauthorized usage. Advances 
in technology and the rapid use of mobile Cloud computing systems created a 
necessity for protecting context sensitive information transferred through the 
system. The access control is not only for defining who is able to take actions on 
resources, but also to control the purpose for which the resources were accessed. In 
mobile Cloud environments, there are real-time contextual attributes which can be 
derived from the context information. From this aspect, the access control model 
for a mobile use case should be able to capture not only the static attributes of 
related stakeholders, but also dynamic attributes to improve the security level. 
The DAC, ManAC and RBAC are designed for a traditional 
privacy-preserving scenario. They can still continue to contribute to suitable 
environments. In today‟s mobile Cloud environment, user‟s mobile devices can be 
considered as a node on the whole network. Those smart devices are always 
provided with Internet access through Wi-Fi or 3/4G data networks. They are 
powerful enough to execute any Web-based or Cloud-based services. Security and 
privacy-preserving framework is required to secure the communication between 
two parties and also to protect the collected personally identifiable information in 
the connected digital society. ABAC is a flexible, scalable, and fine-grained access 
control model which has shown enormous potential in the last couple of years to 
enhance the service provisioning from smart mobile handsets. Considering the 
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nature of attribute-based authorization, XACML is an ideal privacy policy 
language to work with ABAC. The combination of XACML and ABAC can 
address privacy-related issues in the mobile Cloud environment. 
The MA-ABE scheme is a suitable solution for addressing issues of both 
security and privacy aspects in mobile Cloud environment. This chapter examined 
the privacy protection technologies of attribute-based encryption schemes for 
encryption and access control of personal data. Existing privacy protection 
techniques are not designed for mobile environments. The work proposed in this 
thesis will combine state of the art existing access control and privacy preserving 
techniques to provide a novel framework through which the personal data can be 
protected in a mobile Cloud environment. 
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5 User-Centric Attribute-Based Access Control Model 
Using XACML 
 
The exponential growth of mobile applications let users to leave a substantial 
amount of online data via Cloud-based services such as Google services inthe  
Internet. As discussed in Chapter 3, leaving the data (personal) in online Cloud 
storage raises privacy issues. There is a need for user-centric approach whereby 
users can control the usage of their personal data in order to mitigate privacy 
breaches. Therefore, in today‟s mobile Cloud environment, privacy protections are 
important and technologies for protecting privacy are considered as vital features in 
mobile Cloud-based services. Hence, in this Chapter the author proposed a general, 
flexible approach to support the user-centric access control model based on 
XACML, where user controls the privacy of personal data in the mobile Cloud 
environment. 
 This chapter provides an implementation of a user-centric access control model 
using XACML. Section 5.1 describes the architecture of the model and Section 5.2 
gives details of policy evaluation process. Section 5.3 gives the security evaluation 
of the proposed model followed by a case study. The proof of concept and 
implementation details are given in Section 5.4. The conclusion is given the 
chapter in Section 5.5. 
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5.1  Architecture of Policy-Based User-Centric Approach 
 
In a mobile Cloud environment, the following contextual attributes can be exploited 
to secure the personal data: location, time, date, app usage etc. These attributes can 
be exploited to authenticate the user who requests permission for data access. In the 
proposed approach, authorization is a mutual process between a user and a service 
provider (SP).  To allow a SP to access the personal data, the user authorizes the 
SP by pre-defined privacy access policies while the user is also challenged by the 
system in order to verify whether he/she is the actual user who is requesting 
services from the SP. An Attribute Authority (AA) which stores all the users‟ and 
SPs‟ attributes for authorization is introduced. The AA is a trusted party by both the 
users and SPs. By defining personal privacy access policies, users can control the 
disclosure of sensitive information which is stored online (e.g. Cloud based 
storage). Thus, the proposed model enables the mobile users to authorize the SP 
with the participation of AA. By using the available context-related attributes, the 
system also verifies the user to ensure it is the actual person who is requesting the 
services. Compared with the current identity management systems, the proposed 
model focuses on using context-related attributes to verify a mobile Cloud user at 
run-time which is more flexible and secure in mobile Cloud environment, and 
provides data access control for the mobile Cloud user to enforce access control 
on his/her online data. 
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In the proposed model, the users define XACML policies in order to control 
the access to their personal online data. XACML is a privacy access policy 
language which is a dialect for defining attribute-based access control policies 
[173]. The proposed user-centric approach has five main actors: the user, the SP, 
Policy Evaluation Component (PEC), the AA, and Identity Provider (IdP) as shown 
in Figure 5.1. 
In the proposed model, AA is considered as a central authority. It maintains the 
attributes of the users and SPs. SP has to register with AA in order to provide a 
service to the mobile Cloud user. AA assigns a unique Service Provider Identity 
(SPId) to the SP and this identity is stored at the AA. Any attributes related to the 
SP is also stored at the AA. In most of the current identity management systems, an 
identity provider authenticates the users and SPs[174]. It is also introduced in the 
proposed model, and it is not only responsible for authentication, but also connects 
the users, SPs, and the PEC. In order to restrict access control on users' online data, 
PEC is introduced to enforce access control. PEC is modified based on the standard 
XACML structure. It extends the existing XACML standard [151]with real-time 
authentication for the user. By cooperating with AA, real-time attributes such as 
location, time are used to verify the user. Therefore, the proposed model enables 
users to protect their online data by personal preferences in real-time. 
Details of each actor are briefly explained below: 
 User: A user is a person with a mobile device and the mobile device 
is connected to the Internet via the mobile data network or Wi-Fi.  
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 Attribute Authority: The AA is the trusted party that stores 
attributes representing the SPs and the users. 
 Policy Evaluation Component: PEC is the core component that 
formats all the requests into XACML requests, evaluates the access 
requests and performs the access decisions. 
 Identity Provider: IdP is responsible for authentication of the user 
and forwarding the access requests to the PEC. 
 Service Provider: A SP provides online resources (such as Cloud 
services or online data) to the user and requests user‟s data based on 
the policies. 
 
Figure 5.1 Framework of the proposed User-Centric Policy-Based Access 
Control Model Using XACML 
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The user‟s personally identifiable information was defined as PII in the 
previous chapter. In order to authorize the user, PII is used as key attributes for the 
user authorization process. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget suggests 
several examples of attributes related to the PII [175] as given below:  
 Name: Full name, maiden name, mother‟s name, or alias. 
 Personal Identification number: Social security number (SSN), 
passport number, driving licence number, taxpayer identification 
number, or financial account or credit card number. 
 Address Information: Street address, home address, IP address, or 
email address. 
 Personal Characteristics: Photographic image (especially face or 
other identifying characteristic), fingerprints, handwriting, or other 
biometric data. 
 Information about an individual that is linked or linkable to one of 
above: date of birth, place of birth, race, religion, weight, 
geographical indicators, employment information, medical 
information, education information, and financial information. 
 
In some countries, people are assigned with a unique number which can be 
used for identity verification. In the UK, driving licence number and National 
Insurance (NI) number can be considered as unique numbers. As studied in Chapter 
4, the Global Identity (GID) is considered as a key attribute in the proposed model 
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which stands as an identity of a user. The user is registered using the GID and other 
attributes. Assuming that the GID is a secret and only the user knows the exact 
value of the GID.  
The IdP and the PEC have an existing trust relationship. The user is assumed to 
request data and services from the SP. The IdP can also be a federated identity 
provider whereby the user can use the same identity to access any other partner sites. 
The user needs to register with IdP before requesting online resource from the SP. 
PEC is an online access control service, which enable users to define access control 
policies for their online data. PEC can be considered as a private Cloud that 
implements access control services on behalf of the user. AA is trusted by the user, 
SPs, and PEC. 
5.1.1  System Initialization 
In the proposed access control model, there are several steps that needs to be 
executed by both the user and the SPs in order to initialize the system. 
Initially, a user needs to finish the registration process. The registration process 
can be done online. The registration process includes the following steps: 
(1) Register with the IdP 
(2) Register with the AA 
(3) Define privacy access policies for his/her attributes at the PEC 
After the registration, the user‟s details such as username and password will be 
stored in the IdP, the data which is related to users‟ privacy is stored at the AA. For 
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instance, the NI number and driving licence number are stored at the AA. With the 
pre-defined XACML policy, the PEC can evaluate any access request on user‟s PII.  
For a SP, the registration process is explained below: 
(1) Register with the AA and assign a SPId 
(2) Register with the IdP 
After the registration, the SP‟s attributes such as SPId, name, address etc. are 
stored at the AA. SPId is considered as an identifier of the SP. 
 
5.1.2  Design of the Model 
The main goal of proposed model is to enable mobile Cloud usersto define access 
control polices on their online PII. Thus, data requesters who satisfy the access 
policy can be granted access on these sensitive personal online data. Assuming all 
the actors of the proposed model and any services or data provided by the system 
must be available online. The workflow of the proposed model is depicted by the 
stages described below: 
Stage one: for a registered user, the first step is to login into the system via IdP. 
After receiving the request, IdP starts the authentication process. If the user is 
successfully authenticated, he can then request any data or services from a SP. Once 
received the resource request, the SP would ask several attributes of the user in 
order to deliver the resource. In a mobile environment, the user should have full 
control over his online personal information. Thus, in order to protect user‟s 
privacy, an access control mechanism which restricts the access on user‟s personal 
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data is proposed. The SP must satisfy the privacy access policy defined by the user 
in order to gain the PII data. The policies stored at the PEC are used to control the 
access on user‟s data and the policy evaluation is carried out by the PEC. 
Stage two: after requesting the data or services, the IdP generates a local 
security context based on the request. The security context contains information of 
the user, SP and the requested resources. The security context will be forwarded to 
the PEC by IdP.  
Stage three: after receiving the security context, PEC extracts information 
about the user, SP and the requested resource from the security context. PEC 
executes the following three steps: 
Step 1: Retrieve the information of the SP, query the AA for the 
relevant attributes of the SP in order to check the authenticity of the SP. 
Step 2: Retrieve the information of the user, query the AA for the 
relevant attributes of the user to check the authenticity of the user. 
Step 3: Evaluate the request based on the policies stored in the Policy 
Repository. 
In order to verify the user in Step two in Stage three, the PEC needs to generate 
a challenge message and send it to the user. User‟s mobile device generates a 
response message based on user‟s inputs. Then PEC starts the policy evaluation if 
the verifications of the SP and user are successful. If the result of policy evaluation 
in Step 3 is successful, then PEC sends the result to the user and SP via IdP.  
 From the three stages, the proposed model support SSO which is an important 
feature in today's identity management systems. The use of real-time attributes 
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enables the proposed model to dynamically authenticate the user, which cannot be 
provided by the current identity management system such as OpenID, Liberty. 
Figure 5.2 depicts the workflow of the proposed model. The message flow is 
described below. 
 
Figure 5.2Illustration of the Message Flow of Proposed User-Centric 
Policy-Based Access Control Model 
(1)The user sends login requests to the IdP using the mobile device. 
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(2)The IdP sends challenge message to the user for authentication. 
(3)After the user inputs username and password, the mobile device 
generates a response message. 
(4)The IdP authenticates the user based on the response message. 
(5)The user sends a request to SP to access data or services. 
(6)The SP forwards the attribute of itself and the attributes of the 
requested resource to IdP 
(7)User sends his attributes to the IdP 
(8)The IdP generates a local security context based on the request. The 
context contains necessary attributes of the SP, the user and the 
requested resource. 
(9)The IdP forwards the request to the PEC for further policy 
evaluations. 
(10)The PEC receives the request and extracts any required information 
from the request. Then, the PEC queries the AA to check the validity 
of the SP. 
(11)The PEC queries the AA for the GID of the user and generates a 
challenge request to the user based on the GID. 
(12)After receiving the challenge, the user has to answer the challenge. 
The mobile device generates a response message which contains the 
user‟s answers and sends the response back to PEC. 
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(13)If the response is verified, then the PEC starts to evaluate the 
request. 
(14) If the request is approved, the requestor will be granted permission. 
The decision will be sent to the IdP. 
(15) The IdP forwards the decision to both user and service provider. 
 
From Figure 5.2, it shows that once the mobile user requested the data or 
services from SPs, IdP starts to collect all the necessary information from the user 
and SP. The information from the user contains username, or location, time and any 
other dynamic real-time attributes. Meanwhile, the information also contains 
details of the SPs and the information about the requested resource. Such 
information consists of related attributes and the IdP generates a local security 
context based on these attributes. Thus, the security context consists of three parts:  
(1) Attributes of the user 
(2) Attributes of the SP 
(3) Attributes of the requested resources 
The PEC extracts necessary information from the security context and queries 
the AA for any information about SP. If the response from the AA shows that the 
SP is a legitimate provider, then the PEC checks whether the user has defined any 
access control policy for his personal data.  
Based on the requested resource, the SP asks any PII attributes of the user in 
order to deliver the resource. During this step, the PEC challenges the user in order 
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to authenticate the user‟s identity. Policy evaluation protects user‟s privacy. Such 
operations that are carried out at the PEC are the necessary steps for policy 
evaluation process of the system. In the next section, more details about the 
architecture of PEC and the policy evaluation process will be presented. 
 
5.2  Policy Evaluation Component (PEC) 
Policy Evaluation is the core process of a privacy policy-based access control 
system. In our model, PEC is the key component of the architecture. It is 
responsible for XACML authentication and authorization. After receiving the local 
security context, PEC starts to the access evaluation for the access requests. 
The PEC consists of the following main functional components:  
 CH: Context Handler, formats received access requests into XACML format 
 PEP: Policy Enforcement Point, issues access requests to the PDP and 
enforces access decisions 
 VP: Validating Point, verifies the SP 
 PDP: Policy Decision Point, evaluates the applicable policy and renders an 
authorization decision 
 RG: Request Generator, generates challenge requests to verify the user 
 PR: Policy Repository 
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Each component performs different functionalities and processes. Let us recall the 
local security context generated by IdP in the previous section. Once the PEC 
received the security context (see step 8 in Figure 5.2), the PEP extracts the 
attributes of the SP and user. Then PEC queries the AA for the attributes of the 
mobile user and SP. Figure 5.3shows the architecture of the PEC. 
 
 
Figure 5.3Architecture ofthe PEC 
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Figure 5.4 depicts the authorization process of the model. For instance, if a 
mobile user wants to purchase an item from the SP, then the user needs to request 
the mobile banking services to complete the payment. Generally, the user is 
concerned about the authenticity of the SP. At this time, the user needs to check 
whether it is the real SP with whom he/she wants to communicate. The VP 
compares the attributes of the SP obtained from AA and the attributes extracted 
from the security context received from IdP. If the SP is verified, RG will generate 
a challenge message. PEP forwards the challenge message to the user via IdP. 
User‟s mobile device displays this challenge request and waiting for the inputs from 
the user.  This step is to ensure that it is the actual account holder who is requesting 
the resource. A response message will be generated using the input and sent to the 
PEP. PEP forwards the response to VP. If VP successfully validates the user, CH 
will generate a XACML access request and send it to the PDP for policy evaluation. 
PDP makes the access decision based on the policies in the policy repository. If the 
access decision is “Deny”, then user‟s personal data will not be revealed to the SP.  
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Figure 5.4Illustration of Work Flow of Policy Evaluation 
 
The workflow of PEC is briefly depicted below: 
(1) IdP generates the security context and sends it the PEC 
(2) PEC retrieves attributes from AA 
(3) PEC starts to check whether the SP is a legitimate service provider or 
not 
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(4) A challenge message is generated by PEC in order to verify the user, 
the challenge is forwarded by the IdP 
(5) User‟s mobile device generates a response message based on user‟s 
input and sends it to the PEC via IdP 
(6) PEC starts to verify the user based on the response message 
(7) If the verification is successful, PEC then start the policy evaluation 
process 
(8) PEC sends the access decision to IdP 
(9) IdP forwards the decision to both the user and the SP 
 
This approach enables user to define privacy access policies to protect their 
data. In order to deliver data and services, SP requires user's PII. Current identity 
management systems cannot provide flexible access control mechanisms to help a 
mobile user restrict access on his/her PII. The proposed model is designed and built 
on top of the standard XACML framework. Users can simply define privacy access 
polices to control access from different requests on his online PII. The thesis 
contributes the access control model for mobile Cloud users by modifying the 
standard XACML framework. The access control evaluation is given in next 
subsection. 
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5.3  Security Evaluation 
5.3.1  Protocols on Authentication 
5.3.1.1  Protocols on Authentication  
Based on the message flow presented in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4, the protocols 
on authentication can be separated into the following stages. 
 User (smart devices) authenticates to the IdP 
(1) The user will request access to the SP from the IdP. 
(2) IdP challenges the user with username and password. 
(3) IdP verifies the user and redirect the user to the SP 
(4) The user log into the SP 
 
Figure 5.5Authentication between User and SP 
 
 SP authenticates to the PEC 
(1) SP sends attributes to IdP 
(2) IdP generates local security context  
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(3) IdP sends local security context to PEC 
(4) PEC verifies SP 
 
Figure 5.6Authenticaion for SP 
 
 User (smart devices) authenticates the PEC 
(1) User sends attributes to IdP 
(2) IdP generates local security context 
(3) IdP sends local security context to PEC 
(4) PEC challenges user using GID 
(5) User responses to the challenge 
(6) PEC verifies the user 
 
Figure 5.7Authentication for User 
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5.3.1.2  Security Parameters  Local Security Context 
Local Security Context is a set of attributes from user, SP and the required 
resources. The PEC validates user and SP based these attributes. It is 
defined in XML format. 
<SecurityContext> 
 <user> 
  <username>John</username> 
  <time>201206121230</time> 
  <organization>City University London</organization> 
 </user> 
 <SP> 
  <SPId>200010000001</SPId> 
  <SPName>Citi Bank</SPName> 
  <time>201206121235</time> 
 </SP> 
</SecurityContext> 
 
5.3.2  Security Analysis 
The current identity management systems and existing technologies provide 
powerful protection to the data confidentiality and integrity. The proposed model 
uses existing cryptographic technologies to secure data communications between 
each active role. The main goal of the proposed model, is to utilize the existing 
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dynamic attributes in a mobile Cloud environment to protect users' online data 
based on pre-defined privacy access policies. 
5.3.2.1  Access Evaluation 
Let consider the following simple scenario: A customer who lives in the UK is 
travelling to Paris. During the travel, he wants to use his mobile device to access the 
online service from a SP in Paris and at the same time would like to reject all 
requests for online transactions from the UK based ISPs during this period. The 
security analyse is given in the following subsections. 
Our proposed scheme is secure from spoofing attacks. Use the above scenario as a 
typical example and assume the user has defined an access policy that any access 
requests from Paris can be approved. The flow is based on Figure 5.2. 
 
User: Login to the IdP in Paris. 
Adversary: Registered at the IdP as a service provider. The user can request data or 
services from the adversary. Adversary want to collect users' online data without 
permission. 
(1) User request a service from the adversary 
(2) IdP collects attributes from the user and adversary 
(3) IdP collects access request on user's data from adversary 
(4) IdP generates local security context and sends to PEC 
(5) PEC extracts attributes from the local security context 
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(6) PEC queries AA to get legitimate attributes for AA 
(7) PEC verifies SP based on the attributes received from AA 
(8) PEC verifies the user based on the GID 
(9) The access request is evaluated by PEC 
(10) PEC sends the results to IdP 
(11) IdP processes the results 
 
Initially the user is logged in to the IdP. IdP collects the necessary attributes from 
both the user and SP. Attributes from user are location, time, username, OS, IMEI 
etc. Attributes from the SP are SPId, name, time, IP address, location etc. IdP 
generates the local security context, which is described below: 
<SecurityContext> 
 <user> 
  <username>user</username> 
  <time>2013007291600</time> 
  <location>Paris</location> 
  <OS>iOS 7.0</OS> 
 </user> 
 <SP> 
  <SPId>200010000001</SPId> 
  <SPName>Thomas Cook</SPName> 
  <time>2013007291600</time> 
  <location>London</location> 
  <IP>0.0.0.0</IP> 
 </SP> 
 <acessrequest> 
  <subject>Thomas Cook</subject> 
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  <object> 
   <name>John</name> 
   <gender>Male</gender> 
   <...> 
   ...... 
   </...> 
  </object> 
 </accessrequest> 
</SecurityContext> 
 
PEC extracts necessary attributes from the local security context. In order to verify 
the user and SP, it queries the AA for correct attributes to evaluate access request. 
Recall that the user has defined access policy on his personal online data. The 
adversary has to pass the following two steps. 
 PEC verifies SPId based on the AA's records 
Adversary's SPId which is sent via the local security context needs to 
match the record from the AA. 
 PEC evaluate the access request based on the user's pre-define policies. 
    If the SP passes the first step, PEC evaluates the access request. In this 
scenario, the request is: ''Thomas Cook requests John's online PII in UK'. 
The local security context proves user's current location is Pairs, thus the 
access policy is active. Based on the polices, the access decision is 
'FALSE'. 
The adversary can gain access to user's online data unless 1) it is a legitimate SP 
which has records in AA, and 2) its access requests satisfy user's privacy access 
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policy. Therefore, the proposed model provides extra protection on user's online 
data. 
Following the verification of the AA, PEC verifies the user based on the GID. The 
challenge message is displayed on the smart devices and asking user to input the 
GID. The consideration for this step is unauthorized use of the smart device. The 
'unauthorized use of the smart device' suggests that someone is trying to use the 
smart device without the user's permission. For instance, user lost the device in 
Pairs, someone got hold of the phone and ordered products on user's behalf. GID is 
sensitive information and only known to the user. 
5.3.2.2  Security on Communications 
Communication security is mainly focusing on the message confidentiality and 
integrity in the proposed mobile environment, which is evaluated with respect to 
the encryption or signature algorithm and the cryptographic keys. 
Roles in the proposed model such as SP, IdP, PEC and AA can be considered as 
online services providers．The communications between these entities are normally 
carried out using the public key infrastructure. Each entity has a private key and 
public key pair. The sender use its own private key to sign message and use the 
receiver's public key to encrypt the message. Thus, the receiver uses sender's public 
key to verify sender digital signature and decrypts the message using its own 
private key. 
With the development of mobile platforms, smart devices can provide more secure 
and flexible ways to secure communication. Android and iOS supports mobile apps 
using the SSL to secure the communications [176]. Hu et al. proposed a 3 factor 
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(PIN code, SIM card authentication and facial biometric) authentication method to 
protect the message security on Android platform [177].In the proposed model, the 
mobile user uses these existing technologies to protect message communications, 
however, provides more data access restrictions on his online data usage. 
 
5.3.3  User-Centric Approach 
In the proposed model, the IdP authenticates the users. If the user is successfully 
authenticated by the IdP, then he can request data or services from the SPs. A 
registered user trusts the AA and pre-defines the data access control policy for his 
PII data. The user initiates the access request for targeted resources from a SP; the 
IdP generates the local security context based on the request. The context consists 
of user‟s information (e.g. username), and SP‟s information (e.g. SPId).  
In order to deliver the requested resources to the user, the SP requests 
information about the user. In an e-health service use case, the SP needs to know the 
historical medical information of the user in order to provide medical advice. This 
raises a security issue: which part of information can be revealed to the e-health 
system? Most of the existing systems lack mechanisms to protect the user‟s PII. In 
default, SPs collect any information or allow a partner site to collect the required 
information. Hence, user has no control over the data once it leaves his premises.  
In our proposed model, more sensitive attributes are stored at the AA. AA has the 
ability to control the attributes disclosure. XACML privacy access policies can be 
defined by the user at PEC. Thus the user can control the disclosure of his PII from 
unauthorized access. 
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On receiving the security context from the IdP, the PEC extracts the 
information from the security context and then the PEC queries the AA to check the 
legality of the SP. Since the SP is registered at the AA with required information, 
the AA can validate the SP. This step ensures that the SP is a registered and 
legitimate provider. If the SP is verified, then the PEC queries the AA for user‟s 
information. In this scenario, the GID is considered as the identifier of the user. The 
following two phases are carried out to protect the user‟s privacy: 
 SP acquires user‟s attributes to satisfy its own policy in order to 
deliver resources to the user. 
 PEC receives the request from IdP, evaluates user‟s pre-defined 
policies to decide whether to disclose the requested data. 
These two phases are crucial for the mutual authorization and solve the 
potential authorization negotiation between the user and SP. The pre-defined 
policies have the higher priority than the policy defined for the requested resources. 
If there is a conflict that the SP is requiring sensitive information in which the 
pre-defined policies are forbidden, then the PEC rejects the SP‟s request to protect 
user‟s privacy. 
5.3.4  Use Case Study 
Many hospitals today are providing mobile services to the patients. The e-health 
service is a typical user case for mobile Cloud users. For example, a patient wants to 
choose a doctor in dental department. In order to serve the patient, the hospital 
requires his personal information. He firstly registers with the hospital system as a 
patient and uploads the PII and related medical records to the Cloud Storage, which 
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can be managed by the hospital system administrators. And then he defines an 
access policy that only a doctor in dental department can read his PII and the 
medical records. 
    In this scenario, the patient requesting the services from the hospital can be 
considered as the user in the proposed model. The Cloud storage is the AA who 
manages attributes for both the users and doctors. There is a central server which 
enforces access control and is responsible for the verification of user and SP. The 
central server can be considered as the PEC. 
After logging into the system, the patient requests for a dental service. A doctor 
responds to the request and chooses to treat the patient. The identity provider of the 
system receives the requests and collects attributes from the patient and the doctor. 
A local security context is created and sent to the central server. The central server 
extracts the attributes from the local security contexts. Based on these attributes, it 
queries the AA in order to verify the doctor and the patient. The verification method 
can be defined by the practical requirements. For instance, Doctor can be verified 
by the staff ID, job title, and department. The patient can be challenge not only by 
the GID, but also through security questions defined by himself. Once the 
verifications are successful, PEC evaluates the access request from the doctor. 
Neither a doctor from a department other than the dental department, nor a nurse 
from the dental department can gain access to user's PII and medical records. This 
information is available to a doctor from the dental department. 
 Thus, the patient restricts access on his online sensitive data. Privacy and data 
security are protected by unauthorized access. The policy-based access control 
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provides a simple method to the patient if he wants to disclose personal data to a 
specified entity. 
 
5.4  Proof of Concept 
5.4.1  Protocol Verification 
This section provides formal protocol verification and validation for the proposed 
model. Scyther tool [178-180] was developed by CasCremers for security protocol 
verification. It is a tool for the automatic verification and falsification of security 
protocols. Scyther provides a graphic user interface which incorporates the Scyther 
command line tool and python scripting interface. 
    The syntax of Scyther tool will not be discussed in the thesis, but some basic 
knowledge is explained in order to explain the protocol validation process. 
 send_1(X, Y, data1): role X sends data1 to role Y 
 recv_1(X, Y, data1): role Y receives data1 from role X 
 claim_x(X, Secret, data1):role X claims that the event of 'sending data1 to 
role Y' is secret. 
 The five actors in the proposed model is defined as role in the Scyther 
validation tool. The message flow sequence in Figure 5.2 is followed and 
implemented in the Scyther tool as follows: 
protocolProtocolValidation(User, SP, IdP, PEC, AA) 
{ 
 role User { 
  constuname: Data; 
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  freshattrU: Data; 
  var challenge: Nonce; 
  //user uses SSL to send username 
  send_1(User, IdP, {{uname}pk(IdP)}sk(User)); 
  //user sends real-time attributes 
  send_2(User, IdP, {{attrU}pk(IdP)}sk(User)); 
  //receives challenge from PEC 
  recv_7(PEC, User, {{challenge}pk(User)}sk(PEC)); 
  claim_user(User, Secret, uname); 
  claim_user(User, Secret, attrU); 
  claim_user(User, Secret, challenge); 
 } 
 role SP { 
  freshattrSP: Data; 
  //SP sends attributes to IdP 
  send_3(SP, IdP,  {{attrSP}pk(IdP)}sk(SP)); 
  claim_sp(SP, Secret, attrSP); 
 } 
 roleIdP { 
  varuname: Data; 
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  varattrU, attrSP: Data; 
  freshLSConxt: Data; 
  //IdP sends local security context to PEC 
  send_4(IdP, PEC, {{LSConxt}pk(PEC)}sk(IdP)); 
  //receive username from user 
  recv_1(User, IdP, {{uname}pk(IdP)}sk(User)); 
  //receive attributes from user 
  recv_2(User, IdP, {{attrU}pk(IdP)}sk(User)); 
  //receive attributes from SP 
  recv_3(SP, IdP,  {{attrSP}pk(IdP)}sk(SP)); 
  claim_idp(IdP, Secret, uname); 
  claim_idp(IdP, Secret, attrU); 
  claim_idp(IdP, Secret, attrSP); 
  claim_idp(IdP, Secret, LSConxt); 
 } 
 role PEC { 
  varLSConxt, rslt: Data; 
  freshqury, challenge: Nonce; 
  //PEC quiries AA for legitimate information 
  send_5(PEC, AA, {{qury}pk(AA)}sk(PEC)); 
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  //PEC send challenge to user 
  send_7(PEC, User, {{challenge}pk(User)}sk(PEC)); 
  //PEC receives loncal security from PEC 
  recv_4(IdP, PEC, {{LSConxt}pk(PEC)}sk(IdP)); 
  //PEC receives quiry result from AA 
  recv_6(AA, PEC, {{rslt}pk(PEC)}sk(AA)); 
  claim_pec(PEC, Secret, LSConxt); 
  claim_pec(PEC, Secret, qury); 
  claim_pec(PEC, Secret, rslt); 
  claim_pec(PEC, Secret, challenge); 
 } 
 role AA { 
  varqury: Nonce; 
  freshrslt: Data; 
  //send quiry result to AA 
  send_6(AA, PEC, {{rslt}pk(PEC)}sk(AA)); 
  //receive quiries from PEC 
  recv_5(PEC, AA, {{qury}pk(AA)}sk(PEC)); 
  claim_aa(AA, Secret, qury); 
  claim_aa(AA, Secret, rslt); 
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 } 
} 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Validation of the Proposed Model by Scyther Toll 
 
The result of Scyther has proved the claims of implemented protocol. During the 
whole message flow, all communications is claims as secret. No potential attacks 
are found. It can been seen from Figure 5.8 that all secret parameters from each 
actor in the proposed model is secure. 
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5.4.2  Implementation and Tests 
The proposed model is implemented in a mobile web service platform as a 
prototype. The development is based on the open source software development 
platform[15, 181-184]. The functionalities of four entities; IdP, SP, mobile user, 
and the AA were developed separately as shown in Figure 5.5. The 
communications between each entity uses SOAP messages. 
 
 
Figure 5.9Proof of Concept 
Client app for the mobile device is developed using Eclipse and the 
implementation is based on Android JDK using version β.γ.γ. The AA‟s and SP‟s 
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functionalities are developed and deployed on JAX-WS web service using Apache 
Tomcat Web Server [183] in Netbeans [185].  The IdP is also built on top of the 
Tomcat server. The administration functionalities are implemented using JSP 
containers. The J2EE and JSP containers connect with MySQL database for storing 
and retrieving of administrative information such as identity information that are 
stored at the IdP‟s database. The AA also stores all the attributes in the database. 
The XACML engine is developed based on Sun XACML 2.0 implementation 
[182].  
The architecture is feasible to integrate more than one SP into the systems and 
SPs can be implemented using different software development approaches. The 
implementation of access control system is based on the XACML architecture. The 
following section will discuss the message standard of XACML language. 
5.4.3  Sample Screenshots of the Client Application 
The screenshots of Android emulator are provided in Figures5.6-5.9. These figures 
depict several key steps such as user login (Figure 5.6), the SP's request for the 
user‟s PII (Figure 5.7), policy evaluation process (Figure 5.8), and policy decision 
(Figure 5.9) of the proposed user-centric attribute-based access control model. The 
author implemented the XACML policy evaluation process as an online back-end 
service. In Netbeans, the policy evaluation can be tested as a stand-alone service 
under Glassfish server. The Figure 5.10 depicts the screenshot of the policy 
evaluation verification page.  
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Figure 5.10Login Page of the Client Application 
 
Figure 5.11Requesting Page of the Client Application 
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Figure 5.12Information Gathering at PEC 
 
Figure 5.13Authorization Result of PEC Service 
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Figure 5.14Service Test Page 
 
Figure 5.14 depicts the test page of the PEC service. In Figure 5.14, the 
following two different methods are given: generateRequest() for generating 
XACML request and pdpService() for policy evaluation. The first method is a 
service for PEC to generate a dynamic XACML request for the SP on user‟s PII 
data. The second method is a service of PEC to evaluate the PII access request.Let 
us make the pdpService() as an example. In order to test the pdpService(), the 
following four parameters need to be entered: user_id, user‟s email address, the 
authentication state of the user, and the current location.   
Figure 5.15 shown below is a screenshot of SOAP request and SOAP response 
when a data requester is successfully granted access on user's PII. The SOAP 
request part in Figure 5.15 shows the access request, which includes the four 
required attributes from the data requester: user_id, email address, state of 
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authentication, and location data. The SOAP request is received by the PEP and 
formatted by CH. PDP evaluates the formatted request based on the pre-defined 
policies.  
 
Figure 5.15PEC Service Test 
The SOAP response part in Figure 5.15 shows the decision of the access 
request. The decision is made by PDP and CH converts it to original format and 
sends it back to PEP. Thus, PEP can forward the decision to the user and SP. 
It shows that the XACML policy evaluation process is successfully loaded and 
works fine. 
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5.4.4  Possible Extension 
The implementation was currently worked under the scenario for one SP. However, 
based on the study of the existing identity management system in Section 3, our 
system can accommodate more than one SPs. User‟s identity can be considered as a 
federated identity. Therefore, our system can be extended to accommodate a list of 
SPs as long as they have done the registration process described in Section 5.1.1. 
 
5.4.5  XACML Message Standard 
This section describes polices used for the data access control, and construction of 
XACML request/response messages during the transmission.  
5.4.5.1  XACML Policy 
At the root tag of XACML policies is a Policy or a PolicySet. A PolicySet is a 
container that can hold other Policies or PolicySets, as well as references to policies 
found in remote locations. A Policy represents a single access control policy, 
express through a set of Rules. Each XACML policy document contains exactly 
one Policy or PolicySet root XML tag. Therefore, a Policy or PolicySet may 
contain multiple policies or Rules, each of which may have different access 
decisions. XACML defines a collection of Combining Algorithms which reconcile 
the decisions from each decision that is evaluated by policies or rules. 
A policy example which defines that any user who holds an email address from 
the domain of “city.ac.uk” can get access to read any resources at 
“http://www.city.ac.uk” is presented in the section Appendix 
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5.4.5.2  XACML Request Context 
In a XACML policy-based system, every access request has to be formatted using 
XACML‟s specification. A XACML request contains the necessary information to 
make authorization decisions. Basically it has the subject‟s (requestor) attributes, 
the resources‟ attributes and the operation that the subject wants to perform on the 
resource. 
Regarding to the above policy example, a user who holds an email account 
“Alice@city.ac.uk” requests the resources of School of Engineering and 
Mathematical Sciences at http://www.city.ac.uk. This XACML request is given in 
Appendix. 
5.4.5.3  XACML Response Context 
As a result of evaluating the policy, the response context contains only the decision 
and the requested resource. Regarding the policy example and response context 
example, the user has an email account “Alice@city.ac.uk”, hence she can obtain 
the data consent on the resources at “http://www.city.ac.uk/”. The policy evaluation 
decision should be Permit. The response context is listed in Appendix. 
5.5  Discussion 
Attributes based access control scheme, which makes access decision based on the 
attributes of requestors, resources, and environment can provide greater flexibility 
in today‟s environment. The model is constructed based on XACML. XACML 
model use attributes as the key factor to authorize data consent. With standardised 
specifications and components, it can flexibly solve privacy related issues for 
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mobile devices. In XACML based model, each access request, the complete 
XACML hierarchy must be processed in order to find the matching policy sets, 
policies and rules, to evaluate them ,and to compute access decision result[186].In 
reality, authorization policies comprise of thousands of users and millions of 
resources. A XACML based model requires service to establish all the required 
components to complete a XACML request/response, which reduces the flexibility 
to build a privacy preserving model for mobile devices. The efficiency of the whole 
system may be decreased by such process. The computing and memory 
consumption for evaluating policies are high cost tasks. XACML message is 
transmitted in XML format and the parsing overhead of XML documents is also an 
issue [187] that needs attention.  As a result, a more light-weight and general 
solution is required to satisfy today‟s security and privacy issues of mobile devices. 
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5.6  Conclusion 
The proposed user-centric policy-based access control model uses the attributes 
from any related stakeholders in the mobile environment. By involving the trusted 
attribute authority, user has the ability to check the legality of the requested service 
providers and define his/her own access privacy policies to protect the sensitive 
personal information. Thus, the user has the control of his online data to decide who 
can be granted access to the personal information. The access can also be restricted 
to a certain part of the personal information. By using specific attributes that are 
provided by the mobile devices, services providers and the related environment, the 
proposed user-centric access control model establishes a secure mobile Web 
service environment. In addition to this, it helps to grow the customer confidence 
and also provides seamless access to their mobile financial services from anywhere, 
at any time at a touch of a button. 
  
 
140 
 
6 Context-Aware Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter gives a design of context-aware attribute-based encryption (ABE) 
scheme for smart mobile devices. Due to the recent technological advancements in 
mobile devices, powerful processors and various sensors are embedded within 
smartphones. This trend allows millions of people to use smartphones for their 
work and day-to-day social activities. In order to support this transformation, the 
traditional Cloud computing infrastructures are being modified into mobile Cloud 
computing. 
 Chapter 5 presented a model for mobile Cloud users to enforce access control 
over their PII to prevent the privacy attack from unauthorized service providers. 
However, in Cloud infrastructures, platforms and applications are provided by the 
third-party Cloud service providers. Hence, the Cloud service providers have 
control over the data that is stored in the Cloud storage and can monitor the 
communications between the end user and the Cloud with or without their prior 
consent. The Cloud computing organisations should invest heavily in risk 
assessment to ensure system security and compliance.  
    Furthermore, the user experience and usability are important factors that can 
influence a mobile application. Users prefer using applications with good 
performance and user interface. Traditional security mechanisms such as multiple 
passwords, several memorable security questions, security patterns etc. should be 
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avoided in mobile Cloud environment as they are complex and infeasible. The 
smartphone features should be exploited to provide robust access control with less 
user operations. Therefore, the contextual attributes such as location, time, app 
usage, unlock failure etc. in mobile Cloud environment should be involved in the 
security framework. 
This chapter presents a context-aware attribute-based encryption scheme for smart 
mobile devices. It extends the functionality of the proposed model in Chapter 5 for 
Cloud data storage with data confidentiality and addresses some shortcomings in 
usability and user experience. The real-time contextual attributes are further 
investigated via profile-behaviour profiling techniques. The framework is designed 
to address the following issues: 
- The confidentiality and anonymity for data storage in mobile Cloud 
environment. 
- Development of lightweight cryptographic technology, hence the 
data owner encrypts, uploads, and decrypts the data using mobile 
device with low computational cost. 
- The data owner has the control of his personal data, and can define 
flexible privacy access policies using context information (e.g. 
location, time, date). 
- The proposed framework reduces the communication overheads 
compared to the conventional schemes since it is designed for 
mobile networks and utilizes the existing Cloud infrastructure. 
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- Reduce the existing trust relationship between each stakeholder to 
reduce the security risk. 
 
The following three algorithms are proposed in the following sections: (1) 
context-aware ABE scheme based on single authority, (2)context-aware ABE 
scheme based on multiple authorities, and (3) low-complexity multi-authority ABE 
scheme which is designed to reduce the computation and communication overheads 
of mobile devices. 
The available context-related attributes of mobile Cloud environment are used 
in the proposed algorithms in order to strengthen the data security. The 
context-related attributes can be determined by behaviour-profiling techniques[93, 
188-190]. Mobile user‟s activities such as app usage, network usage, charging 
times and unlock failures have been used to profile the user-behaviour. This 
user-behaviour profile can be used to detect anomaly activities and provide more 
fine-grained level of security.  
Let us assume that there is an app installed in mobile-device which can be used 
to detect anomalous activities (let us call this app as “behaviour-profiling” app). 
Installing the behaviour-profiling app in the user‟s mobile device can be used to 
capture the real-time attributes. Such attributes can be used to verify whether the 
current user is the phisical owner of the mobile device. In the following three 
algorithms, assuming that user‟s mobile device has the profiling-behaviour app 
installed and the context-related attributes can be captured by the app. There is a 
mapping function M, embedded within the behaviour-profiling app. M outputs “yes” 
Chapter 6. Context-Aware Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes 
143 
 
if the particular attributes satisfied the requirements. The outputs will be used by the 
following three algorithms for the user to recover the encrypted data. 
 
6.2  Context-Aware Single Authority Attribute-Based Encryption 
Scheme 
  
In this section, a context-aware attribute-based encryption scheme with single 
authority is described. It is designed for mobile users to share and store their 
personal data securely in the Cloud storage. A user has his personal data such as 
location records, medical history stored in the Cloud. He would not allow any 
unauthorized requesters to access this sensitive information, even the Cloud 
service provider. This can only be achieved by storing the data in the encrypted 
form in the Cloud storage. In the meantime, access control techniques should also 
be deployed to restrict access to the data. Attribute-based encryption techniques 
are considered as the ideal solution together with the access control models for 
authentication of the users. A data owner can upload encrypted data in the Cloud, 
and the encrypted data was enforced with access control polices during the 
encryption process. Access policies are defined by the data owner, thus, he 
determines who can access the data. A user will request data from an Attribute 
Authority, which is responsible for maintaining the attributes, verifying the user 
authenticity, and also issuing the decryption keys. 
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Figure 6.1The Framework of Single Authority ABE scheme. 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the architecture of single authority ABE scheme. Four actors are 
involved in the scheme, the data owner, the AA, the user and Cloud Storage. A 
data owner uses the contextual attributes and static attributes from AA to 
encrypted his data and uploads it to the Cloud storage. A user downloads the data 
and requests decryption keys based on his attributes. The AA verifies the user and 
issues the decryption keys to the user. 
6.2.1  Preliminaries 
This section gives the background information and security assumption for the 
ABE scheme. Figure 6.1 shows the architecture of the single authority ABE 
scheme. 
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6.2.1.1  Bilinear Pairings 
Let �1 and �2be two cyclic groups of order q for some large prime q and g is a 
generator of �1. A bilinear map e :�1× �1→ �2between these two groups. The 
map must satisfy the following properties: 
 Bilinear: A map e :�1× �1→ �2is bilinear if e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all P, 
Q ∈ �1and all a, b ∈ ℤ. 
 Non-degenerate: The map does not send all pairs in �1× �1to the identity 
in �2. Observe that since �1,�2are groups of prime order, this implies 
that  e(g, g) ≠ 1. 
 Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any P, 
Q ∈ �1. 
 
6.2.1.2  Complexity Assumption: Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
(DBDH) Assumption 
Suppose a challenger chooses a, b, c, z ∈ ℤq at random, the DBDH assumption is 
that no polynomial-time adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple (A =  ga, B =  
gb, C =  gc,Z =  e(g, g)abc) from the tuple (A =  ga, B =  gb, C =  gc,Z =  e(g, g)z) with 
more than a negligible advantage. 
 
6.2.1.3  Secret Sharing Scheme 
In a secret sharing scenario, a data D is divided into n pieces. In order to reconstruct 
D, a threshold value k where 1< ݇ ≤ ݊ is defined. Only if there are k pieces shares 
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or more comes together, then user can reconstruct the secret D. Complete 
knowledge of (k – 1) pieces reveals no information about D. The scheme was firstly 
invented by Adi Shamir in 1979 [161]. 
 
6.2.2  Construction 
The section will begin by explain how the traditional ABE scheme can be 
converted into context-aware ABE scheme. In a single authority ABE scheme, 
there is only one attribute authority (AA) maintains a set of attributes and 
corresponding encryption and decryption credentials. In contrast to the 
conventional ABE scheme, a data owner in the proposed scheme can encrypt the 
data by not only using credentials obtained from AAs but also using context-related 
attributes based on the data owner‟s preferences. 
 The proposed algorithm is composed of four sub algorithms namely Setup, 
Key Issuing, Encryption and Decryption. Functionalities of each algorithm are 
briefly explained in the following: 
 Setup: The setup algorithm takes a security parameter as input and 
outputs a bilinear group and a set of security parameters. 
 Key Issuing: AA generates decryption key for a user u that holds a 
set of attributes. 
 Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of attributes 
maintained by AAs as well as a set of context-related attributes 
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defined by data owner and data as inputs and outputs the ciphertext 
of the data. 
 Decryption: The decryption algorithm inputs the decryption 
credentials received from AAs and context-related parameters 
obtained from the smart mobile device and the ciphertext. Then it 
outputs the original data. 
 
The descriptions of the four sub algorithms are detailed below. 
Setup S 
 For a given security parameter �and � ∈ {0, 1}ݏ݌݋݈ݕ (λ), group bilinear 
parameters are generated by the AA: q, g, �1ึS(1� ;   �). 
 AA randomly picks a secret y, tA,i ∈  ℤq for each attribute i(1 ≤ ݅ ≤ n) 
and publishes corresponding public keys {Ti = �ݐܣ,݅} ∀i and Y =  e (g, g)y. 
Key Issuing KI 
 To issue decryption keys to user u, the AA chooses a random polynomial  
pu with degree (d – 1) where  pu(0) = y. 
 The AA generates decryption credential for ith attribute for the user u as: 
Dui =   �݌ݑ (݅) ݐܣ ,݅ where ∀i ∈ Au(Au denotes the attributes set of the user 
u). 
Encryption E 
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The data owner encrypts the message m for a set of attributes Am=  AA׫AC, 
where AA = {a a,1, …, a a,N} denotes the attributes maintained by AA and AC =  ܽܿ,1,… ,ܽܿ ,݊  denotes the context-related attributes defined by the data owner, as 
follows: 
 The data owner randomly chooses sA , sB∈  ℤq, and encrypts the message  
as ܧ݊ܥ݉  =  mܻݏܤ . 
 The data owner computes E0 = h(M(a a,1)∥ M(a a,2)∥… M(a a,n))ܻݏܣ+ݏܤ, Ei = �ݐ݅ܵܣ∀i ∈ AA, where h : {0, 1} ื ℤq is a secure function, M is a 
mapping function of context related attributes and  ∥  denotes 
concatenation. 
 Now the data owner uploads CTm= {ܧ݊ܥ݉ , E0, Ei, ∀i ∈ AA, and AC} into 
the Cloud. 
Decryption D 
 User downloads CTm  from the Cloud and checks the required attributes 
to obtain the message m. 
 User computes e(Ei, Di)  =  e(g, g)݌ݑ (݅)ܵܣ  for any attribute i∈ACת Au. 
 Using interpolation technique, user can compute ܻܵܣ=  e(g, g)݌(0)ܵܣ  =  
e(g, g)ݕܵܣ . 
Now the behaviour-profiling application installed in user‟s mobile device 
computes the hash value of context related attributes such as location, risk-level 
associated with current location and risk-level associated with user behaviour and 
outputs h(M(a’a,1)∥M(a’a,2)∥…M(a’a, n)). 
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User can decrypt the data as follows: 
 
ܧ݊ܥ݉  ∙  ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊))YSAܧ0  
 
=     ܻ݉ܵܤ ∙   ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊))YSAℎ(ܯ(ܽܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽܽ, ݊)) ܻݏܣ+ݏܤ 
 
 If and only if:  
h(M(a a,1)∥M(a a,2)∥…M(a a,n)) =  ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊)) , 
then the user can get the message m. 
The novelty in our scheme compared to the conventional ABE scheme lies in 
encryption and decryption sub algorithms which are detailed in the following: 
denote the context related attribute set defined by the data owner as AC= 
{aC,1, …,aC,n}, where aC,I  denotes context related attributes. For sake of simplicity, 
consider the following three context related attributes: aC,1 = “location”, aC,2 = “risk 
level with his recent app usage” and aC,3 = “unlock failures in last two days”. Now 
the data owner defines AC as follows: 
AC = {aC,1  =  “London”, aC,2< “γ” and aC,3< “β”}, assume that risk level 
varies between 1 to 10 where higher risk denoted by larger value. Then computes  ܧ0 = ℎ(ܮ݋݊݀݋݊ ∥ ݕ݁ݏ ∥ ݕ݁ݏ)ܻܵܣ+ܵܤ .  
This is the hash value of the required context-related information and is 
considered as the access policy of the encrypted message. Using the client 
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application installed in the mobile device, the user will capture the real-time context 
related attributes such as, location. The mapping function, M, outputs “yes” if the 
current risk level is less than threshold defined by employer. This ensures that the 
employee has all the credentials from AA, context-related attributes enforced by the 
employer also need to be satisfied in order to decrypt the message. 
 The security and performance analysis will be discussed in the Section6.3.3. 
 
6.3  Context-Aware Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption 
Scheme 
In this section, the author describes the context-aware MA-ABE scheme. In a single 
authority scenario, there is only one AA will monitor all the attributes and issues 
encryption and decryption credentials for the users. It is a fully trusted party which 
users have to prove his identity in order to obtain a decryption credential. For 
instance, to decrypt a message m, a user proves his identity with required set of 
attributes and receives the decryption credentials based on those attributes. In this 
case, the AA has too much power which provides itself with the ability to decrypt 
all communication messages and knows all the user‟s attributes. In the event of 
corruption and/or compromise, the message‟s confidentiality cannot be achieved 
and user‟s privacy can be revealed to the attackers. This is one of the drawbacks in 
single authority based ABE scheme. 
Meanwhile, it is more convenient to monitor and maintain different sets  of 
attributes by different authorities in real world. As mentioned in Section 3.6.3, NHS 
manages UK national health information system and the UK drivers and vehicles‟ 
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information is maintained by the Department of Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA). Hence, in reality, it is impossible for a single authority to monitor all these 
attributes and hence a viable solution is to go for multiple authorities based ABE 
scheme (MA-ABE). Several MA-ABE schemes without considering context 
information were proposed in [164-166].  
In the context-aware MA-ABE scheme, each AA manages different sets of 
attributes and issues credentials for the employees based on a set of attributes. The 
AA defines a threshold value dk so that the message can be decrypted only if a user 
has at least dk number of given attributes from the AA. There is no trusted central 
authority exists for issuing keys and verifying identities. 
 
6.3.1  Preliminaries 
6.3.1.1  Bilinear Pairings and Complexity Assumption 
The bilinear pairings and complexity assumptions are the same in section 6.2.1. 
6.3.1.2  Two-phase Commit Protocol 
Two-phase commit protocol (2PC protocol) is a distributed algorithm that 
coordinates all the processes that participate in a distributed transaction on whether 
to commit or abort the transaction [191, 192]. The protocol is a standard protocol 
for making commit and abort atomic. In a normal execution of a single distributed 
transaction, the protocol consists of two phases: 
(1) The Commit-request Phase: In this phase, a coordinator attempts to 
prepare all the required participating process for transactions. Define 
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necessary steps for either committing or aborting the transaction for 
every participant. 
(2) The Commit Phase: The coordinator decides whether to commit or 
abort the transaction based on the response from the participants 
(commit or abort), and notifies the results to all the participants.  Then 
the participants take actions regards to the result. 
6.3.1.3  Anonymous Key Issuing Protocol 
In our MA-ABE scheme, the central authority which holds the master secret was 
removed. An anonymous key issuing protocol under the structure of Chase and 
Chow‟s scheme [166] is presented. 
 In MA-ABE system, public parameters are available for users and AAs. A user 
can request secret keys from an AA provided he has some attributes which are 
managed by the AA. Then key generation algorithm will be executed by the AA 
and the corresponding secret keys will be returned to the user. When a data owner 
wants to encrypt a message, he makes use of the public parameters together with an 
attribute set of his choice to carry out the encryption. Any user can obtain the 
decryption keys from the corresponding keys to the attributes. 
Define GID as the global identifier of the user. u is the GID of the user; it can 
be a hash value of the GID. The user uses the anonymous key issuing protocol to 
obtain decryption keys without the central authority. Before starting the key issuing 
process, the kth AA has to generate several parameters. 
Using the key issuing algorithm presented, the kth AA shares a secret ݏ݇ ,݆ , with 
jth AA and picks ݔ݇ ∈  ℤݍ , and computes ݕ݇ = �1ݔ݇ . Thus, the kth AA and jth AA 
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can jointly compute the shared secret  �
1
ݔ݇ݔ݆  ݏ݇ ,݆+ݑ  
 . The kth AA also has private 
keys: α, ȕ, Ȗ ∈  ℤݍ . Figure 6.2 depicts the flow of the anonymous key issuing 
protocol. Each step in the protocol is described below: 
(1) A two-phase commit protocol is used to start the key issuing and 
takes u,�1 from the user and ݏ݇ ,݆ from the kth AA as input, and 
outputs ܺ =   ݏ݆݇ +  ݑ �1. 
(2) The kth AA picks a random  � ∈  ℤݍ  , computes 1ܺ = �� ݔ and ܺ2 = ℎ�� . 
(3) The kth AA sends ܺ1,ܺ2and proof of knowledge of the secret values 
(i.e. �, �, ݔ). 
(4) The user picks a random �2 ∈  ℤݍ  and computes  ܻ =   ܺ1�1ܺ2 �2 . 
Then the user sends Y and proof of knowledge of  �2 to the kth AA. 
(5) The kth AA computes  ܼ =  ܻ� �  and forwards Z and proof of 
knowledge of Ȗ and τ to user. 
(6) The user computes ܦ = ܼ1 �2 . Therefore, user gets the key D as a 
corresponding decryption key. 
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Figure 6.2Anonymous Key Issuing Protocol 
 
6.3.2  Construction 
Similar to single authority case, the proposed algorithm is also composed of four 
sub algorithms namely as Setup, Key Issuing, Encryption and Decryption. In the 
following functionalities of each algorithm are briefly explained. 
 Setup: The setup algorithm takes a security parameter as input 
and outputs a bilinear group and a set of security parameters. Let 
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us denote the total number of AAs as K and number of attributes 
maintained by kth AA as ݊݇ . 
 Key Issuing: Each AA generates decryption keys for a user u that 
holds a set of attributes using the anonymous key issuing 
protocol defined in Section 5.3.1.3. 
 Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of attributes 
maintained by AAs as well as a set of context-related attributes 
defined by data owner and data as inputs. Then it outputs the 
ciphertext. 
 Decryption: The decryption algorithm inputs the decryption 
credentials received from each AA and context-related 
parameters obtained from smart mobile device and the 
ciphertext. The output will be the original data. 
 
Let us describe the context-aware MA-ABE scheme below: 
Setup S 
For a given security parameter � and � ∈ {0, 1}݌݋݈ݕ (λ) , group bilinear 
parameters are generated by the AAs: q, �1�2, �1, �2, �TึS(1� ;   �). 
   Now, the AAs interact with each other and execute the following: 
 kth AA randomly chooses ݒ݇ ∈ܴ ℤݍ and computes ܻ݇ =݁ �1, �2 ݒ݇ , and sends ܻ݇  to other AAs, where each AA computes ܻ =   ܻ݇ = ݁ �1, �2  ݒ݇݇ . 
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 Each pair of AAs shares a secret, kthAA and  jth AA randomly 
choose ݏ݆݇ ∈  ℤݍ , such that ݏ݆݇  =  ݆ݏ ݇ .  
 kth AA randomly chooses ݔ݇ ∈  ℤݍ  and computes ݕ݇ =  �1ݔ݇ . 
Using the share secret ݏ݆݇  and u, kth AA and jth AA computes ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   and ݆ݕݔ݇  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   respectively. 
Then each AA carries out the following steps individually: 
 For ith attribute stored in the kth AA, where ݅ ∈   1,… , ݊݇ , and ݇ ∈    1,… ,ܭ  the kth AA randomly chooses a secret  ݐ݇ ,݅  ∈   ℤݍ  
and computes corresponding public key as ܶ݇ ,݅ =   �2ݐ݇ ,݅ .       
 
Key Issuing KI 
 User u executes the following steps with each  kth  AA: 
 For ݆ ∈    1,… ,ܭ ݇ , user gets the ܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   for ݇ > ݆ or ܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕ ݏ݆݇ +ݑ ݔ݆  if ݇ < ݆, where ܴ݆݇  ∈  ℤݍ   is a 
random value. 
After obtaining all  ܦ݆݇ , user computes 
 ܦݑ =    ܦ݆݇ =   �1ܴ ݑ , ݇ ,݆  ∈ 1,…,ܭ × 1,…,ܭ  ݇    where ܴݑ =   ܴ݆݇ ݇ ,݆  ∈ 1,…,ܭ × 1,…,ܭ  ݇  . 
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 If user u satisfies dk number of attributes, then kth AA randomly 
picks a dk-degree polynomial ݌݇ ,ݑ  with ݌݇ ,ݑ 0 = ݒ݇  −
 ܴ݆݆݇∈  1,…,ܭ  ݇  . 
 kth AA computes ܵ݇ ,݅ = �1݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅ ݐ݇ ,݅ , ݅ ∈    1,… , ݊݇  for each 
eligible attribute i for the user. 
 
Encryption E 
The data owner encrypts the data m for attribute set ܣ݉ =  ܣܣ1 ׫ ܣܣ2 ׫ …  ܣܣܭ ׫ܣܥ  as follows: 
 The data owner randomly picks ݏܣ , ݏܤ ∈  ℤݍand encrypts the data as 
follows: ܧ݊ܥ݉ =  mܻݏܤ. 
The data owner then computes 
 E0 = h(M(a a,1)∥ M(a a,2)∥… M(aa,n))ܻݏܣ+ݏܤ , ܧ1 =  �2ݏܣ ,  ܥ݇ ,݅ = ܶ݇ ,݅ݏܣ  ,݅ ∈ ܣ݇ܣ ,݇ ∈   1,… ,ܭ . 
 Now the data owner uploads the encrypted data ܥܶ݉ = ܧ݊ܥ݉ ,ܧ0,ܧ1,ܥ݇ ,݅݅ ∈   ܣܣܽ݊݀ܣܥ  into the Cloud. 
 
Decryption D 
The user downloads the ܥܶ݉  from the Cloud and checks the required 
attributes to decrypt the data. 
Chapter 6. Context-Aware Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes 
158 
 
For each kth  AA: 
 Using ܵ݇ ,݅  and the corresponding ܥ݇ ,݅ , user computes݁ ܵ݇ ,݅ ,ܥ݇ ,݅ =݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅ . 
 User interpolates all ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅  and gets ܲ݇ ,ݑ =
  ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ݌݇ ,ݑ  0 = ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ ݒ݇− ܴ݆݆݇∈  1,…,ܰ  ݇   . 
 User multiplies all ܲ݇ ,ݑ  together, gets  ܳ = ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ   ݒ݇−ܴݑ  =  ܻݏܣ݁ �1ܴ ݑ ,�2ݏܣ  . 
Now the client application installed in user‟s mobile device computes the hash 
value of context-related attributes such as current location, risk-level associated 
with current location and risk-level associated with user behaviour and outputs ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊)). 
The user can decrypt the data as follows. 
 ܧ݊ܥ݉  ∙  ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊))e Du , E1 Qܧ0  
 
=     ܻ݉ܵܤ ∙   ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊))YSAℎ(ܯ(ܽܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽܽ, ݊)) ܻݏܣ+ݏܤ 
 If and only if:  
h(M(a a,1)∥M(a a,2)∥…M(a a,n)) =  ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊)) , 
then the user can get the message m. 
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6.3.3  Security Analysis 
In this section, the security of the proposed framework is analyzed. The data 
confidentiality which is the most important feature of MA-ABE scheme is firstly 
analysed. Then the security analyse of key issuing protocol is presented to prove the 
anonymity key issuing protocol.  
6.3.3.1  Confidentiality 
The proposed scheme is to be proved secure in the selective ID (SID) model. In SID, 
the adversary must provide the identity he wishes to attack before receiving the 
parameters of the system. It is analysed following by Sahai's method in [193]. 
 Assume there are N number of attribute authorities. Let us denote nkto be the 
number of attributes monitored by each AA. Consider the following scenario: 
 Setup 
 The adversary sends a list of attribute sets  ܣܥ = ܣܥ1 … .ܣܥܭ , one set 
for each AA. He also provides a list of corrupted AAs. 
 The challenger generates parameters for the system and sends them 
to the adversary. 
Key Issuing 
 The adversary receives all the parameters which includes the system 
parameters, honest AA‟ public keys, public and secret keys of the 
corrupt AAs. 
 The adversary makes secret key queries as he wants the AAs follow 
two rules: 1) for each GID, there must be at least one honest AA 
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from which the adversary has fewer than dk  number of attributes, 
and 2) the adversary never queries the same authority twice with the 
same GID. 
 
Challenge 
 The adversary sends two messages M0 and M1. 
 The challenger chooses a bit b, computes the encryption of Mb for 
attribute set ܣܥ  and forwards this encryption to the adversary 
 Guess 
 The adversary outputs a guess b’ that Mb‟ has been encrypted. 
 The adversary is said to succeed if he can correctly identify the 
encrypted message if b = b’. 
  
In our scheme, the challenge encryption  ܾ =  ܧ݊ܥܻ݉ݏܤ =  ܧ݊ܥ݉݁ �1 ,�2 ݏܤ  ݒ݇݇  = 
݁ �1,   �2 ݏܤ  ݒ݇݇ ∙ ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊))e Du , E1 Qܧ0  
From the algorithms in the previous section, the following three values are 
known. 
 e ܦݑ ,ܧ1 = e  ܦ݆݇ ݇ ,݆  ∈ 1,…,ܭ × 1,…,ܭ  ݇  ,�2ݏܣ  ; 
 Q = ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ   ݒ݇−ܴݑ  =  ܻݏܣ݁ �1ܴ ݑ ,�2ݏܣ  ; 
Chapter 6. Context-Aware Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes 
161 
 
 ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊)); 
 
These three values are the key parameters to decrypt the encrypted message. If 
the adversary can successfully compute these values, the algorithm can be 
considered as an insecure algorithm. The possibility for the adversary to get these 
values is investigated. 
 Given that: 
e ܦݑ ,ܧ1 = e  ܦ݆݇ ݇ ,݆  ∈ 1,…,ܭ × 1,…,ܭ  ݇  ,�2ݏܣ  
whereܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   for ݇ > ݆  or ܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕ ݏ݆݇ +ݑ ݔ݆  if ݇ < ݆ , 
where ܴ݆݇  ∈  ℤݍ  and ܧ1 =  �2ݏܣ  is a public key.  
 For kth AA, the adversary queries each AA for the secret. Assume jth (1 < ݆ <݇) AA receives the request. jth AA issues ܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ  . 
In ܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ  , the ݏ݆݇  is the secret shared between jth and kth AA. 
Since there is only one honest AA, it will exchange the secret with all other corrupt 
authorities by computing ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   and ݆ݕݔ݇  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   during the Setup stage. 
The ܴ݆݇  ∈  ℤݍ  is issued by kth AA during the Key Issuing stage. The 
adversary can get the value of  ܦ݆݇ . This is a potential risk of the MA-ABE scheme 
and it will be studied in Section 6.3.3.2. 
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For Q = ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ   ݒ݇−ܴݑ  =  ܻݏܣ݁ �1ܴ ݑ ,�2ݏܣ  , let us recall that the kth AA issues a 
secret key ܵ݇ ,݅ = �1݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅ ݐ݇ ,݅  for the eligible attributes of user u. ݌݇ ,ݑ ݅  is a 
polynomial that can be computed as a linear combination of d known points. A (d – 
1) degree polynomial can be solved by d number of points on the polynomial. For 
the kth AA, if the number of user‟s eligible attributes is greater than the threshold dk. 
Then the user can get ݌݇ ,ݑ 0 . 
In order to obtain Q, for any dk attributes ݅ ∈  ܣ݇ܥ ת ܣ݇ݑat kth AA, three steps are 
executed: 
Computes݁ ܵ݇ ,݅ ,ܥ݇ ,݅  = ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅ . 
The kth AA interpolates all the values ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅  together to get ܲ݇ ,ݑ =   ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ݌݇ ,ݑ  0 = ݁ �1,�2 ݏܣ ݒ݇− ܴ݆݆݇∈  1,…,ܭ  ݇   . Q can be obtained by 
multiplying all ܲ݇ ,ݑ . 
For the adversary, all the corrupt AAs issue decryption keys for him. However, 
for the honest AA, the adversary with insufficient attributes cannot compute the 
value of ܲ݇ ,ݑ  because he is unable to get the value ݌݇ ,ݑ 0 . Thus Q is not available 
for the adversary. 
For the last the value of ℎ(ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 1) ∥  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, 2) ∥ ⋯  ܯ(ܽ’ܽ, ݊)). With the 
behaviour-profiling app, user‟s context-related attributes can be captured at runtime 
and the necessary operations executed during decryption. Therefore, the mobile 
operating system should have a secure mechanism to protect the app and the data 
from being modified.  
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The recently introduced robust security software such as KNOX [194] and 
BES [195] virtually divided the mobile device into two isolated containers: 
personal user container and work container. The apps in one container are separated 
from the apps in the other container. The apps in work container are also virtually 
located in the user mobile device management server. Thus, the behaviour-profiling 
app can be verified by the device management server to prevent from being 
modified. Thus, modifying the behaviour-profiling app by malicious user in order 
to feed false results for the context-related attributes can be easily detected. 
From the analysis above, it shows that if the adversary request secret keys from 
an authority which he has insufficient attributes (the honest authority), the 
adversary cannot output a correct guess of b’ such that b’ = b. Our scheme is secure 
based on the selective ID model.  
Hence, our proposed context-aware single authority ABE scheme and 
context-aware MA-ABE scheme is secure in the selective ID model. 
 
6.3.3.2  Key Issuing Analysis 
In the anonymous key issuing protocol, the kth AA will set up several parameters 
before staring the key issuing. Then it computes ܺ =   ݏ݆݇ +  ݑ �1, ܺ1 = �� ݔ , 
and ܺ2 = ℎ�� , where � = ݆ݕݔ݇ ,ℎ = �1. g and h are unknown to the user.. 
Now adversary can get that ܺ1 = �� ݔ = ݆ݕݔ݇�   ݏ݆݇ + ݑ �1   and ܺ2 = ℎ�� =�1��where � = ܴ݆݇  ݓℎ݁݊ ݇ > ݆ ܽ݊݀ � = −ܴ݆݇  ݓℎ݁݊ ݇ < ݆. 
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The challenger then computes ܻ =   ܺ1�1ܺ2 �2 =  ݆ݕ�2ݔ݇�  ݏ݆݇ + ݑ  �1���2  with a 
random�2 ∈  ℤݍ . The kth authority computes the ܼ =  ܻ� � =  ݆ݕ��2ݔ݇  ݏ݆݇ + ݑ  �1���2 . 
Finally the user gets the key using  
 ܦ݆݇ =  ܼ1 �2 = ݆ݕ�ݔ݇  ݏ݆݇ + ݑ  �1�� = �1�ݔ݇ݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ + ݑ  �1�ܴ݆݇ ,where Ȗ = 1 when k > 
j and Ȗ = -1 when k < j. 
Note that during the kth AA issuing a key, the other AAs will also participate to 
compute the pseudorandom values: the shared secret ݏ݆݇  and the public key ݆ݕ = �
1
ݔ݆
. 
However, values of discrete logarithm between � = ݆ݕݔ݇ = �ݔ݆ݔ݇  ܽ݊݀ ℎ = �1 
should be unknown. This also requires that the collusion group authorities cannot 
learn the other honest authority‟s private key xj. 
If there is only one honest AA, the adversary can extract the master secret such 
as ݏ݆݇ ,during the key issuing process because of the incorporation of some 
pseudorandom values from other corrupt authorities. Then the protocol is not 
secure.  
For kth corrupted authority, the adversary obtains ݆ݕ = �
1
ݔ݆
, from the honest jth 
AA (1 < ݆ < ݇). The value is a pseudorandom value based on the shared secret ݏ݆݇  and u. It also incorporates some pseudorandom values to get ܦ݆݇ =
 �
1ܴ
݆݇ ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ  . If there are only one honest authority, recall that each pair of 
authorities shares the ݏ݆݇ , with the knowledge of ݆ݕ , ݏ݆݇  , ݑ, ܽ݊݀ ܴ݆݇  the adversary 
can easily compute ܦ݆݇  of the honest authority as a result. Thus, the secret value 
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e ܦݑ ,ܧ1  is revealed to the adversary. All the other corrupt AAs are able to 
compute the pseudorandom values to compromise the system. 
In this scenario, therefore, at least one more AAs are required to adjust its 
pseudorandom to compensate. This authority must be an honest AA that the 
adversary cannot request sufficient values.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that our proposed context-aware MA-ABE 
scheme maintains the collusion resistance against up to ( ܰ − 2 ) Attribute 
Authorities. 
 
6.3.4  Performance Analysis 
In this section, computation and communication costs associated for both the single 
and multi-authority algorithms proposed in Section 6.2 and 6.3 are analysed. The 
efficiency of the proposed algorithms is demonstrated by comparing them against 
the related conventional ABE schemes. The single authority ABE scheme is 
discussed first followed by the discussion of MA-ABE scheme. 
 
6.3.5  Computational Complexity Analysis 
In single authority ABE scheme, the user is only involved in the computation 
process during the Decryption stage and the data owner involves computation 
process in the Encryption stage. The computational cost involved in the Setup and 
Key Issuing stages can be ignored since those can be done in the idle time. The 
computational cost of hash function is negligible compared to pairing and 
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exponentiation. Let us denote the computational time for one multiplication, one 
exponentiation, and one bilinear pairing as  ܥ݉ ,ܥ݁ݔ ,ܽ݊݀ ܥ݌ , respectively. Denote 
the total number of attributes used for encryption as n and the total number of 
context-related attributes used by the data owner as d. Table 6.1 shows the total 
time required for encryption and for decryptions for the proposed scheme and 
conventional scheme. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of Computational Cost for the Single Authority ABE 
Scheme and the proposed Context-Aware Single Authority ABE Scheme 
 
From Table 6.1, it shows that in the single authority scenario, our scheme takes just 
one more exponentiation operation and one more multiplication than the 
conventional ABE scheme. The decryption time of the proposed scheme is 
increased only by one multiplication time and independent of the number of 
context-related attributes.  The proposed scheme adds an additional layer of 
security for negligible computational expense. 
Table 6.2 compares the computational complexity of the proposed MA-ABE 
scheme with Chase and Chow‟s scheme [166]. In the multi-authority scenario, the 
users are involved in the Decryption stage while the data owner is involved in the 
Encryption stage. For simplicity, denote the total number of AAs in the system as K 
 Conventional ABE Scheme Proposed Scheme 
Encryption (n + 1)ܥ݁ݔ  + ܥ݉  (n + 2)ܥ݁ݔ  + 2ܥ݉  
Decryption nܥ݌  + nܥ݉  nܥ݌  + (n + 2)ܥ݉  
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and the data owner uses n number of attributes from each AA for encryption. Let us 
use the same benchmark time values given for jPBC library for comparison[196]. 
Table 6.3 shows the time values (in ms) for ܥ݉ ,ܥ݁ݔ , and ܥ݌  based on two different 
test beds:  
(1) Intel (R) Core (TM) 2 Quad CPU Q6600 with 2.50GHz and 3GB 
memory running on the Ubuntu 10.04 
(2) HTC Desire HD A9191running on Android 2.2. 
The time values given in Table 6.3 are for a symmetric elliptic curve called 
Type A curve which has a base field size of 512-bit and the embedding degree is 2. 
The type A curve has a 160-bit group order. Let us assume that the data owner uses 
an environment similar to the Test bed 1 for encryption while the user uses a mobile 
device similar to Test bed 2 for decryption. 
 
Table 6.2 Comparison of Computational Complexity of Proposed MA-ABE 
Scheme with Chase and Chow‟s Scheme 
 
 
 
 Conventional ABE Scheme Proposed Scheme 
Encryption (nK + 2)ܥ݁ݔ  + ܥ݉  (nK + 3)ܥ݁ݔ  + 2ܥ݉  
Decryption (nK+1)ܥ݌  + (nK + 1)ܥ݉  (nK + 1 )ܥ݌  + (nK + 3)ܥ݉  
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 Test Bed 1 (ms) Test Bed 2 (ms) ܥ݌  14.6 491.2 ܥ݁ݔ  2.8 34.1 ܥ݉  1.8 20 
 
Table 6.3 Time Complexity Measures for Two Different Test Beds 
 
Figure 6.3Comparison of Computational Costs for Encryption Between 
Conventional MA-ABE Scheme and the proposed Context-Aware MA-ABE 
Scheme 
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Figure 6.3 shows the computational complexity in terms of total time required for 
the data owner and the user to encrypt and decrypt the data, respectively for 
conventional MA-ABE scheme and the proposed scheme when K =  1. For 
encryption, our scheme consumes nearly 5msmore than the conventional ABE. 
However, the proposed scheme incorporates the context-related attributes during 
the encryption which provides runtime security to the data owner. It is worth noting 
that from Figure 6.3 that the time difference between our scheme and the 
conventional ABE for encryption is independent of the number of attributes (i.e. 
time complexity orders for both schemes are same for encryption). However, our 
scheme is capable of including context–related attributes on top of the regular 
attributes. For decryption, it is obvious from Figure 6.3 that our scheme performs 
equally well as the conventional ABE scheme. 
 
Figure 6.4Comparison of Computational Costs for Decryption Between 
Conventional MA-ABE Scheme and the Proposed MA-ABE Scheme 
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Figure 6.4 compares the decryption costs for both the proposed scheme and the 
conventional MA-ABE scheme in terms of time complexity for different number of 
AAs (i.e. K =  2, 4, 6, 8, 10).Encryption and decryption time increases with the total 
number of AAs. For encryption, similar to K =  1 case, the time complexity orders 
of both the schemes are same (i.e. our scheme consume nearly 5ms more than the 
conventional MA-ABE scheme irrespective of number of attributes and number of 
AAs). Moreover, for decryption, our scheme performs equally well as the 
conventional MA-ABE scheme regardless of number of AAs involved in the 
encryption. As seen from both Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4, time complexity for 
decryption is nearly 100 times more than the encryption due to the limited process 
power at the mobile device. The time complexity can be reduced if less number of 
attributes are used for encryption. The proposed scheme enables the data owner to 
reduce the time complexity at the user end by reducing the number of attributes 
from the AA. However, our scheme adds an extra layer of security by adding the 
context-related attributes with negligible increment in complexity. 
The proposed scheme enables the data owner to reduce the time complexity at 
the user end by adding more context-related attributes with negligible increment in 
complexity. For instance, the data owner can include five attributes from AAs and 
another five context-related attributes which almost reduces the complexity by half 
compared with the conventional MA-ABE scheme. However, the proposed scheme 
has additional security in terms of context-related attributes which is not possible in 
conventional ABE scheme. In a nutshell, the proposed scheme does not degrade the 
performance of conventional ABE scheme while including context-related 
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attributes to enhance the security of the employer‟s data while reducing the 
complexity at user‟s end. 
 
6.3.6  Communication Complexity Analysis 
The communication costs for the proposed schemes and the conventional schemes 
are relying on the Key Issuing stage and when uploading and downloading the data. 
Since, Key Issuing stage purely dependent on communication between authorities 
and the data owner. Communication costs for both the schemes in Key Issuing 
Stage are equal. During uploading and downloading stage, only the extra 
components added to the proposed scheme compared to the conventional ABE 
scheme are E0 = h(M(aa,1)∥M(aa,2)∥…M(aa,n))ܻݏܣ+ݏܤ, which requires 160-bits and ܣܥ  (3-bits are enough to represent one context-related attribute out of eight 
context-related attributes).Overall, increment in the communications cost in the 
proposed algorithm is negligible. 
From the performance analysis in the previous section, it shows that the 
workload of the computation and communications are heavy for the mobile users. 
For the communication, each user has to communicate with all the authorities for 
requesting keys and execute required computations in order to obtain the 
decryption keys and data. These interactions and computational works are a burden 
for the mobile user in terms of communication and computation complexity. The 
reliability of mobile data network is also a challenge for completing all required 
communications. The next section will present a solution to address these issues. 
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6.4  Low-Complexity Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption 
Scheme 
This section presents the low-complexity MA-ABE scheme which substantially 
reduces the communication and computation workload to the user compared to 
both the conventional MA-ABE scheme and the proposed context-aware MA-ABE 
scheme presented in Section 6.3.  
Since mobile Cloud computing serves mobile devices anywhere, anytime 
through the channel of Ethernet or Internet regardless of heterogeneous 
environments and platform [197]. The author introduced a Cloud server based 
semi-trusted-authority (STA) between the user and the AAs. The user equipped 
with smart devices only provides pseudonym of his identity to the STA. Then the 
STA interacts with all the AAs on-behalf of the user and obtains decryption-keys. 
Later, STA combines all the keys to obtain a key and pass it to the user. The user 
has the ability to do necessary computations on the received keys and obtains the 
final decryption keys to recover the data. Since all the distributed keys provided by 
the AAs are masked, STA cannot decrypt the data. Moreover, STA cannot pool all 
the keys and obtain attributes of the user. Hence, our algorithm preserves the 
security and privacy of Chase and Chow‟s MA-ABE scheme while outsourcing the 
computational and communication overheads to the STA.  
Assume that the STA will execute the protocol correctly that he will behave in 
a semi-honest manner, e.g. he is honest but curious so privacy is a real issue. 
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6.4.1  Constructions 
There are five different parties involved in the proposed framework: the data owner 
(encryptor), the user (decryptor), the AA, STA and the Cloud storage server. Figure 
6.5 depicts the main framework and work flow of the proposed system.   
 
Figure 6.5Illustration of the proposed Framework of Low-Complexity 
Context-Aware Multi-Authority ABE Scheme for Mobile Cloud 
Environment 
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The algorithm is composed of four sub algorithms which are named as: Setup, 
Key Issuing, Encryption and Decryption. In the following functionalities of each 
algorithm are briefly explained. 
 Setup: The setup algorithm takes a security parameter as input and 
outputs a bilinear group and a set of security parameters. 
 Key Issuing: AAs generate decryption keys for a user u that holds a 
set of attributes. 
 Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of attributes 
maintained by AAs as well as a set of context-related attributes 
defined by data owner as inputs and it outputs the ciphertext. 
 Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes as input the decryption 
credentials received from AAs and context-related parameters 
obtained from smart mobile device and the ciphertext. The output 
will be the original data. 
 
Define each algorithm as follows: 
Setup S 
For a given security parameter � and � ∈ {0, 1}݌݋݈ݕ (λ) , group bilinear 
parameters are generated by the AA: q, �1,�2, �1,�2,�TึS(1� ;   �). 
   Now, the AAs interact with each other and execute the following: 
Chapter 6. Context-Aware Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes 
175 
 
 kth AA randomly chooses ݒ݇ ∈ܴ ℤݍ and computes ܻ݇ =݁ �1, �2 ݒ݇ , and sends ܻ݇  to other AAs, where each AA computes ܻ =   ܻ݇ = ݁ �1, �2  ݒ݇݇ . 
 Each pair of AAs shares a secret, kth AA and  jth AA randomly 
choose ݏ݇ ∈  ℤݍ , such that ݏ݆݇  =  ݆ݏ ݇ .  
 kth AA randomly chooses ݔ݇ ∈  ℤݍ  and computes ݕ݇ =  �1ݔ݇ . 
Using the shared secret ݏ݆݇  and u, kth AA and j computes ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   and ݆ݕݔ݇  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   respectively. 
Then each AA carries out the following steps individually: 
 For ith attribute stored in the kth AA, where ݅ ∈   1,… , ݊݇ , and ݇ ∈    1,… ,ܭ  the kth AA randomly chooses a secret ݐ݇ ,݅  ∈   ℤݍ  
and computes corresponding public key as ܶ݇ ,݅ =   �2ݐ݇ ,݅ .       
Key Issuing KI 
The STA executes the following steps with kth AA on behalf of user u, hence 
the following communication and computational overheads have been offloaded to 
STA. In order to mask the decryption keys to the STA, a pre-shared secret between 
user and kth AA is used when issuing keys, the key will be combined into the 
pseudorandom and only the user can derive the decryption key.  
 For ݆ ∈    1,… ,ܭ ݇ , STA gets the ܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕݔ݆  ݏ݆݇ +ݑ   for ݇ > ݆ or ܦ݆݇ =  �1ܴ ݆݇ ݇ݕ ݏ݆݇ +ݑ ݔ݆  if ݇ < ݆, where ܴ݆݇  ∈  ℤݍ   is a 
random value. 
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After obtaining all ܦ݆݇ , STA computes 
 ܦݑ =    ܦ݆݇ =   �1ܴ ݑ , ݇ ,݆  ∈ 1,…,ܭ × 1,…,ܭ  ݇    where ܴݑ =   ܴ݆݇ ݇ ,݆  ∈ 1,…,ܭ × 1,…,ܭ  ݇  . 
 If user u satisfies dk number of attributes, then kth AA randomly 
picks a (݀݇ − 1 ) degree polynomial ݌݇ ,ݑ ∙  
 If the user doesn‟t satisfy dk number of attributes, the kth AA 
randomly picks a polynomial ݌݇ ,ݑ ∙  with degree nk+1, where 
nkdenotes the number of attributes managed by kth AA. 
 Now, kth AA use the pre-shared secret, ݇ݎ between user u and kthAA, 
define ݌݇ ,ݑ 0 = ݒ݇ +  ݇ݎ −   ܴ݆݆݇∈ 1,…,ܭ  ݇  . 
 The kth AA computes ܵ݇ ,݅ = �1݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅ ݐ݇ ,݅ , ݅ ∈    1,… , ݊݇   for each 
eligible attribute i for the user. 
 
Encryption E 
 The data owner encrypts the message m for attribute set Ac=  
{ܣܥ1 , …, ܣܥܭ} The data owner picks ݏ ∈ ℤݍ  and outputs  ܧ0 =ܻ݉ݏ, ܧ1=�2ݏ, ܥ݇,݅= ܶ݇,݅ݏ݅∈ܣܥݏ, ∀݇∈1, …, ܭ. 
 Now the data owner uploads the encrypted data and related 
parameters to the cloud storage. 
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Decryption D 
 The decryption stage has two steps. Firstly STA obtains the masked keys from 
all the authorities and combine them together. Then the combined key will be 
forwarded to the user to get the unmasked the combined key. 
 Decryption by STA 
o For each authority k: 
(1) For any attribute ݅ ∈  �݇ܥ  ת  �݇ݑ , STA computes ݁ ܵ݇ ,݅ ,ܥ݇ ,݅  = ݁ �1,�2 ݏ݌݇ ,ݑ  i . 
(2) STA interpolates all ݁ �1,�2 ݏ݌݇ ,ݑ  i  together and gets ܲ݇ = ݁ �1,�2 ݏ݌݇ ,ݑ  0 =
 ݁ �1,�2 ݏ ݒ݇+ ݎ݇− ܴ݆݆݇∈ 1,…,ܭ  ݇   . 
o STA multiplies all ܲ݇  together, and gets ܳ =݁ �1,�2 ݏ   ݒ݇+ ݎ݇ −ݏܴݑ =  ܻݏ+ݏ  ݎ݇݁ �1ܴ ݑ , �2ݏ . 
o Then STA computes ܶ = ݁ ܦݑ ,ܧ1 ∙ ܳ = ݁ �1ܴ ݑ ,�2ݏ ∙ ܳ =
 ܻݏ+ݏ  ݎ݇  and forwards ܶ to the user. 
 Decryption by User 
o User holds the pre-shared secret ݇ݎ , computes  ݁ �1ݎ݇ ,�2ݏ  = ݁ �1,�2 ݏ  ݎ݇ = ܻݏ  ݎ݇ . 
o In order to recover the message, the user computes ܻݏ =ܶ ܻݏ  ݎ݇ , recover m as ݉ =  ܧ0ܻݏ. 
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6.4.2  Security Analysis 
This section analyses the security of the proposed low-complexity MA-ABE 
scheme. As the proposed scheme is an extension of Chase and Chow‟s MA-ABE 
scheme [166], the security analysis showed that the proposed scheme does not 
degrade the security and privacy of the encrypted message and mobile user 
compared to original scheme. It satisfies data confidentiality of encrypted data 
against unauthorized users and the curious Cloud service providers under the 
selective ID model. It maintains the collusion resistance against up to (N – 2) AAs. 
The user‟s privacy is also protected by the anonymous key issuing protocol. 
 The stages that differ between the two schemes are focused on, the Key Issuing 
stage and the Decryption stage. 
 During the Decryption stage, the STA performs the steps in place of the 
authority AA. In more detail, the STA only computes ܶ = ݁ ܦݑ ,ܧ1 ∙ ܳ =݁ �1ܴ ݑ ,�2ݏ ∙ ܳ =  ܻݏ+ݏ  ݎ݇  in contrast toܻݏ  that is computed by the authority in 
the Chase and Chow‟s scheme. As the required decryption key to decrypt the 
message m is  ܻݏ , the STA cannot decrypt to obtain the message m, therefore the 
confidentiality of the message is ensured. More precisely, since the shared secret 
 ݇ݎ  is only known between the kth AA and the mobile user, and thus the summation  ݇ݎ݇  can only be obtained by a mobile user; therefore the STA cannot obtain ܻݏ  
for its know expression of ܶ =  ܻݏ+ݏ  ݎ݇ . 
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 During the Key Issuing stage, the STA performs most of the steps in place of 
the user in Chase and Chow‟s scheme. The kth AA computes ܵ݇ ,݅ = �1݌݇ ,ݑ  ݅ ݐ݇ ,݅ , ݅ ∈
   1,… , ݊݇  and sends them to STA. If the user satisfies the minimum ݀݇  number 
of attributes, then the degree of polynomial chosen by AA is equal to ݀݇ . Hence, ݀݇  number of ܵ݇ ,݅  can be used to get the secret ݌ 0 =  ݒ݇ +  ݇ݎ −   ܴ݆݆݇∈ 1,…,ܭ  ݇   during the interpolation. If the user does not 
satisfy the minimum ݀݇  number of attributes then the user cannot obtain enough 
number of key ܵ݇ ,݅ to recover the secret ݌ 0 . This is the crucial point that for the 
polynomial with degree (݀݇ −  1). A number of ݀݇points are required in order to 
get ݌ 0 . If the user with insufficient attributes, then the kth AA chooses a 
polynomial with degree (݊݇ +  1). Therefore, the STA is not able to pool all ܵ݇ ,݅ 
from all AAs in order to find attributes of mobile user, and cannot distinguish which 
set of attributes belongs to the mobile user. This also preserves the privacy of the 
user. 
  
6.4.3  Performance Analysis 
In Chase and Chow‟s scheme, the user takes part in the computation during the 
Key Issuing and Decryption stages. Most of the required computation and 
communications take place in these two stages. Our proposed scheme successfully 
offloads these time-cost operations to the semi-trusted Cloud based server. Since 
the Cloud servers have powerful computing capacity and reliable network, utilizing 
these powerful resources is an ideal way. 
 
Chapter 6. Context-Aware Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes 
180 
 
 
6.4.3.1  Reduction in Communication Overhead 
The communication overhead is always an important factor for mobile Cloud 
environment. It is important for the service performance and user experience. In 
Chase and Chow‟s scheme, user needs to start (ܰ − 1)independent invocations for 
each AA during the key issuing stage. In order to compute the decryption key ܦݑ , a 
user has to request the key  ܦ݆݇  from all the authorities. This process requires a 
large number of communications. The more authorities requested, the more 
communications take place. It is a big challenge for mobile data networks to 
complete the process. Our proposed scheme offloads these communications to the 
Cloud based server, so that the communication overheads can be avoided at the 
user‟s end. Figure 6.6 shows the comparisons of number of communications 
between the conventional MA-ABE scheme and our proposed scheme. From 
Figure 6.6, the number of communications in Chase and Chow's scheme goes up 
much more than our proposed scheme. In our scheme, the user only needs to do 
communications with the STA, which improves the communication performance. 
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Figure 6.6Comparisons of Communications between Chase and Chow’s 
MA-ABE Scheme and proposed Low Complexity MA-ABE Scheme 
 
6.4.3.2  Reduction in Computational Overhead 
In both the conventional MA-ABE scheme and proposed low complexity MA-ABE 
scheme, the user (data requester) has to execute several computations which are 
required in the Key Issuing and Decryption stages in order to decrypt the data. The 
computational time (in ms) for one multiplication, one exponentiation and one 
pairing as ܥ݉ ,ܥ݁ݔ ,ܥ݌ , respectively. Let us also denote the total number of 
attributes of each authority n and total number of attributes used by the data owner 
as d, and N denotes the total number of authorities. The following table shows a 
comparison of the number of required computations between the conventional 
MA-ABE scheme and the proposed scheme. From the results, it shows that for both 
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Key Issuing and Decryption stages, the high-cost computational tasks are 
substantially offloaded to the Cloud-based server. 
 
 
 Conventional MA-ABE 
Scheme 
Proposed Low Complexity 
MA-ABE Scheme 
Key Issuing N(N-1)ܥ݉  _______ 
Decryption (Nn+1)ܥ݌  + (Nn + 1)ܥ݉  Nܥ݌  + (N+1)ܥ݉  
Total (Nn+1)ܥ݌  +(N2 + Nn +1)ܥ݉  Nܥ݌  + (N+1)ܥ݉  
 
Table6.4Comparison of Number of Required Computations between 
the Conventional MA-ABE Scheme and Proposed scheme 
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6.5  Conclusion 
The concept of ABE scheme has been demonstrated to perform a step closer in 
securely sharing the data. The traditional ABE is based on a single authority which 
manages all the attributes, communications and also issues the decryption keys. 
From the security aspect, if the authority was attacked, the whole system will be 
compromised. From the performance aspect, the authority is designed with too 
much responsibility. It can be the bottleneck of the whole system when a large 
number of users request keys at the same time.  Furthermore, in the mobile Cloud 
environment, the available contextual attributes should be used to strengthen the 
security and data access control due to mobility. 
 In this chapter first a context-aware single authority ABE scheme is proposed 
which extended the traditional ABE scheme by incorporating contextual attributes 
in the mobile Cloud environments. Thus, the decryption keys are not only issued 
based on the attributes that are maintained by AAs, but also rely on policies defined 
by the data requestor. Following this, a context-aware MA-ABE scheme which is 
more practical is presented. In reality, attributes are managed by different AAs. A 
user requests the decryption keys from different authorities. The proposed scheme 
also removes the dependency on the central authority which issues final decryption 
keys and monitors all the communications to reduce the risk level of the system.In 
this way, users can combine all the keys received from all the AAs and the real-time 
contextual attributes captured by the mobile device in order to obtain the final 
decryption key. Then, the author proposed the third scheme, the low-complexity 
MA-ABE scheme, which effectively offloads the high-cost computational and 
communication workloads to Cloud based Semi Trusted Authority (STA). By 
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analysing the second scheme, the author found that the performance of mobile 
device to complete all the processes may degrade together with the user experience. 
High computation workloads should be offloaded to the Cloud. The STA which 
works on behalf of the user is introduced, thus the performance of mobile devices 
are much improved. The communication overheads and computation work are 
reduced compared with other schemes. Meanwhile, the designed protocol 
maintains the system security and data access at the same level as the previous 
schemes.
  
 
185 
 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
7.1  Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis investigated security and privacy issues in the emerging mobile Cloud 
paradigm. Traditional access control techniques developed for Cloud environment 
do not support both the privacy and security issues in the mobile Cloud 
environment. In mobile Cloud environment, due to the seamless interaction 
between the user and smart devices, the user generates a large volume of personal 
data. These data are eventually collected by the mobile Cloud service providers and 
users do not have much control over their utilisation. In order to enhance the user 
privacy together with security in the mobile Cloud environment, various access 
control techniques were proposed in this thesis. The conventional attribute-based 
access control and attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes were modified in the 
proposed schemes in order to support the access control in mobile Cloud 
environments. 
 Mobile Cloud environment is a combination of Cloud computing technology 
together with mobile Internet. It delivers tailored conventional Cloud services to 
smart mobile devices. This enables the smart devices to offload computational, 
communicational, and storage tasks to the Cloud servers. In mobile Cloud 
environment, Cloud service providers collect very sensitive real-time user 
information such as location, user behaviour and contact details. The existing 
management systems such as .NET Passport, OpenID, Liberty Alliance, Higgins, 
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and OAuth were solely developed to protect user‟s identities in conventional Cloud 
environments. The author compared these identity management systems and 
investigated the issues where such identity management systems are used in mobile 
Cloud environments. Moreover, conventional access control mechanisms such as 
DAC, ManAC, RBAC, and ABAC, privacy protection languages such as P3P, 
EPAL, and XACML and ABE encryption techniques cannot be directly extended to 
the mobile Cloud environment. 
For mobile Cloud environment, three techniques were proposed to protect users‟ 
privacy and security of online data: (1) deploying an access control technique to 
control the usage of user data in Chapter 5, (2) privacy-preserving technique to 
protect the user data in Chapters 5 and 6, and (3) storing the online data in the 
encrypted form in Chapter 6. Implementation of a user-centric attribute-based 
accesscontrol model is also given for mobile Cloud environments. The proposed 
techniques mutually authorize the user and the service provider (SP). 
XACML-based access control protocol was proposed to enable mobile usersto 
define access control policies for their online data. SPs need to satisfy the privacy 
access policy in order to obtain users‟ data. An attribute authority (AA) is proposed 
to maintain attributes of the users and SPs. This assures the status of a SP so that 
user‟s sensitive data will not be revealed to a malicious third party. The available 
real-time context-related attributes such as time, date, and location are used during 
the authorization process. When a requester requests user‟s privacy data, the system 
will pick required real-time attributes to verify the requesterduring the policy 
evaluation process. The model is built on top of the XACML standard, which is one 
of the popular privacy-preserving languages. he standard XACML architecture was 
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extended by using attributes from the mobile users, SPs, and surrounding 
environment so that the authorization can be done at runtime. Thus, the access 
control of user‟s data in mobile Cloud environment is more secure than the 
traditional access control schemes. 
Using XACML requires the system to follow the standards of XACML. All the 
message flows should be formatted into the XACML specification, which is a 
drawback in the collaboration environment such as the mobile Cloud environment. 
Different domains would define their own structures and protocols to set up an 
access control system. For a mobile user of domain A, it would be infeasible to 
request data from domain B if domain B could not understand the requested 
message from domain A. Furthermore, policy evaluation would be a long-time 
process if there are a large number of policies. In order to address these issues, the 
author investigated the ABE schemes. 
ABE scheme was modified to ensure the security of data together with privacy. 
There were three different ABE schemes proposed in this thesis for data and 
services access in the mobile Cloud environment. In the proposed schemes, the data 
are stored in the encrypted formatso that data confidentiality is guaranteed. ABE 
enables the data owner to define access policy during the encryption process. Due 
to the features of mobile users and mobile platforms in mobile Cloud environment, 
contextual attributes are available and can be used to strengthen the security and 
data privacy. The first technique is a single authority context-aware ABE scheme 
which incorporates contextual attributes. The data owner defines privacy access 
policy during the encryption process and uploads the encrypted data. An AA 
maintains a set of attributes, issues decryption keys and can monitor all the 
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communications. After receiving the decryption keys from the AA, the contextual 
attributes of the data requester are also collected by data requester‟s mobile device. 
These attributes are combined with the decryption keys to recover the original data.  
Single authority ABE scheme is impractical since the single authority has too 
much control, such as manages users‟ attributes, issues decryption keys, and 
monitor communication. All the data will be lost if it is compromised by an attacker. 
Also single authority system cannotbe scaled due to the bottleneck problem if there 
are a large number of users requesting keys. Meanwhile, in reality, different sets of 
attributes are stored in different AAs. In order to incorporate this reality, a 
context-aware multi-authority attribute-based encryption (MA-ABE) scheme was 
proposed. More than one AA maintains different sets of attributes and issues 
decryption keys. In order to protect user‟s identity from being tracked by each AA, 
an anonymous key issuing protocol was proposed. Using this protocol, the data 
requester‟s real identity cannot be revealed to each AA.Hence, an AA cannot track 
the requester‟s data transactions. Due to the nature of the anonymous key issuing 
protocol, as long as there are two honest authorities and other AAs are malicious; 
the rest of the malicious AAs cannot combine the requester‟s data that they hold to 
recover the original text. Thus, the collusion attacks are prevented.  The proposed 
scheme removed the central authority, which takes charge of issuing decryption 
keys and monitoring all the activities. As a result, the central authority will not be 
the bottleneck if the system is designed in a large scale. The loss of corruption of 
central authority can be avoided using the proposed scheme. 
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, the data requester must satisfy the access 
policy. The requestor‟s mobile device capturesrequired contextual attributes and 
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combines them with the decryption keys received from all the AAs. The data 
requester has to contact all the AAs to get the decryption keys. The communication 
overheads will be high if there are a large number of AAs. In mobile Cloud 
environment， considering network conditions, the reliability of data network to 
complete such communicationsis unpredictable.This can bea drawback. 
Furthermore, final decryption key is computed based on the keys received from all 
the AAs and attributes captured by the mobile devices, hence the computational 
work is a burden. Those two limitations affect the performances of the mobile 
Cloud services and lower the quality of services. 
A low-complexity ABE scheme was proposed to address the issues that exist in the 
context-aware MA-ABE scheme as a third technique. A Cloud-based Semi-Trusted 
Authority (STA) is introduced, thus, the high-cost communications and 
computationsare migrated from the mobile end to the Cloud end. This method 
improves the performance at the mobile end. In this proposed algorithm, a user is 
not required to make contact with the AAs; STA requests the keys on behalf of the 
user. The user has a pre-shared secret with each AA, which is unknown to the STA. 
When issuing decryption keys, each AA embeds the pre-shared secret into the 
decryption keys.Therefore, STA cannot compute the final decryption key to 
recover the message. The security analysis showed that the proposed 
low-complexity technique prevents collusion attacks. The proposed techniques not 
only secure the users‟ data, but also empower the mobile users to control the 
privacy of their data. 
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Finally, this thesis proposes the data access control techniques and ABE 
schemes to protect users‟ privacy and sensitive data from unauthorized access. 
In this part of the research work, an attributes-based access control model for 
mobile Cloud environment is proposed to restrict access of users‟ online data. The 
author deployed access control techniques to protect the user‟s data access. 
XACML is used as the privacy access policy language, which is a flexible and 
user-centric solution for mobile environment.. 
(1) The MA-ABE scheme for mobile Cloud environments is also 
developed and implemented to protect user privacy and data 
security from unauthorized access and fraud. As each of the AAs 
maintains different sets of attributes for issuing decryption keys for 
the use. The MA-ABE scheme removes the central authority and 
improves the system performance by removing single point of 
failure and providing end to end security 
(2) The incorporation of context-related attributes compared with the 
conventional ABE enables the data owner to define the privacy 
access policies for their personal data at runtime. The mobile 
devices of users will capture the dynamic contextual attributes to 
satisfy the privacy access policies.  It strengthens the privacy and 
data protection in a more flexible, user-centric, and fine-grained 
manner. 
(3) In addition to this, an anonymisation key issuing protocol is 
designed to protect the users‟ identity during data transactions. An 
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AA cannot track a transaction and identify the user who initiates the 
transaction. Furthermore, the AAs cannot combine the information 
they hold to reveal the original text as long as there are two honest 
authorities. The proposed scheme maintains the collusion resistance 
against up to (N – 2) AAs. 
 
7.2  Recommendations for Future Work 
The following summaries some of the future research work that could be carried out 
in this area based on our research findings. 
 The use of context-related attributes can be further investigated. 
With the development of the mobile operating systems, mobile 
applications for detecting and analysing user‟s behaviours can 
derive more valuable and accurate contextual attributes to define the 
risk level of a user. The incorporation of such applications with 
Cloud based services can be investigated to develop highly secure 
solutions in mobile Cloud environments. 
 Enable the data owner to define more complex access structures to 
restrict the access to his online resources. 
 Adding a key revocation mechanism. If a user no longer holds an 
attribute, the relevant private key should be updated by the authority 
in parallel. The user could not use the previous key to operate the 
resource any longer. 
Chapter 7. Conclusions and Future Work 
192 
 
 Developing completely decentralized ABE scheme where new AA 
can join and leave the mobile Cloud environment without 
bootstrapping the whole system. This enables seamless interaction 
between the user and SPs and will be ideal for multi-Cloud 
environments. However, developing such algorithms under standard 
security assumptions such as decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman is 
very challenging at the same time promising.  
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Appendix 
XACML Language 
XACML Policy 
The following polices defines that any user who holds an email address 
from the domain of “city.ac.uk” have the access to read resources at 
http://www.city.ac.uk. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Policy 
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:conformance-test:IIC082:policy" 
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining- 
algorithm:permit-overrides"> 
<Rule 
RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:conformance-test:IIC082:rule" 
          Effect="Permit"> 
<Description> 
            Anyone from city.ac.uk can perform any action on any 
resource. 
</Description> 
 <Target> 
<Subject> 
<SubjectMatchMatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:rf
c822Namematch"> 
<AttributeValueDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
#string"> 
city.ac.uk</AttributeValue> 
<SubjectAttributeDesignator 
SubjectCategory="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject- 
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category:access-subject" 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
subject:subject-id" 
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:datatype: 
rfc822Name"/> 
</SubjectMatch> 
</Subject> 
<Resources> 
<Resource> 
<ResourceMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
function:anyURI-equal"> 
<AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/ 
XMLSchema#anyURI"> 
http://www.city.ac.uk</AttributeValue> 
<ResourceAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
resource:resource-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/ 
XMLSchema#anyURI"/> 
</ResourceMatch> 
</Resource> 
</Resources> 
<Actions> 
<Action> 
<ActionMatch 
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
function:string-equal"> 
<AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#
string"> 
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Read</AttributeValue> 
<ActionAttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/ 
XMLSchema#string"/> 
</ActionMatch> 
</Action> 
</Actions> 
</Target> 
</Rule> 
</Policy> 
  
Bibliography 
212 
 
XACML Request 
A user who holds an email account “Alice@city.ac.uk” requests the 
resources of School of Engineering and Mathematical Science at 
http://www.city.ac.uk. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Request 
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0: 
context:schema:os 
access_control-xacml-2.0-context-schema-os.xsd"> 
<Subject> 
<Attribute              
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
subject:subject-id"               
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
data-type:rfc822Name"> 
<AttributeValue>Alice@city.ac.uk</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
<AttributeAttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0: 
conformance-test:age" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"> 
<AttributeValue>45</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
</Subject> 
<Resource> 
<AttributeAttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
resource:resource-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"> 
<AttributeValue>http://www.city.ac.uk</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
</Resource> 
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<Action> 
<AttributeAttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0: 
action:action-id"               
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
<AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
</Action> 
</Request> 
 
XACML Response 
Regarding to the policy example and response context example, the user has 
an email account “Alice@CITY.AC.UK” can obtain the data consent on the 
resources at “http://www.city.ac.uk/”. The policy evaluation decision should be 
Permit. The response context is listed as follows. 
<Response> 
<Result ResourceId="http://www.city.ac.uk/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status> 
<StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
 
